ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ
आन्वीक्षिकी

Chief Editor :
SHRIPRAKASH PANDEY

Editors :
Ananda Mishra
Sachchidanand Mishra

काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय **BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY**

An Institution of National Importance Established by an Act of Parliament

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Editorial Note

The publication of a bi-lingual Research Journal was mooted by the faculty of Center of Advance Study in Philosophy, BHU, decades earlier. It was christened *Ānvīkṣikī* and did its job in that spirit. Any Research Journal is the academic face of a particular department or branch of knowledge and it bears the stamp of originality. The publication of *Ānvīkṣikī* gave a golden opportunity to established as well as budding scholars to pour out their created and researched knowledge and its dissemination for inspiring more researchers to come forward with their own share of refreshing and hitherto unexplored mysteries and enigmas of Philosophy. I fervently hope that the articles published in this volume will sufficiently add meaning and importance to the treasure trove of philosophical learning.

I am happy to present this volume of *Ānvīkṣikī* before the world of scholars containing learned research articles on varied philosophical topics contributed by erudite university teachers who are experts in their own field of specialization. I am confident that the academic toil of the contributors will open up new vistas of further research and philosophical exploration.

Shriprakash Pandey

CONTENTS

महामना की सनातनी अद्वैत दृष्टि

देवव्रत चौबे

महामना पण्डित मदनमोहन मालवीय आधुनिक भारत के उन विभूतियों में से एक थे जिनका जीवन सर्वभूत के हित के लिए समर्पित था। वे सनातन धर्म के मूर्तरूप थे। उनका पूरा जीवन धर्म ही था। गीता एवं भागवत का वे जीवन भर पारायण करते रहे। गीता को वे दुनिया का सर्वश्रेष्ठ ग्रन्थ मानते थे।[1] क्योंकि यह मनुष्य को न्यायपूर्वक जीवन बिताने के लिए प्रेरित करती है। यह केवल अध्यात्म की ही शिक्षा नहीं देती, सांसारिक व्यवहार की भी शिक्षा देती है। महामना के शब्दों में– ''जैसे अंधेरे में लालटेन हमें प्रकाश देती है और हमें ठीक मार्ग बताती है, ठीक उसी प्रकार गीता भी हमें कर्त्तव्य और अकर्त्तव्य का ज्ञान कराती है। यह हमें आध्यात्मिक और सांसारिक दोनों का ऊँचे से ऊँचा उपदेश देती है।''[2] संभवतः इसीलिए स्वातंत्र्य आंदोलन के सभी महान नेता गीता से प्रभावित हुए थे। उनमें महामना मालवीय, तिलक और महात्मा गाँधी का नाम विशेष रूप से उल्लेखनीय है। मालवीय जी गीता पर प्रवचन देते समय कहते थे कि गीता सामान्य जन के दैनन्दिन जीवन का अनमोल ग्रन्थ है। संकटकाल का यह सबसे बड़ा साथी है। उन्हीं के शब्दों में– ''संसार में झगड़े होते हैं, उपद्रव होंगे और होते हैं। ऐसे संसार में, ऐसी स्थिति में जीवन लाभ देने वाला अमूल्य ग्रन्थ गीता ही है। इसमें धर्म और राजनीति का मेल है। पृथ्वी मण्डल पर ऐसी पुस्तक नहीं है, जब आपत्ति हो तब गीता से उत्तर पूछे और अनुकूल उपाय करे।''[3] मालवीय जी की तरह महात्मा गाँधी भी कहते हैं कि– ''जब–जब हम मुसीबत में पड़ते हैं तब–तब अपनी मुसीबत दूर करने के लिए गीता की शरण जाते हैं और उससे आश्वासन लेते हैं।''[4] चूँकि गीता समस्याओं के समाधान का शास्त्र है इसलिए मालवीय जी गीता का प्रचार दुनिया के सभी नगरों एवं गाँवों में करना चाहते हैं। उनकी सोच थी कि ऐसा करने से अन्याय का दमन होगा और लोक का मंगल होगा।

महामना मालवीय जी का कहना है कि सनातन धर्म के सभी धर्म ग्रंथ परमात्मा को एक एवं अद्वितीय मानते हैं।[5] उस एक ही परमात्मा को विद्वान् अनेक नामों से पुकारते हैं।[6] वे कहते हैं कि उसी एक तत्व को हम ईश्वर, परमेश्वर, परब्रह्म, नारायण, भगवान्, वासुदेव, शिव, राम, कृष्ण, विष्णु, जिहोवा, गॉड, खुदा, अल्लाह आदि सहस्रों नामों से पुकारते हैं।[7]

उनका ईश्वर सृष्टि के कण–कण में व्याप्त है। कोई भी ऐसा जीवधारी नहीं है जिसमें वह समान रूप से वास न करता हो। वे कहते हैं कि भगवान् स्वयं गीता में कहते हैं कि हे अर्जुन! ईश्वर सभी जीवों के हृदय में विराजमान रहते हैं।[8] वे वेदव्यास के इस मत को स्वीकार करते थे कि ब्रह्म की ज्योति अपने भीतर ही है, अन्यत्र नहीं है, और वह सब जीवधारियों में एक समान है। उनका कहना था कि चूँकि उसका वास समस्त प्राणियों में है इसलिए हमें प्राणिमात्र से प्रीति करनी चाहिए और सभी जीवधारियों को प्रेम की दृष्टि से देखना चाहिए।[9] उन्हीं के शब्दों में– ''यदि आप यह याद रखेंगे कि परमात्मा विद्यमान है और वही सभी जीवधारियों में विद्यमान है तो उस ईश्वर तथा अपने अन्य जीवधारी भाइयों से आपका सच्चा सम्बन्ध सदा बना रहेगा।''[10] वे विवेकानन्द की तरह मनुष्यों की सेवा को ईश्वर की सर्वोत्तम सेवा मानते थे। उनका कहना था कि जो ईश्वर की दी हुई शक्तियों को प्राणिमात्र की सेवा में नहीं लगाता, वह चोर है।

महामना मानते थे कि सनातन धर्म प्राणिमात्र में समता का भाव सिखाता है इसलिए उसकी दृष्टि में मनुष्यों में छोटा और बड़ा का भेद नहीं है। वे कहते हैं कि इस भाव को भगवान् कृष्ण ने गीता में स्पष्ट रूप से व्यक्त कर दिया है– ''मैं सभी प्राणियों में एक समान हूँ।''[11] और भी– ''पंडित लोग विद्या और विनय से युक्त ब्राह्मण में, गौ–बैल में, कुत्ते में और चाण्डाल में समदर्शी होते हैं।''[12] उनकी धारणा है कि ऐसे लोग सबके सुख–दुःख को एक जैसा समझते हैं। क्योंकि वे समत्व को प्राप्त कर चुके होते हैं। समत्व प्राप्त करने का अर्थ अपने वास्तविक स्वरूप का बोध कर लेना होता है। जब मनुष्य शरीर, इन्द्रिय आदि की विषमता से अपने में विषमता और भेद मानने लगता है तभी अशान्ति, वैमनस्य एवं विग्रह आदि फैलता है। परन्तु जब वह समझ लेता है कि मैं उनसे पृथक् हूँ, तब

वास्तविक आत्मस्वरूप जानकर वह सर्वत्र समबुद्धि और प्रेमभावना रखता है। मालवीय जी के शब्दों में– ''यह मनुष्य की व्यक्तिगत आत्मा नहीं है, यह उसकी उच्च महान् आत्मा है, यह विश्वात्मा है।''[13] सच्चिदानन्द स्वरूप परमात्मा का बोध सभी अनर्थों को मिटा देता है। इसलिए कि ''वही हममें और तुममें है– अब हौं कासौं वैर करौं।''[14] यदि वही परमात्मा सब में है तो अशान्ति और संकट का प्रश्न ही नहीं खड़ा होता।

महामना मालवीय जी की दृष्टि में सनातन धर्म का लक्ष्य समाज में समता लाना है। वे समता को कोरा आदर्श ही नहीं मानते अपितु धरती पर उतारकर उसे लोकोपयोगी बनाते हैं। संभवतः इसीलिए प्रसिद्ध दार्शनिक प्रोफेसर एस0के0 मैत्रा[15] उन्हें व्यावहारिक वेदान्ती कहते हैं।[16] प्रो0 मैत्रा के शब्दों में– ''उन्होंने (मालवीय जी ने) अपने चरित्र में न केवल व्यावहारिक वेदान्ती के आदर्श को, जिसे गीता में ज्ञान–विज्ञान–तृप्तात्मा कहा गया है, को समाहित किया था बल्कि उन्होंने ज्ञान और विज्ञान के माध्यम से आत्मतुष्टि प्राप्त की थी। इतना ही नहीं, भागवत (11.19.13) में जिस ज्ञान, विज्ञान, वैराग्य, श्रद्धा और भक्ति को जीवन का लक्ष्य बताया गया है उसे उन्होंने अपने जीवन में उतारा था।''[17] मालवीय जी चाहते थे कि प्रत्येक मानव उपर्युक्त आदर्शों से युक्त होकर आध्यात्मिक जीवन जीते हुए देश एवं समाज को समग्र दृष्टि से शक्तिशाली बनाने में योगदान दे। इसीलिए वे विद्यार्थियों से कहते थे– ''खूब गड़कर, जमकर मेहनत करो और अपने उच्च और पवित्र आदर्श को कभी मत भूलो। शास्त्र और शस्त्र, बुद्धिबल और बाहुबल दोनों का उपार्जन करो।''[18] उनका कहना था कि इसके लिए तप की आवश्यकता है। तप से केवल शारीरिक बल में ही वृद्धि नहीं होती अपितु मानसिक और आध्यात्मिक बल में भी वृद्धि होती है। वे कहते हैं– ''तप से अभ्युदय और निःश्रेयस्, स्वर्ग और मोक्ष, धन और संपत्ति, नाम और यश, बल और पराक्रम, सुख और शान्ति, राज्य और अधिकार सबकी ही प्राप्ति होती है और होगी।''[19]

मालवीय जी गीता के निष्काम कर्म के आदर्श पर विशेष बल देते थे। उनका कहना था कि जो लोग निष्काम भाव से काम नहीं करते उन्हें अपने कार्यों में सफलता नहीं मिलती। वे यह भी कहते थे कि ऐसे लोग आपस में मिलकर किसी कार्य का संपादन भी नहीं कर सकते। ''कारण

यह कि एक समझता है कि 'इससे अमुक का हित हो रहा है, मैं इसमें क्यों अपना समय और शक्ति नष्ट करूँ?' ऐसा ही दूसरा समझता है और ऐसा ही तीसरा। परिणाम यह होता है कि उन लोगों में परस्पर ईर्ष्या और द्वेष उत्पन्न हो जाते हैं और कार्य सफल नहीं होने पाता।"[20] इसलिए वे कहते हैं कि जहाँ निष्काम भाव से काम होता है, वहाँ लोग एक दूसरे की सफलता देखकर प्रसन्न होते हैं और उनमें एक दूसरे के प्रति प्रेम और सहानुभूति का भाव उत्पन्न होता है तथा कार्य में शीघ्र सफलता मिलती है।[21] यह भाव सामाजिक हित का भाव प्रस्तुत करता है। मालवीय जी के शब्दों में "निःस्वार्थ भाव से जनकल्याण के निमित्त किया कार्य ही निष्काम कर्म कहलाता है।"[22] वे कहते हैं कि सकाम भाव से जो कर्म करते हैं वे विपत्ति आने पर काम से विमुख हो जाते हैं। लेकिन निष्काम भाव से काम करने वाले लोग लाख विपत्ति आने पर अपने–अपने कार्यों से विमुख नहीं होते क्योंकि वे उसे ईश्वर का काम मानते हैं। उन्हें यह विश्वास है कि चूँकि यह ईश्वर का कार्य है इसलिए विघ्न बाधाएँ उनका कुछ भी नहीं बिगाड़ सकतीं। वे विवेकानन्द की तरह निष्काम सेवा को ईश्वर की आराधना मानते थे। उनकी दृष्टि में निष्काम कर्म जीवनोत्कर्ष और लोककल्याण का प्रमुख साधन है।[23]

महामना मालवीय जी को महाभारत का यह कथन बहुत ही व्यावहारिक लगता था कि जो कार्य अपने लिए अहितकर हो, उसे दूसरे के लिए न करें।[24] उनका मानना था कि इसके प्रतिपादन से देश की उन तमाम समस्याओं का समाधान हो सकता है जो देश को कमजोर करने में लगी हैं। वे कहते थे कि हमारा लक्ष्य ऐसा होना चाहिए जिससे अपनी भी उन्नति हो और दूसरों का भी कल्याण हो। किसी का अमंगल न हो। इसीलिए उन्हें निम्न प्रार्थना बहुत ही प्रिय लगती थी–

<div align="center">सर्वे च सुखिनः सन्तु सर्वे सन्तु निरामयाः।
सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चिद् दुःखभाग् भवेत्।।</div>

मालवीय जी ईश्वर को मनुष्य के स्तर पर नहीं उतारना चाहते हैं, बल्कि मनुष्य में ही ईश्वरत्व पैदा करना चाहते हैं। वे कहते हैं कि– "मनुष्यत्व का विकास ही ईश्वरत्व और ईश्वर है। मनुष्य का मानसिक, नैतिक और आध्यात्मिक जीवन केवल ईश्वरत्व से ही विकास प्राप्त करता

है और उसी में लीन होता है।''[25] वे हमारा ध्यान एक ऐसे तथ्य की ओर खींचते हैं जो बहुत ही महत्वपूर्ण है। वे कहते हैं कि यदि कोई मनुष्य को विचार करने से रोकता है, उसे स्वतंत्र विचार प्रकट करने में बाधा डालता है, सामाजिक, आर्थिक और राजनैतिक मामलों में उसके योगदान की अवहेलना करता है तो इसका तात्पर्य यह है कि वह उसकी हत्या करता है। वह उसमें ईश्वरत्व का प्रादुर्भाव नहीं होने देना चाहता है। उनका मानना है कि यदि कोई व्यक्ति सामाजिक और राजनैतिक उन्नति में योग दे रहा है, दूसरे के लाभ के लिए अपने लाभ का परित्याग कर रहा है तथा परोपकार एवं देश के हित के कार्यों में संलग्न है तो इसका तात्पर्य है कि वह मनुष्य ईश्वर से उसके ईश्वरत्व में हिस्सा बँटा रहा है।[26] लेकिन मालवीय जी कहते हैं कि पराधीन देश में ऐसा होना संभव नहीं है। क्योंकि पराधीन देश में ऐसे कार्यों को राजद्रोह की श्रेणी में रखा जाता है। ऐसी परिस्थिति में मनुष्य में सर्वहितैषिता और सम्पूर्ण सत्यता का पनपना संभव नहीं हो पाता है। उसका ह्रास हो जाता है। वह अपने साथ–साथ ईश्वर को भी खो देता है। इसलिए मालवीय जी पराधीनता से मुक्ति दिलाकर देश को स्वतंत्र करना चाहते हैं।

महामना स्वतंत्रता के लिए आत्मा में विवेक का होना आवश्यक मानते हैं। जैसे ही उसमें विवेक उत्पन्न होता है वैसे ही स्थिति की भिन्नता का ज्ञान उसमें उत्पन्न हो जाता है। उन्हीं के शब्दों में– ''उसमें आत्मिक बल उत्पन्न होता है और उसमें एक शक्ति का प्रादुर्भाव होता है जिसे अध्यक्षता कहते हैं। वेदान्त के मतानुसार स्वतन्त्रता का तात्पर्य इसी को प्राप्त करना या स्थिति और परिसर को विवेक द्वारा जानकर और भिन्न समझकर उसका शासन करना है। इसमें यह ध्वनि है कि उसमें आधिपत्य की शक्ति–अध्यक्षता– जागृत हो जाती है, जिससे वह कहता है– 'यह ऐसा ही होगा, यह नहीं होगा', 'इस पर अधिकार हमारा होगा' इत्यादि। जो सिद्धान्त व्यक्तिगत जीवन के लिए उपयुक्त है, वह राष्ट्रीय जीवन के लिए भी उपयुक्त है।[27] स्वतंत्रता के लिए राष्ट्रीय आत्मा या जीवन में विवेक होना आवश्यक है। उनका कहना है कि जब राष्ट्र में विवेक एवं अध्यक्षता करने की शक्ति उत्पन्न हो जाती है, तभी वह स्वतंत्र होता है। सारे मनुष्यों और जातियों का कर्तव्य इसी स्वतन्त्रता को प्राप्त करना है। उनकी धारणा

है कि सनातन धर्म में वर्णित आत्म–सिद्धान्त को जन–जन तक नहीं पहुँच पाना ही परतंत्रता का कारण है।

महामना के अनुसार आत्मा स्वयमेव न कमजोर है, न मजबूत, न वह हिन्दू है, न मुसलमान। क्योंकि इन सबसे भेद प्रगट होता है। आत्मा नाशवान् भी नहीं है क्योंकि जो नाशवान् होता है वह सांसारिक होता है। ''आत्मा आन्तरिक है, वह बदलती नहीं, उसका नाश नहीं होता; वह हत्या नहीं करती, न कोई उसकी हत्या कर सकता है।''[28] अपने इस मत के समर्थन में वे गीता के श्लोकों को उद्धृत करते हैं।[29] उनका कहना है कि इस संसार में आत्मा ही ऐसी है जो न बदलती है, न सुखी होती है, न दुःखी होती है। वह सब प्रकार के बंधनों से रहित है। वह हर प्रकार से स्वतन्त्र है। उसका जब शरीर से सम्पर्क होता है तब उसमें गुण–अवगुण दीखने लगते हैं यद्यपि उसमें गुण–अवगुण कुछ भी नहीं है। वह आईने की तरह स्वच्छ है। मालवीय जी के शब्दों में –''किसी के यह प्रश्न करने पर कि जब आत्मा अनादि है, अनन्त है, सच्चिदानन्द है, स्वतन्त्र है– तब फिर क्या कारण है कि मनुष्य को पूरा ज्ञान नहीं रहता, वह दुःख भोगता है, बन्धनों से वह जकड़ा जा रहा है, परतन्त्र रहता है? वह उत्तर देता है कि ''सत्यमेव तुम स्वतंत्र हो, तुम्हारी आत्मा अनादि, अनन्त और सच्चिदानन्द स्वरूप है, परन्तु तुम्हें पूरा ज्ञान नहीं है, इससे तुम दुःखी हो। तुम बन्धनों से जकड़े हो, इसका एकमात्र कारण यही है कि तुम अपने को भूल गए हो और तुम अपने को पहचानने का प्रयत्न नहीं करते। तुम आत्मा और शरीर को एक समझते हो, तुम्हें सत् और असत् का ज्ञान नहीं है।........यदि तुम अपने को अपने शरीर, स्थिति से अलग कर सको, तभी और उसी समय तुम्हें अपना पूरा ज्ञान होगा और उसी समय तुम अपने को स्वतन्त्र, स्वच्छन्द, अनादि और अनन्त समझ सकोगे। उस समय तुम्हें पूर्ण ज्ञान हो जाएगा। तुम्हारा सब पर अधिकार हो जाएगा और तुम यह समझ सकोगे कि सब कुछ तुम्हारे भीतर है, तुम पर निर्भर है, और तुम्हीं, जो चाहो, कर सकते हो।''''[30] हमारी अन्तर्यामी आत्मा स्वरूपतः स्वाधीन है और वही हममें मुक्ति की इच्छा जागृत करती है। महामना का कहना है कि यदि हम ही बन्धन में रहेंगे तो हमारा देश स्वतंत्र कैसे होगा? पराधीनता से बढ़कर हानिकारक वस्तु संसार में दूसरी नहीं है।[31] इसलिए हमें बंधन से मुक्त

होने के लिए प्रयत्नशील होना पड़ेगा। स्वामी विवेकानन्द भी कहते थे कि ''अपनी आत्मा का अपने उद्योग से उद्धार करो।''

महामना मालवीय जी कहते थे कि जो व्यक्तिगत आत्मा के लिए ठीक है, वही जनसमुदाय की और राष्ट्रीय आत्मा के लिए भी ठीक है। वे कहते थे कि हमें हमेशा यह ध्यान रखना चाहिए कि जीव शरीर से श्रेष्ठ अवश्य है किन्तु हमें एक को हीन समझ कर दूसरे को ही केवल महत्व नहीं देना चाहिए। उनके अनुसार ''यदि शरीर पर हमारा अधिकार नहीं है, तो धीरे–धीरे आत्मा पर से भी हमारा अधिकार जाता रहेगा; क्योंकि आध्यात्मिक उन्नति के लिए शरीर का सब प्रकार से पुष्ट रहना पहली और सबसे जरूरी आवश्यकता है।''[32] वे शरीर को परमात्मा का मन्दिर भी मानते हैं। इसलिए भी उसे पवित्र एवं पुष्ट रखना आवश्यक समझते हैं। सत्य और ब्रह्मचर्य दोनों को इसका रक्षक मानते हैं। उनका मानना है कि असत्य व्यवहार ईश्वर को अच्छा नहीं लगता क्योंकि उन्हें सत्य से बहुत ही लगाव है। इसलिए स्वप्न में भी असत्य से बचना चाहिए। वे सत्य को सबसे बड़ा धर्म भी मानते हैं। यही धर्म शरीर रूपी मन्दिर को अपवित्र होने से बचाता है। उनकी दृष्टि में शरीर की रक्षा ब्रह्मचर्य से भी होती है। क्योंकि उसमें अपार शक्ति है। ''ब्रह्मचर्य ही हमें वह आत्मबल देता है जिसके द्वारा हम इस संसार में सब कष्टों और बाधाओं का साहस के साथ सामना कर सकते हैं।''

मालवीय जी का कहना है कि जो ईश्वर हमारा जन्मदाता, पालनकर्ता एवं रक्षक है उसके प्रति हमें कृतज्ञ होना चाहिए। नियमित रूप से उसकी आराधना तथा हमेशा उसका स्मरण वे प्रत्येक मानव का पुनीत कर्त्तव्य समझते थे। वे भक्तिमार्ग को सबसे सरल और उत्तम मानते थे। उनका कहना था कि हमारे दीन और अन्त्यज भाइयों के उद्धार का यही सर्वोत्तम मार्ग है। वे कहते हैं कि भगवान् कृष्ण ने गीता में स्वयं कहा है कि दुराचारी भी मुझे अनन्य भाव से भजता है तो वह मेरे लिए साधु ही है। क्योंकि अनन्य भक्ति दुराचार को शांत कर देती है। कृष्ण अर्जुन से पुनः कहते हैं कि तुम सबको यह बतलाओ कि मेरे भक्त का भला ही होता है, बुरा नहीं होता।[33] श्रद्धावान् मत्परायण भक्त मुझको अत्यन्त प्रिय हैं।[34]

महामना कहते हैं कि जैसे माता अपनी संतान की देखरेख करती है वैसे ही परमात्मा अपने भक्त की रक्षा करते हैं।

महामना मालवीय जी के अनुसार भक्ति–साधन के अनेक मार्ग हैं किन्तु वे उन मार्गों में से दो को सामान्य जन के लिए विशेष उपयोगी मानते हैं– प्रथम कीर्त्तन अथवा नामस्मरण एवं द्वितीय भगवान् की मूर्ति का दर्शन। उनका कहना है कि नाम का स्मरण सामान्य से सामान्य प्राणी के लिए सहज है किन्तु उसका फल बहुत बड़ा होता है। नाम के स्मरण से मनुष्य की बुद्धि ईश्वर की ओर उन्मुख होती है। उनके गुणों के स्मरण से मनुष्य के दोष और पाप छूट जाते हैं। मन पवित्र तथा प्रकाशमान हो जाता है।[35] वे कहते हैं कि भीष्म ने भगवान् के नाम–स्मरण को ही सबसे बड़ा धर्म और तप बतलाया है। इसके उच्चारण मात्र से मनुष्य संपूर्ण दुःखों से मुक्त हो जाता है। भक्तिपूर्वक मन्दिर में देवदर्शन करने से भी लोकसुख के साथ–साथ पारलौकिक सुख की भी प्राप्ति होती है। उनका कहना है कि मन्दिर में देवदर्शन के अधिकारी सभी वर्ण के लोग हैं। वे कहते हैं कि पद्मपुराण में आया है कि मन्दिर में जो मूर्ति है, उसका दर्शन करने वाले को सब पृथ्वी का फल मिल जाता है।[36] वे अन्य और शास्त्रों से भी अपने मत के समर्थन में उदाहरण प्रस्तुत करते हैं।

महामना कहते हैं कि भगवद्स्वरूप में 'सोऽहमस्मि' का भाव देखना चाहिए। जब यह भाव आ जाता है तब उनका दर्शन हो जाता है। मन उज्ज्वल हो जाता है। आत्म–अन्धकार और अपवित्रता दूर हो जाती है। उसका वास्तविक ज्ञान हो जाने से यह मालूम हो जाता है कि वही तो हम हैं। हम भी उसी परमात्मा की ज्योति हैं। ऐसा होने पर हम भी आनन्द स्वरूप हो जाते हैं।[37]

शिवपूजन सहाय जी ने अपने एक लेख[37] में यह बतलाया है कि गीताप्रवचन में महामना विशेषतः ईश्वरभक्ति, ईश्वरप्रार्थना और ईश्वरोपासना पर ही जोर देते थे। उनका कहना था कि भगवत्प्रीत्यर्थ कर्म करते हुए भी भजन सुमिरन होना चाहिए। वे भक्ति और भजन के बहाने मौलिक कर्मों से विमुख होना उचित नहीं मानते थे। वे कहते थे कि सच्ची निष्ठा के साथ किया गया कोई भी कर्म आज तक भगवान् से अपुरस्कृत नहीं रहा। वे कहते थे कि सनातन धर्म का यही संदेश है कि मानव जीवन की सार्थकता

इसी में है कि जो कुछ भी करो, भगवान् को समर्पित करते चलो। महामना की आखिरी आकांक्षा यही थी कि—

न त्वहं कामये राज्यं न स्वर्गं नाऽपुनर्भवम्।
कामये दुःखतप्तानां प्राणिनामार्ति नाशनम्।।

उनकी यह उक्ति युगों तक हमें प्रेरणा प्रदान करती रहेगी।

दर्शन एवं धर्म विभाग
काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी

संदर्भ सूची

1. सनातनधर्म, साप्ताहिक मुखपत्र, वर्ष—3, अंक—21, पृ0 15, 15 दिसम्बर, 1935

2. सीताराम चतुर्वेदी : महामना पण्डित मदनमोहन मालवीय, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ0 6, काशी, संवत् 1993

3. महामना श्री पण्डित मदनमोहन जी मालवीय के लेख और भाषण : (भाग—1 धार्मिक), (संकलनकर्ता) वासुदेवशरण, पृ0 168, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय, 1962

4. महात्मा गाँधी : गीता माता, प्रास्ताविक, यरवदा जेल, 11.11.1930, सस्ता साहित्य मण्डल, नई दिल्ली, 2010

5. सनातन धर्म साप्ताहिक, वर्ष—2, अंक—1, 17 जुलाई, 1934 ई0

6. ऋग्वेद 1 : 164 : 46

7. कल्याण : (ईश्वरांक) लेख— जगत् में सबसे उत्तम और अवश्य जानने योग्य कौन है? ईश्वर—लेखक महामना पं0 मदनमोहन जी मालवीय, पृ0 35, वर्ष—7, अंक—1—2, गोरखपुर, सम्वत् 2056

8. गीता : 18 : 61

9. कल्याण : (ईश्वरांक), पृ0 38

10. सीताराम चतुर्वेदी : महामना पंडित मदनमोहन मालवीय, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ0 66

11. गीता : 9 : 29

12. वही, 5 : 18

13. मालवीय जी के लेख : (संपादक, पं0 पद्मकान्त मालवीय), पृ0 205, नेशनल पब्लिशिंग हाउस, दिल्ली, 1962

14. महामना पण्डित मदनमोहन मालवीय, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ0 12

15. पूर्व अध्यक्ष, दर्शन विभाग, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय

16. होमेज टू मालवीय जी : (संपादक) वी0ए0 सुन्दरम्, लेख : प्रो0 एस0 के0 मैत्रा : मालवीय जी– ट्रू डिसेन्डट ऑफ आर्य ऋषि, पृ0 29, बनारस, 1949

17. वही, पृ0 29

18. महामना पंडित मदनमोहन मालवीय, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ0 15

19. मालवीय जी के लेख, पृ0 187

20. अभ्युदय, 26 मार्च, 1909

21. वही

22. महामना मालवीय जी के सदुपदेश : (संकलनकर्ता) प्रो0 मुकुट बिहारी लाल, पृ0 4, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय

23. वही, पृ0 4–5

24. आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत्।

25. अभ्युदय, 19 मई, 1912

26. वही

27. वही, 23 मई, 1912

28. वही, 2 जून 1912

29. गीता : 2 : 19, 20, 23

30. अभ्युदय, 2 जून 1912

31. वही, 19 मई, 1912

32. वही, 2 जून, 1912

33. सनातन धर्म, वर्ष–1, अंक–1, भक्ति की महिमा, गीता 9 : 30–31

34. वही, गीता : 12 : 20

35. वही, भक्ति की महिमा

36. रावलपिण्डी की सनातनधर्म कान्फ्रेंस का भाषण, सनातन धर्म, वर्ष–1, अंक–43

37. सनातन धर्म, वर्ष–3, अंक–21

38. नागरी प्रचारिणी पत्रिका : (संपादक मण्डल) डॉ0 सम्पूर्णानन्द आदि, पृ0 548–549, वर्ष 66, संवत् 2018, काशी नागरी प्रचारिणी सभा

10   देवव्रत चौबे

स्मृति का अप्रामाण्य

सच्चिदानन्द मिश्र

न्याय–वैशेषिक परम्परा में ज्ञान का वर्गीकरण प्राथमिक रूप से अनुभव तथा स्मृति के रूप में किया जाता है। कुछ एक दर्शनसम्प्रदायों को छोड़कर प्रायशः भारतीय दर्शनों में ज्ञान के इसी प्रकार के वर्गीकरण को स्वीकार लिया जाता है। सामान्यतया अनुभव के द्वारा भी ऐसी ही स्थिति सामने आती है, जिससे इस प्रकार के वर्गीकरण को वस्तुगत रूप से एक उचित आधार प्राप्त होता है। ज्ञान का एक प्रकार वह है जिसमें सामान्यतया नवीनता का पुट होता है, तथा द्वितीय प्रकार का ज्ञान वह है जिसमें नवीनता का पुट बिलकुल ही नहीं होता, जो केवल संस्कार से उत्पन्न होता है। प्रथम प्रकार के ज्ञान को अनुभव शब्द के द्वारा तथा द्वितीय को स्मृति शब्द के द्वारा जाना जाता है। तदुपरान्त अनुभव का द्विविध विभाग करते हैं यथार्थ तथा अयथार्थ। यथार्थ अनुभव के लिए ही प्रमा शब्द का प्रयोग किया जाता है। इसके समानान्तर अयथार्थ अनुभव के लिए अप्रमा शब्द का प्रयोग प्रचलित है। यथार्थ अनुभव के चार प्रकार बताये जाते हैं प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमिति, उपमिति तथा शाब्दबोध। परन्तु इसी प्रक्रिया से अयथार्थ अनुभव के चार प्रकार नहीं बताये जाते क्योंकि अयथार्थ अनुभव का वर्गीकरण एक भिन्न रीति से करना अधिक वैज्ञानिक है। इस कारण अयथार्थ अनुभव के तीन प्रकार बताये गये संशय, विपर्यय तथा तर्क। यह प्रमा व अप्रमा का विभाग बहुत ही सुस्पष्ट है।

यद्यपि यह स्वयं एक विवादास्पद प्रश्न हो सकता है कि अनुभव के प्रभेदों में अनुमिति, उपमिति तथा शाब्दबोध को रखना कहाँ तक सङ्गत है। अनुभव शब्द के द्वारा तो केवल प्रत्यक्षात्मक ज्ञान को लेना या समझना अधिक युक्तिसङ्गत होता। परन्तु हम इस विवाद में इस समय नहीं पड़ेंगे। इतना ही कहना पर्याप्त होगा कि न्यायपरम्परा में भी इस प्रश्न को रघुनाथ शिरोमणि ने उठाया है तथा बहुत ही उचित तरीके से यह व्यवस्थापित किया है कि इस शब्द का प्रयोग पारम्परिक रूप से प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमिति, उपमिति तथा शाब्दबोध के लिए किया अवश्य जाता है, परन्तु वस्तुतः इसका प्रयोग केवल साक्षात्कारमात्र के लिए होना चाहिए था। पारम्परिक रूप से प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमिति, उपमिति तथा शाब्दबोध के लिए इस शब्द का प्रयोग होने का अप्रस्तुत रूप से कारण यह है कि वस्तुतः जितने भी ज्ञान होते हैं, उन समस्त ज्ञानों में किसी न किसी अंश में

साक्षात्कारत्व होता ही है। इसी कारण अनेक बार कहा जाता है समस्त ज्ञान मानसप्रत्यक्षात्मक हैं। हालाँकि यह वक्तव्य स्वयं ही अनेक विरोधाभासों को जन्म देता है। सबसे बड़ा विरोधाभास यह है कि यदि समस्त ज्ञान मानसप्रत्यक्षात्मक हैं तो अनुमिति रूप ज्ञान भी तो प्रत्यक्षात्मक ही हुआ। इस कारण एक ही ज्ञान में प्रत्यक्षत्व तथा अनुमितित्व का साङ्कर्य होगा। इस विरोधाभास का परिहार नैयायिक यह कहकर करते हैं कि यद्यपि समस्त ज्ञानों के प्रति मन कारण होता है, तथा इस कारण समस्त ज्ञान मानस होते हैं। तथापि 'जिस असाधारण सहकारी को प्राप्त कर मन बाह्यपदार्थविषयक प्रमा को उत्पन्न करता है, उसको प्रमाणान्तर माना जाता है'[1]। हालाँकि प्रश्न यह भी है कि फिर प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाओं के विभाग का आधार क्या होगा? अनुमिति आदि ज्ञान भी तो इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष से जन्य हो रहे हैं, तो इसका आधार नैयायिक यह बताते हैं कि वस्तुतः कोई एक कारण किसी ज्ञान के लिए नहीं होता। सामग्री के वैजात्य से कार्य का वैजात्य सम्भव होगा। प्रत्यक्षात्मक ज्ञान के लिए जिस प्रकार की कारणसामग्री की अपेक्षा होती है, अनुमिति आदि ज्ञानों के लिए उससे अतिरिक्त किस्म की कारणसामग्री की अपेक्षा होती है। इस कारण ज्ञानों का भेद भी समुचित रूप से व्यवस्थापित किया जा सकता है। विभिन्न कारणसामग्रियों के आधार पर विभिन्न प्रजाति की प्रमाओं की व्यवस्था सम्भव है।

इस सारे विवेचन से यह भी स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि स्मृति न तो प्रमा में तथा न तो अप्रमा में अन्तर्भूत हो रही है क्योंकि प्रमा तथा अप्रमा ये दोनों ही वर्गीकरण ज्ञान के नहीं हैं, अनुभव के हैं तथा स्मृति अनुभव ही नहीं है। इस कारण न तो उसके प्रमात्व का प्रश्न है और न तो उसके अप्रमात्व का। इस कारण न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा में स्मृति को न तो प्रमा माना जाता है और न तो अप्रमा।

प्रमाणों को भी न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा में चार प्रकार का माना गया है प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, उपमान तथा शब्द क्योंकि प्रमा का करण ही प्रमाण कहलाता है। स्मृति को, जिस प्रकार प्रमा तथा अप्रमा इन दोनों विभागों से बहिर्भूत माना गया, ठीक उसी प्रकार से स्मृति को प्रमाण भी नहीं माना जाता। प्रामाण्य शब्द का प्रयोग दो अर्थों में होता है प्रमात्व तथा प्रमाकरणत्व। हम पाते हैं कि न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा में दोनों ही प्रकार का प्रामाण्य स्मृति का नहीं है।

पाश्चात्य ज्ञानमीमांसा में 'नॉलेज' और 'बिलीफ़' का विभाग बहुत प्रसिद्ध है। भारतीय परम्परा में तथा विशेष कर न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा में ज्ञानों का विभाग अनुभव तथा स्मृति के रूप में किया गया है, जिसको अभी हमने स्पष्ट किया। परन्तु पश्चिमी

दर्शनपरम्परा 'नॉलेज' और 'बिलीफ़' के रूप में ज्ञानों का विभाग प्राप्त होता है। इस वर्गीकरण में पूरा का पूरा तो नहीं, परन्तु प्रमा का काफी सीमा तक पर्यायवाची शब्द 'नॉलेज' है। स्मृति को पश्चिमी दर्शन में 'नॉलेज' का एक प्रकार माना गया है, 'बिलीफ़' का सामान्य रूप से जो अर्थ होता है उसके अनुसार स्मृति 'बिलीफ़' में अन्तर्भूत नहीं होती। वस्तुतः साक्ष्यों के समस्त सङ्कलन, समस्त अवधारणाएँ, समस्त प्रमाण स्मृति पर आधारित होते हैं। यहाँ तक कि न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा में भी समस्त प्रमाणों के आधार के रूप में स्वीकृत सर्वप्रमाणज्येष्ठ प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण का अनुभवगम्य प्रभेद सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष भी स्मृति पर आधारित होता है। इस कारण स्वाभाविक रूप से प्रश्न उपस्थित होता है कि यदि पश्चिमी परम्परा स्मृति को 'नॉलेज' के अन्तर्गत परिगणित करती है, तो किस कारण न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा का स्मृति को प्रमा से बहिर्भूत रखने का आग्रह है? पश्चिमी दर्शन के परिप्रेक्ष्य में इसके अतिरिक्त एक अन्य बिन्दु को भी ध्यान में रखना आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है, पाश्चात्य ज्ञानमीमांसा में स्मृति प्रमाण के रूप में स्वीकार की गयी है। इसके विपरीत न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा स्मृति को जिस प्रकार प्रमा नहीं मानती, उसी प्रकार प्रमाण भी नहीं मानती। नव्यन्याय शब्द से जिस तार्किक परम्परा को जाना जाता है, वह काफी हद तक वैशेषिकपरम्परा से प्रभावित है। तत्त्वमीमांसीय परिप्रेक्ष्य में तो नव्यन्याय ने वैशेषिक पदार्थव्यवस्था को ही समुचित रूप से स्वीकार किया है। वैशेषिक दर्शन के प्रामाणिक ग्रन्थ तथा अनेक स्थलों पर आकर शब्द के द्वारा अभिहित पदार्थधर्मसङ्ग्रह में विद्या के प्रभेदों में स्मृति का भी उल्लेख प्राप्त होता है[2]। विद्या शब्द पश्चिमी दर्शन के 'नॉलेज' शब्द का अधिक नज़दीकी पर्याय प्रतीत होता है। इस प्रसङ्ग में यह भी देखनेवाली बात है कि क्या विद्या का तात्पर्य प्रमा से है? क्योंकि परवर्ती न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा में स्मृति को प्रमा मानने की बात कहीं पर प्राप्त नहीं होती। यह अवश्य है कि गङ्गेशोपाध्याय के पूर्वकालीन तथा न्यायलीलावती के लेखक वल्लभाचार्य स्मृति को प्रमाणों के अन्तर्गत परिगणित करते प्रतीत होते हैं[3]। मैं अपने इस आलेख में यह देखने का प्रयास करूँगा कि न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा की इस विषय में जो अवधारणा है वह कितनी युक्तिसङ्गत है, तथा उसको तार्किक रूप से कितना बल मिलता है।

स्मृति क्या है? स्मृति का विषय क्या है? इन प्रश्नों पर विचार किये विना स्मृति के प्रामाण्य पर चर्चा करना नितान्त असङ्गत होगा क्योंकि किसी भी ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य उस ज्ञान के विषय पर निर्भर करता है। स्मृति पर विचार करने के क्रम में कल्पना पर विचार करना भी आवश्यक है क्योंकि बहुधा कल्पना तथा स्मृति को एक मानने की

ग़लती हमसे हो जाती है। नैयायिक बताते हैं कि स्मृति एक ऐसा ज्ञान है जिसकी उत्पत्ति केवल संस्कार से होती है। संस्कारमात्रजन्य ज्ञान को स्मृति कहा जाता है[4]। तथा स्मृति का विषय पूर्वानुभूत विषय ही होता है। इसके विपरीत कल्पना मनःप्रभूत मानस ज्ञान है। कल्पना को प्रमात्मक कोई भी दार्शनिक नहीं मानता है, हालाँकि उसको प्रमात्मक मानने का प्रश्न हो सकता था क्योंकि वह मानस ज्ञान है। कल्पना को प्रमात्मक न मानने का आधार यह है कि कल्पना कभी भी यथार्थ नहीं होती। प्रमात्व का आधार यथार्थता है। चूँकि कल्पना यथार्थ नहीं होती, इस कारण उसको प्रमात्मक नहीं माना जा सकता। न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा में कल्पना के विषय में कुछ अधिक विवेचन नहीं उपलब्ध होता। यहाँ तक कि कल्पना की चर्चा भी ज्ञान के प्रभेदों में नहीं प्राप्त होती। कल्पना चूँकि इच्छाजन्य होती है, इस कारण उसको आहार्य ज्ञान के अन्तर्गत रखा जा सकता है। आहार्य ज्ञान की चर्चा विस्तार से विविध स्थलों में प्रसङ्गानुसार प्राप्त होती है। बाधकालीन इच्छा से जन्य ज्ञान को आहार्य ज्ञान कहा जाता है[5]। ज्ञानों के वर्गीकरण में यद्यपि इस आहार्य ज्ञान की भी चर्चा नहीं प्राप्त होती है। परन्तु तर्क को अप्रमा के प्रभेदों में अन्तर्भूत किया गया है, तथा तर्क भी एक खास प्रकार का इच्छाजन्य आहार्य ज्ञान ही होता है। इस कारण न्यायवैशेषिकपरम्परा की ज्ञानमीमांसा में कल्पना के लिए भी स्थान बन जाता है। बौद्धों ने कल्पना का अभिप्राय कुछ अन्य प्रकार से बताया है। ऐसी प्रतिभासप्रतीति को कल्पना कहते हैं जो अभिलापसंसर्ग के योग्य हो, जिसका कि अभिलाप किया जा सकता हो[6]। बौद्धदर्शन में वर्णित यह कल्पना की अवधारणा पाश्चात्य ज्ञानमीमांसा में डेविड ह्यूम द्वारा प्रतिपादित कल्पना (इमेजिनेशन) की अवधारणा के काफी समीप है। ह्यूम के अनुसार स्मृति तथा कल्पना दोनों का विषय प्रतिमा हुआ करती है, परन्तु कल्पना की प्रतिमा स्मृति की प्रतिमा की अपेक्षा कम जीवन्त होती है। यह कम या अधिक जीवन्तता की बात ह्यूम करता अवश्य है, परन्तु उस पर उसको स्वयं ही भरोसा नहीं है। जीवन्तता व्यक्तिभेद से भिन्न हो सकती है, हर एक के लिए स्मृति की प्रतिमा कल्पना की प्रतिमा की अपेक्षा अधिक ही जीवन्त हो, यह आवश्यक तो नहीं। इसी कारण आलोचकों ने ह्यूम के इस प्रतिमासिद्धान्त की तीखी आलोचना भी की है। प्रायशः उसी प्रतिमा को बौद्ध दार्शनिक प्रतिभासप्रतीति कहते हैं। बौद्धों द्वारा सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष को प्रमाण न मानने का आधार भी यही है। चूँकि सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में कल्पना का अनुप्रवेश है, इस कारण वह प्रमाण नहीं हो सकता। पाश्चात्य ज्ञानमीमांसा के अनुसार भी कल्पना (इमेजिनेशन) को प्रमा या प्रमाण नहीं माना गया है क्योंकि कल्पना को प्रमात्मक होने के लिए उसका विषय कोई तथ्य या

कोई सत्य प्रतिज्ञि होनी चाहिए थी, जो कि नहीं होती। इस कारण कल्पना को प्रमा नहीं माना जा सकता। न्यायदर्शन अपने वस्तुवाद के आलोक में स्मृति का विषय क्या है? इस प्रश्न का सीधा–सीधा उत्तर देता है कि स्मृति का विषय अतीत वस्तु है तथा स्मृति संस्कारमात्र से उत्पन्न होनेवाला ज्ञान है।

स्मृति को प्रमा क्यों नहीं मानना? इस प्रश्न पर विचार करने के पूर्व प्रमा की अवधारणा पर भी तनिक विचार आवश्यक दिखता है क्योंकि भारतीय विभिन्न दर्शनसम्प्रदायों में प्रमा की अवधारणा भी एक समान नहीं है। मीमांसक तथा वेदान्ती प्रमा की अवधारणा में अगृहीतग्राहित्व की बात भी अन्तर्भूत करते हैं। उनके अनुसार किसी ज्ञान को प्रमा होने के लिए उस ज्ञान का अगृहीतग्राही होना आवश्यक है— किसी ऐसी वस्तु या तथ्य को विषय बनाना आवश्यक है, जो पूर्व में ज्ञात न रही हो। यदि स्मृति का विषय अतीतवस्तु ही होती है, तो निश्चय ही वह अतीतवस्तु पूर्व में उत्पन्न अनुभव के द्वारा विषय बना ली गयी है। इस कारण स्मृति का विषय कोई ऐसी वस्तु या कोई ऐसा तथ्य नहीं हो सकेगा जो पूर्व में ज्ञात न रहा हो। इस कारण मीमांसकों तथा वेदान्तियों के पक्ष में स्मृति को प्रमा मानने का प्रश्न ही नहीं उपस्थित होता। इसके विपरीत नैयायिक प्रमा की परिभाषा यथार्थ अनुभव कह कर देते हैं, उस यथार्थता में कहीं पर भी अगृहीतग्राही होना आवश्यक या अनिवार्य नहीं है। नैयायिक न केवल वस्तुवादी हैं, अपितु वस्तुस्थिरतावादी भी हैं। घटादि वस्तुएँ स्थिर हैं, क्षण–क्षण परिवर्तनशील नहीं। धारावाहिक ज्ञान के स्थल में— जहाँ पर एक ही आकार के ज्ञान लगातार उत्पन्न हो रहे हैं जैसे 'यह घट है' 'यह घट है' इस प्रकार के विभिन्न समानाकारक ज्ञान धारावाहिक रूप से उत्पन्न हो रहे हैं, वहाँ पर— ज्ञान के प्रमात्व के लिए अगृहीतग्राही होने को आवश्यक शर्त मानने की स्थिति में केवल प्राथमिक 'यह घट है' ऐसा ज्ञान प्रमा माना जा सकेगा, द्वितीयादि 'यह घट है' ऐसे ज्ञान प्रमात्मक नहीं माने जा सकेंगे। इस कारण प्रमा के लिए अगृहीतग्राही होने की शर्त एकदम से अनावश्यक है। किसी भी प्रकार से यह आग्रह उचित नहीं जान पड़ता कि समानाकारक तथा समानविषयक प्रथम ज्ञान तो प्रमा है, तथा द्वितीयादि ज्ञान अप्रमा हैं। किसी ज्ञान का विषय पूर्व में गृहीत हो या न हो, इससे उस ज्ञान के प्रमात्व पर कोई फर्क नहीं पड़ना चाहिए[7]। एक बार जिस विषय का ज्ञान उत्पन्न हो गया है, उसका ज्ञान दुबारा उत्पन्न ही नहीं होगा, ऐसा तो नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि प्रथम ज्ञान के उत्पादक जो कारण थे वे तो द्वितीय ज्ञान के काल में भी हैं ही। इस कारण यह मानना सम्भव नहीं है कि जिस विषय का ज्ञान उत्पन्न हो गया है, उसका ज्ञान दुबारा उत्पन्न ही नहीं होगा। एक बार ज्ञान

के उत्पन्न हो जाने पर कारणों के सामर्थ्य का प्रतिबन्ध नहीं होता[8]। यह अवश्य कहा जा सकता है कि प्रमाता को किसी विषय में एक ज्ञान उत्पन्न हो जाने के उपरान्त तद्विषयक द्वितीयादि ज्ञानों की कोई आवश्यकता नहीं रहती, इस कारण हम गृहीतग्राही ज्ञान को प्रमा नहीं मानते। परन्तु समस्या यह है कि किसी ज्ञान का प्रमात्व प्रमाता के द्वारा उस ज्ञान के आवश्यक होने या न होने पर निर्भर नहीं करता[9]। ज्ञान का प्रमात्व प्रमाता की अपेक्षा या अनपेक्षा से स्वतन्त्र है। इसलिए प्रमाता को किसी ज्ञान की अपेक्षा न रहने पर भी उस ज्ञान का प्रमात्व तो स्वीकार करना आवश्यक है। अनेक बार हम नहीं चाहते कि अपने किसी परिजन के बारे में कुछ अशुभ जानें, इस प्रकार के अशुभ ज्ञान की हमको कभी अपेक्षा नहीं होती, परन्तु ऐसा ज्ञान भी उस ज्ञान की कारणसामग्री के द्वारा उत्पन्न अवश्य होता है। द्वितीय अनुभव प्रथम अनुभव की अपेक्षा से नहीं उत्पन्न होता। धारावाहिक अनुभव के स्थल में परस्पर एक दूसरे की अपेक्षा न करते हुए ये समानाकारक तथा समानविषयक अनुभव उत्पन्न होते हैं। इस कारण यदि प्राथमिक अनुभव प्रमा है, तो द्वितीयादि अनुभवों का भी प्रामाण्य स्वीकार करना ही चाहिए। सिर्फ़ अगृहीतग्राही ज्ञान मात्र को ही प्रमा माना जाये, यह तो सिद्ध नहीं है। इस कारण यह नहीं कहा जा सकता है कि स्मृति चूँकि गृहीतग्राही होती है तथा प्रमा हमेशा अगृहीतग्राही होती है, इस कारण स्मृति को प्रमा नहीं माना जा सकता। फिर स्मृति को प्रमा न मानने का आधार क्या है? न्यायमञ्जरी के लेखक जयन्त भट्ट एक विवादास्पद समाधान देते हैं, जिसको कि परवर्ती नैयायिक ही मान्यता नहीं प्रदान करते। जयन्त भट्ट कहते हैं कि स्मृति का अप्रमात्व उसके गृहीतग्राही होने के कारण नहीं अपितु उसके अर्थोत्पन्न न होने के कारण है[10]। स्मृति अपने विषय से उत्पन्न नहीं होती क्योंकि स्मृति का विषय अतीतकालीन होता है, उस अतीतकालीन विषय से वर्तमान काल में स्मृति किसी भी प्रकार उत्पन्न नहीं हो सकती। इस प्रकार हम पाते हैं कि जयन्त भट्ट के अनुसार प्रमा होने की शर्त केवल यथार्थानुभव होना ही नहीं है, अपितु उस ज्ञान का अर्थोत्पन्न होना भी है। यह एक नवीन बात जयन्त भट्ट कह रहे हैं। जिसका सन्दर्भ किसी अन्य ग्रन्थकार ने उपलब्ध नहीं कराया है। परन्तु क्या समस्त प्रमाओं पर अनिवार्य रूप से अर्थोत्पन्नता की शर्त लागू हो सकती है? क्या समस्त प्रमात्मक ज्ञान नियमतः अर्थोत्पन्न होते हैं? जयन्त भट्ट बहस करते हैं कि अनुमिति में भी अर्थोत्पन्नत्व है क्योंकि हम केवल धर्म का अनुमान करते हैं धर्मी का नहीं। धर्मी तो प्रत्यक्षसिद्ध वर्तमान है ही। चूँकि धर्मीरूप अर्थ से अनुमिति भी उत्पन्न हो रही है, इस कारण अनुमिति में भी अर्थजत्व है। इसलिए उसका प्रामाण्य उपपन्न है[11]। प्रातिभ ज्ञान के विषय की भी वर्तमानता के कारण प्रातिभ

ज्ञान में भी अर्थजत्व का उप्पादन जयन्त भट्ट करते हैं। परन्तु जयन्त भट्ट के इस सिद्धान्त से सहमत होना उचित नहीं दिखता क्योंकि अनेक प्रमा के उदाहरण ऐसे हैं जहाँ पर ज्ञान के अर्थोत्पन्नत्व का व्यवस्थापन नहीं किया जा सकता। उदाहरण के रूप में अदृष्टार्थविषयक शाब्दी प्रमा के अर्थोत्पन्नत्व का व्यवस्थापन किसी भी प्रकार से नहीं किया जा सकता। द्वितीयतः इस पक्ष में ईश्वरीय ज्ञान के प्रमात्व का स्वीकार सम्भव नहीं होगा क्योंकि ईश्वरीय ज्ञान नित्य होने के कारण अर्थोत्पन्न नहीं हो सकता। इस कारण स्मृति के प्रमात्व का निराकरण जयन्त भट्ट के इस सिद्धान्त के आधार पर नहीं किया जा सकता। इसी कारण जयन्त भट्ट के मत की आलोचना करते हुए प्रशस्तपादभाष्य की न्यायकन्दली व्याख्या के लेखक श्रीधर भट्ट कहते हैं कि जो लोग स्मृति के अर्थोत्पन्न न होने के कारण स्मृति का अप्रामाण्य मानते हैं, उनके मत में अतीत तथा अनागत विषयक अनुमानों का प्रामाण्य नहीं हो सकेगा[12]।

न्यायकन्दलीकार श्रीधरभट्ट इस बारे में पक्ष रखते हैं कि स्मृति का विषय अतीत होता है। इसी कारण स्मृति प्रमाण नहीं होती। स्मृति उसी विषय को अपना विषय बनाती है, जो कि पूर्वोत्पन्न अनुभव का विषय हो चुका हो। जो विषय पूर्वोत्पन्न अनुभव का विषय नहीं होता, उस विषय को स्मृति विषय नहीं कर सकती। इस कारण स्मृति अर्थ का परिच्छेदन करने में स्वतन्त्र नहीं है[13]। स्मृति अपने विषयीभूत अर्थ का परिच्छेदन करने में स्वतन्त्र नहीं है, इस कथन का तात्पर्य यह है कि यदि पूर्वोत्पन्न अनुभव प्रमात्मक हुआ है, तो स्मृति भी उसी प्रकार की यथार्थ होती है। यह सम्भव नहीं है कि हमें पूर्व में ज्ञान तो अप्रमात्मक हुआ हो, अयथार्थ हुआ हो, परन्तु परकालीन स्मृति यथार्थ हो जाये। इसका तात्पर्य यह है कि स्मृति में जो यथार्थता आ रही है, वह यथार्थता उस स्मृति की अपनी यथार्थता नहीं है अपितु वह यथार्थता उधार की है, पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की यथार्थता है। चूँकि यह किसी भी प्रकार से सम्भव नहीं है कि पूर्वज्ञान का प्रामाण्य माने विना स्मृति का प्रामाण्य स्वीकार कर लिया जाये। इसलिए उचित यही लगता है कि पूर्वकालीन अनुभव का प्रामाण्य तो अनिवार्यतया स्वीकार्य होने के कारण माना जाये, परन्तु स्मृति का प्रामाण्य न माना जाये। पूर्वकालीन अनुभव का उपस्थापन कर देने मात्र से ही स्मृति की चरितार्थता हो जायेगी[14]। प्रकरणपञ्चिका के लेखक शालिकनाथ भी स्मृति के अप्रमात्व का आधार इसी में देखते हैं कि स्मृति पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की अपेक्षा करती है परन्तु धारावाहिक बुद्धियाँ पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की अपेक्षा नहीं करती हैं[15]। इस कारण धारावाहिक ज्ञानों में समस्त ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य स्वीकार किया जाता है, परन्तु स्मृति का प्रामाण्य नहीं स्वीकार किया जाता। श्रीधरभट्ट के प्रायशः समकालीन

उदयनाचार्य भी समान युक्ति के आधार पर स्मृति का प्रामाण्य नहीं स्वीकार करते। उनका कथन यह भी है कि स्मृति के प्रमात्व का व्यवहार नहीं होता। यदि कथञ्चित् स्मृति के प्रमात्व का व्यवहार होता भी हो, तो उस व्यवहार के प्रति भी पूर्वकालीन अनुभव को ही प्रमा समझना चाहिए क्योंकि पूर्वकालीन अनुभव किसी की अपेक्षा नहीं करता, स्मृति तो अपने प्रामाण्य के लिए नियम से पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की अपेक्षा करती है[16]। परन्तु उदयनाचार्यजी प्रश्न को यहीं पर नहीं छोड़ते। वे अगला प्रश्न करते हैं कि यदि स्मृति अपने प्रामाण्य के लिए नियम से पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की अपेक्षा करती है, तो समान रूप से अनुमिति भी अपने प्रामाण्य के लिए नियम से पूर्वकालीन व्याप्तिविषयक अनुभव की अपेक्षा करती है। यदि पूर्व में व्याप्ति का अनुभव प्रमात्मक हुआ है, तो अनुमिति प्रमात्मक होती है। यदि अप्रमात्मक व्याप्ति का अनुभव हुआ है, तो अनुमिति भी अप्रमात्मक ही होती है। इस कारण स्मृति के समान अनुमिति भी नियम से पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की अपेक्षा करने के कारण प्रमात्मक नहीं हो सकेगी? तो इसका समाधान देते हैं कि अनुमिति अपने प्रामाण्य के लिए जिस पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की अपेक्षा करती है, उस अनुभव का विषय अनुमिति के विषय से भिन्न है[17]। स्मृति तो अपने प्रामाण्य के लिए स्वसमानविषयक पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की अपेक्षा करती है। इस कारण स्मृति अर्थपरिच्छेदन करने में भी पराश्रित है, अनुमिति उत्पत्ति में तो पराश्रित है किन्तु अर्थपरिच्छेदन करने में पराश्रित नहीं है। परन्तु जो आपत्ति स्मृति के प्रामाण्य के विषय में दी गयी, ठीक वही आपत्ति शब्द प्रमाण के प्रामाण्य के विषय में भी उठायी जा सकती है। यह कहा जा सकता है कि जो विषय किसी अन्य प्रमाण से जाना हुआ रहता है, उसी विषय को शब्द प्रमाण भी विषय करता है। किसी अर्थ को प्रमाणान्तर से जाने विना हम शब्द के द्वारा उस अर्थ का अभिलाप नहीं कर सकते। इस कारण जो अर्थ प्रमाणान्तर का विषय होता है, वही शब्द प्रमाण का विषय होता है तथा शब्द प्रमाण स्वयं अर्थ का परिच्छेदन करने के लिए प्रमाणान्तर से अर्थपरिच्छेदन की अपेक्षा करता है। इस कारण जिस प्रकार से स्मृति का प्रामाण्य नहीं होता, समान रूप से शब्द प्रमाण का प्रामाण्य भी नहीं स्वीकृत हो सकेगा। तो ऐसा नहीं है, उदयन समाधान देते हैं कि शब्द प्रमाण पर स्मृति पर आरोपित आपत्ति लागू नहीं होती क्योंकि प्रमाता के भेद से शब्द प्रमाण को अर्थ परिच्छेदन के लिए प्रमाणान्तर के द्वारा अर्थपरिच्छेदन की अपेक्षा नहीं होती[18]।

स्मृति को यदि प्रमा न माना जाये तो एक अन्य प्रश्न अवश्य बहुत गम्भीर उठता है— पूर्व में अनुभव हुआ था, उस अनुभव से स्मृति उत्पन्न होती है। परन्तु यदि स्मृति

प्रमा नहीं है तो पूर्वकालीन अनुभव में प्रमाण क्या है? पूर्वकालीन अनुभव को तो हर कोई स्वीकार करता है, उसको निष्प्रमाणक नहीं होना चाहिए। स्मृति को यदि प्रमा न मानें तो पूर्वकालीन अनुभव में प्रमाण क्या है? यदि कहा जाये कि स्मृति का अन्यथा अनुपपन्न होना ही पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की सत्ता में प्रमाण है, तो यह कथन युक्तिसङ्गत नहीं है क्योंकि स्मृति का अन्यथा अनुपपन्न होने के आधार पर केवल स्मृति के कारण की सत्ता सिद्ध हो सकती है, यह नहीं सिद्ध हो सकता कि वह स्मृति का कारण अनुभव था[19]। स्मृति का कारण कोई ज्ञान अवश्य उत्पन्न हुआ था इतना ही पता चलता है। यह पूछा जा सकता है कि यदि स्मृति का अन्यथा अनुपपन्न होना अनुभव को प्रमाणित नहीं करता, तो जिस वस्तु का अनुभव नहीं हुआ है, उसका भी स्मरण होना चाहिए था। क्यों नहीं होता? जब स्मृति होने के लिए अनुभव के होने में कोई प्रमाण नहीं है, तो ऐसा हो ही सकता है[20]। यदि किसी विषय का ज्ञान पूर्व में हुआ है, तो अनुभव के विना भी स्मृति हो ही सकती है, पूर्व में अनुभव होना आवश्यक नहीं है, ज्ञान होना आवश्यक है। वस्तुतः तो पूर्वकालीन अनुभव में प्रमाण के रूप में आत्मा की प्रत्यभिज्ञा ही है। जैसे पूर्व तथा पर अवस्था की सिद्धि आत्मा की प्रत्यभिज्ञा के द्वारा होती है, उसी प्रकार जिस मैंने घट को देखा था वही मैं घट का स्मरण कर रहा हूँ, इस प्रकार की प्रत्यभिज्ञा के द्वारा ही पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की सिद्धि होती है। इस कारण स्मृति का प्रामाण्य स्वीकार किये विना भी पूर्वकालीन अनुभव में प्रमाण का प्रस्तुतीकरण सम्भव है[21]। इस प्रकार पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की सिद्धि के लिए स्मृति को प्रमाण मानने की आवश्यकता नहीं है। पूर्वकालीन अनुभव की सिद्धि मानसप्रत्यक्षरूप प्रत्यभिज्ञा के द्वारा ही सम्भव है।

यद्यपि एक अन्य प्रश्न उपस्थित होगा कि प्रत्यभिज्ञा तथा स्मृति में क्या तात्त्विक अन्तर है जिसके कारण नैयायिक प्रत्यभिज्ञा का प्रामाण्य मानते हैं, परन्तु स्मृति का प्रामाण्य नहीं मानते? प्रत्यभिज्ञा में भी तो संस्कार का उपयोग होता ही है, स्मृति के द्वारा प्रत्यभिज्ञा उत्पन्न होती है, फिर ऐसा क्यों? तो इस पर आगे कभी किसी अन्य आलेख में विस्तार से चर्चा की योजना है, क्योंकि यह प्रश्न अपने आपमें जटिल है। अभी मात्र इतना कहना ही पर्याप्त है कि नैयायिकों के अनुसार प्रत्यभिज्ञा कोई ज्ञान का अतिरिक्त प्रभेद नहीं है, बल्कि वह प्रत्यक्षात्मक ही है। इसी कारण प्रत्यभिज्ञा का प्रामाण्य हम मानते हैं क्योंकि प्रत्यक्ष का प्रामाण्य तो स्वीकार्य ही है।

गङ्गेशोपाध्याय भी उदयनाचार्य से सहमति रखते हुए स्मृति के अप्रामाण्य का कारण स्मृति का पूर्वानुभवसापेक्ष होना ही मानते हैं। चूँकि अनुभव पूर्वानुभवसापेक्ष नहीं

होता, स्मृति तो पूर्वानुभवसापेक्ष होती है। इस कारण अनुभव को प्रमा तथा स्मृति को अप्रमा माना जाता है[22]।

न्यायलीलावती के लेखक वल्लभाचार्य स्मृति को प्रमाणान्तर मानते हैं तथा उन्होंने स्मृति को प्रमाणान्तर मानने के लिए अनेक तर्क भी उपलब्ध कराये हैं। प्रथमतया वे कहते हैं कि चूँकि स्मृति भी अर्थनिश्चय के प्रति कारण होती है, इस कारण स्मृति को भी प्रमाण मानना चाहिए[23]। ध्येय है कि समस्त दार्शनिकों ने स्मृति का अर्थनिश्चायकत्व माना ही है, इस पर किसी ने प्रश्न नहीं किया है। सवाल यह है कि अनुभवपरतन्त्रता स्मृति में होती है, तो इस पर कहते हैं कि उत्पत्ति में स्मृति प्रमाणान्तरपरतन्त्र है या स्वविषय का परिच्छेदन करने में? उत्पत्ति में यदि स्मृति प्रमाणान्तरपरतन्त्र है, तो इससे कोई दोष नहीं है क्योंकि उत्पत्ति में तो अन्य प्रमाण भी प्रमाणान्तरपरतन्त्र होते हैं, जैसे अनुमिति, उपमिति तथा शाब्दबोध। यदि ज्ञप्ति में प्रमाणान्तरपरतन्त्र होने की बात की जाये, तो ज्ञप्ति में स्मृति प्रमाणान्तरपरतन्त्र नहीं है क्योंकि किसी भी ज्ञान के द्वारा कोई फल नहीं उत्पादित किया जाता है। मीमांसकों के समान यदि आप ज्ञान के द्वारा ज्ञानविषय में कोई फल उत्पन्न होने की बात स्वीकार करते[24], तो यह कहा जा सकता था कि चूँकि स्मृति अतीतविषयक होती है और अतीत विषय में कोई फल ज्ञान के द्वारा उत्पादित नहीं किया जा सकता। इस कारण स्मृति को प्रमाण नहीं मानेंगे। परन्तु नैयायिक तो ऐसा मानते ही नहीं[25]। उदयनाचार्य ने जो अर्थपरिच्छेदन में स्मृति की परतन्त्रता की बात की थी उसकी भी वल्लभाचार्य आलोचना करते हैं कि यदि स्मृति अपने विषय का परिच्छेदन करने में अन्य की अपेक्षा करेगी, तो वह स्मृति ज्ञान ही नहीं हो पायेगी क्योंकि इच्छा ही अपने विषय का परिच्छेदन करने में अन्य पर निर्भर करती है, ज्ञान नहीं[26]। उदयनाचार्यजी ने अन्य जो प्रश्न उठाये थे, उनमें सबसे महत्त्वपूर्ण था कि स्मृति का पूरा का पूरा विषय पूर्वकालीन अनुभव के द्वारा विषय किया जाता है, किसी भी प्रमाण के साथ ऐसा नहीं है कि उसका पूरा विषय किसी के द्वारा विषय किया जाता हो। इसी कारण स्मृति की यथार्थता भी वस्तुतः याचित है, उसकी अपनी नहीं है। फिर किस कारण स्मृति को प्रमा मानें? इस पर वल्लभाचार्य कहते हैं कि वस्तुतः स्मृति भी पूर्वकालीन अनुभव से अधिक विषय का परिच्छेदन करती है। पूर्वकालीन अनुभव में तत्ता का भान नहीं हुआ था, परन्तु स्मृति में तत्ता का भान होता है। स्मृति में घट का भान जब होता है, तो 'वह घट' इस रूप में घट का भान होता है। परन्तु जब उस घट का प्रत्यक्ष हुआ था, उस समय 'वह घट' इस रूप में घट का भान नहीं हुआ था, अपितु 'यह' इस रूप में उस घट का प्रत्यक्ष हुआ था। इससे पता चलता है कि स्मृति में

भी कोई बात ऐसी है, कोई विषय ऐसा है, जो कि पूर्वानुभव का विषय नहीं है। यह कहना तो सम्भव नहीं है कि पूर्वानुभव भी तत्ता को विषय करता है, क्योंकि ऐसी स्थिति में तो पूर्वानुभव में तत्ता का भान होना चाहिए था, जो कि नहीं होता। इससे यह स्पष्ट है कि तत्ता अंश के भान के लिए स्मृति पूर्वानुभवपरतन्त्र नहीं है, पूर्वानुभवापेक्ष नहीं है। इस कारण उसको प्रमाण मानना चाहिए[27]। तत्ता ज्ञातता ही है, ऐसा भी नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि 'यह ज्ञात है' तथा 'वह यह है' इन दोनों ही अनुभवों में पर्याप्त अन्तर है। तत्ता यदि ज्ञातास्वरूप होती तो इन दोनों अनुभवों में कोई अन्तर नहीं होना चाहिए था[28]। इस प्रकार वल्लभाचार्य स्मृति के विषय में एक नवीनता का अन्वेषण भी कर लेते हैं। उदयनाचार्य आदि के द्वारा यह जो प्रश्न उठाया गया था कि 'प्रामाणिकों का स्मृति में प्रमात्व का व्यवहार नहीं होता, इस कारण स्मृति प्रमा नहीं है', उसके उत्तर में ये कहते हैं कि सत्य ज्ञान में ही लौकिकों तथा प्रामाणिकों का प्रमाव्यवहार होता है, न कि सत्य अनुभव के बारे में। इस कारण यह कहना नितान्त अनुचित है कि प्रामाणिकों का प्रमाव्यवहार स्मृति में नहीं होता[29]।

इस प्रकार स्मृति के प्रमात्व का प्रायशः व्यवस्थापन करने के उपरान्त वल्लभाचार्य परम्परा की दृष्टि से परम्परा के अन्दर से ही एक गम्भीर प्रश्न उपस्थापित करते हैं कि यदि सत्यज्ञान में ही प्रमात्वव्यवहार होता है तो दो ही प्रमाणों का स्वीकार क्यों है? ध्येय है कि वैशेषिक परम्परा में दो ही प्रमाणों की स्वीकृति है प्रत्यक्ष तथा अनुमान। यदि स्मृति भी प्रमा है तो निश्चय ही दो ही प्रमाण नहीं होंगे, दो से अधिक प्रमाण हो जायेंगे। समाधान प्रस्तुत करने के क्रम में वे कहते हैं कि सत्यज्ञानत्व या सत्यानुभवत्व को प्रामाण्य मानकर प्रमाणों के द्वैविध्य की बात नहीं की गयी है क्योंकि सत्यज्ञानत्व को प्रामाण्य मानने पर स्मृति का भी प्रामाण्य आवश्यक होने के कारण प्रमाणों का द्वैविध्य नहीं होगा। यदि सत्यानुभवत्व को प्रामाण्य माना जाये तो ईश्वरीय ज्ञान न तो प्रत्यक्ष है और न तो अनुमिति, इस कारण ईश्वरीयज्ञान का प्रामाण्य नहीं हो सकेगा[30]। इस कारण प्रमाण के प्रतिपादन के विषय में अभियुक्त (प्रामाणिक) अक्षपाद तथा कणाद प्रभृति आचार्यों के द्वारा स्मृति में प्रमाण व्यवहार न होने के कारण तथा चूँकि स्मृति पूर्वानुभव की अपेक्षा करते हुए ही विषय की प्रतीति कराती है, इसलिए स्मृति को प्रमा नहीं ही मानना उचित है[31]। तत्ता का अधिक भान होने की बात जो की थी उसके बारे में भी वे स्पष्ट करते हैं कि वस्तुतः तत्ता अतीतज्ञान का वैशिष्ट्य ही है अथवा अतीतसमय का वैशिष्ट्य है। वह अनुभव के उत्तरकाल में नियम से भासित होता ही है, इस कारण ऐसा नहीं समझना चाहिए कि अनुभव की अपेक्षा स्मृति में कोई नया

विषय आ गया है[32]। तत् शब्द के द्वारा उल्लेख होने का कारण भी यह है कि किसी अन्य प्रकार से पूर्वानुभव के सम्पन्नत्व का अनुसन्धान करके स्मृति के काल में तत्ता के वाचक का उल्लेख करनेवाला व्यवहार किया जाता है[33]। इस प्रकार स्मृतिविषयक अपने विवेचन को पूर्ण करते हुए वल्लभाचार्य निष्कर्ष के रूप में उस अन्तिम युक्ति का भी खण्डन सा कर देते हैं जिसके आधार पर स्मृति के प्रमात्व का व्यवस्थापन किया जा सकता था। बात यह ध्वनित हो रही है कि 'तत्ता का भान नवीन है, इस कारण स्मृति का प्रामाण्य होना चाहिए' ऐसा पक्ष रखा था। परन्तु तत्ता तो प्रकारान्तर से आ रही है, तो जिस प्रकार से आ रही है, उसे प्रमाण माना जा सकता है, स्मृति को प्रमा नहीं माना जा सकता। यह अवश्य है कि वल्लभाचार्य के स्मृतिविषयक विवेचन को पढ़ते हुए अनेक बार ऐसा आभास होता है, जैसे वे स्मृति के प्रमात्व को स्वीकृति प्रदान करना चाहते हैं।

इस प्रकार यह सारी का सारी चर्चा इस बिन्दु पर आकर रुक जा रही है कि स्मृति यथार्थ तो है, परन्तु नियमतः पूर्वानुभवापेक्ष होती है, इस कारण उसको प्रमा मानना उचित नहीं है। परन्तु गङ्गेशोपाध्याय इसमें एक नया पक्ष लाते हैं। जिस युक्ति के आधार पर वल्लभाचार्य ने स्मृति के प्रामाण्य को स्वीकृति देने का पक्ष रखा था, उसी के आधार पर वे कहते हैं कि 'तत्ता का भान नवीन है, इस कारण स्मृति का अप्रामाण्य होना चाहिए'। इदन्ता का भान अनुभव में हुआ था, उस अनुभव से उत्पन्न स्मृति में तत्ता के द्वारा धर्मान्तर ही भासित हो रहा है, इसी कारण 'यह घट' ऐसा स्मरण नहीं होता किन्तु 'वह घट' ऐसा स्मरण होता है। इस कारण समस्त स्मृतियाँ या तो अयथार्थ हैं या तो अयथार्थ अनुभव हैं[34]।

आगे पुनः स्मृति के अप्रमात्व का उपस्थापन करने के लिए गङ्गेशोपाध्याय युक्ति देते हैं कि स्मृति अपने विषय के वर्तमानत्व को विषय करती है क्योंकि उसमें न तो अतीतता का भान होता है और न तो अनागतता का भान होता है। जिस किसी भी प्रतीति में उस प्रतीति के विषय के अतीतत्व या अनागतत्व का भान नहीं होता, उस हर एक प्रतीति में उस प्रतीति के विषय के वर्तमानत्व का भान होता है, जैसे कि प्रत्यभिज्ञा में, या जैसे घट आदि के ज्ञान में। हर वह प्रतीति समयविशेष (वर्तमानकाल) को विषय करती है, जिसमें अतीतत्व या भविष्यत्त्व का भान नहीं हो रहा हो। स्मरण जब भी होता है, उसमें 'वह घट' इस प्रकार से प्रतीति होती है, परन्तु उसमें न तो अतीतत्व का भान होता है और न तो भविष्यत्त्व का। इस कारण स्मृति के विषय की वर्तमानता अवश्य भासित होगी, इस कारण मृत पिता आदि की स्मृति में पिता की वर्तमानता यदि भासित हो रही है, तो निश्चय ही स्मृति की अयथार्थता ही होगी क्योंकि तदभाववान् में तद्वत्ता

की प्रतीति हो रही है, वर्तमानता जिसमें नहीं है उसमें वर्तमानता की प्रतीति हो रही है। इसी कारण पाक होने के उपरान्त यदि घट में 'श्याम घट' इस प्रकार का यदि ज्ञान हो रहा हो, तो उस ज्ञान की अयथार्थता का व्यवहार लोक में किया जाता है। इस ज्ञान में न तो श्याम घट के अतीतत्व का भान होता है और न तो भविष्यत्त्व का, इस कारण श्याम घट का वर्तमानत्व भासित होता है। वस्तु स्थिति यह है कि वर्तमान काल में घट में श्यामत्व है नहीं, उस घट में तो रक्तत्व है। परन्तु इसके विपरीत ज्ञान में श्यामत्व की वर्तमानता का भान हो रहा है[35]।

गङ्गेशोपाध्याय स्मृति की अयथार्थता को एक अन्य युक्ति से भी सिद्ध करते हैं कि स्मृति में तत्ताविशिष्ट की वर्तमानता भासित होती है[36], ऐसी स्थिति में या तो विशेषण और या तो विशेष्य दोनों में से किसी एक का अभाव निश्चित तौर पर रहेगा। इस कारण स्मृति में तदभाववान् में तद्दत्ता की प्रतीति हो रही है। इस कारण स्मृति की यथार्थता ही नहीं बनेगी। अतः यदि प्रमा के लक्षण में अनुभव पद का प्रवेश न करें, तब भी स्मृति का प्रामाण्य सम्भव नहीं है।

न्यायवैशेषिक परम्परा के उदयनाचार्य, वल्लभाचार्य, गङ्गेशोपाध्याय आदि आचार्यों के द्वारा उपस्थापित समस्याओं के मद्देनज़र स्मृति के प्रमात्व को स्वीकार करना युक्तिसङ्गत नहीं दिखता। कुछेक बिन्दुओं पर यदि हम अपना ध्यान केन्द्रित करें तो पाश्चात्य ज्ञानमीमांसा में भी स्मृति को नॉलेज मानना तथा प्रमाण के रूप में स्वीकार करना उचित नहीं दिखायी देता। गेटियर ने 'सांयोगिक रूप से किसी ज्ञान के सत्य होने की स्थिति में उसको भी नॉलेज मानना क्या उचित है?' ऐसा प्रश्न उठाकर किसी बिलीफ़ के सत्यापित हो जाने मात्र से उसको नॉलेज नहीं माना जा सकता, ऐसा पक्ष प्रस्तुत किया था। भारतीय परिप्रेक्ष्य में यह प्रश्न बहुत प्राचीन है। श्रीहर्ष ने खण्डनखण्डखाद्य में गेटियर से प्रायः एक हजार वर्ष पूर्व यह प्रश्न उठाया था। ठीक उसी प्रकार स्मृति के विषय में यह प्रश्न उठता है कि 'क्या किसी ज्ञान के सिर्फ़ सत्य होने के कारण उस ज्ञान को नॉलेज या प्रमा माना जा सकता है, यदि उस ज्ञान की सत्यता किसी अन्य ज्ञान की सत्यता पर निर्भर है?' निश्चय ही इसका उत्तर सकारात्मक नहीं दिया जा सकता, नकारात्मक ही देना होगा। पाश्चात्य चिन्तकों ने यह तो देखा कि स्मृति कभी यथार्थ होती है, तथा कभी अयथार्थ होती है। परन्तु इस अयथार्थता का कारण उन्होंने यह समझा कि जब कल्पना आ जाती है तो स्मृति यथार्थ नहीं रह जाती। कभी कभी हमें ज्ञान तो सत्य हुआ था, परन्तु हमें स्मृति ऐसी होती है, जो कि यथार्थ नहीं होती क्योंकि उसमें हमारी कल्पना मिल जाती है[37]। परन्तु पाश्चात्य

चिन्तकों ने यह नहीं देखा कि फिर भी ऐसा कभी भी सम्भव नहीं है कि स्मृति यथार्थ हो रही हो, परन्तु उस स्मृति के विषय को विषय करनेवाला पूर्वकालीन अनुभव यथार्थ न रहा हो। गम्भीर विवेचन करने पर तो स्मृति की यथार्थता भी सम्भव नहीं दिखती। इस कारण स्मृति को प्रमा न मानने का नैयायिकों का निर्धारण निश्चय ही गम्भीर तार्किक युक्तियों पर आधारित है।

दर्शन एवं धर्मविभाग
काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय,
वाराणसी–221005

सन्दर्भ एवं पादटिप्पणी

1. यदसाधारणं सहकारिणमासाद्य मनो बहिर्गोचरां प्रमां जनयति तस्य प्रमाणान्तरत्वात्। अनुमिति तत्त्वचिन्तामणि दीधिति

2. विद्यापि चतुर्विधा– प्रत्यक्षलैङ्गिकस्मृत्यार्षलक्षणा। प्रशस्तपादभाष्य पृ.441

3. स्मृतिरपि मानान्तरमेव, अर्थनिश्चयहेतुत्वात्। न्यायलीलावती पृ.621

4. संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः।

5. बाधकालीनेच्छाजन्यं ज्ञानमाहार्यम्।

6. अभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासप्रतीतिः कल्पना। न्यायबिन्दुप्रकरण

7. प्रमाणस्य गृहीततदितरविषयप्रवृत्तस्य प्रामाण्ये विशेषाभावात्। न्यायमञ्जरी पृ.33

8. न ह्यधिगते अधिगतिरिव नोत्पद्यते, कारणानामप्रतिबन्धात्। गद्यपद्यात्मक न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि 4/1

9. न चोत्पद्यमानापि प्रमातुरनपेक्षितेति न प्रमा, प्रामाण्यस्यातदधीनत्वात्। वहीं

10. न स्मृतेर्प्रामाण्यं गृहीतग्राहिताकृतम्, अपित्वनर्थजत्वं तदप्रामाण्यकारणम्। न्यायमञ्जरी पृ.34

11. स चानुमानग्राह्यो धर्मी विद्यत एवेति नानर्थजमनुमानम्। वहीं

12. ये त्वनर्थजत्वात् स्मृतेर्प्रामाण्यमाहुः, तेषामतीतानागतविषयस्यानुमानस्याप्रामाण्यं स्यादिति दूषणम्। न्यायकन्दली पृ.628

13. तस्याः पूर्वानुभवविषयत्वोपदर्शनेनार्थे निश्चिन्वत्या अर्थपरिच्छेदे पूर्वानुभवपारतन्त्र्यात्। वहीं पृ.627

14. पूर्वज्ञानविज्ञानविषयं विज्ञानं स्मृतिरुच्यते। पूर्वज्ञानाद्विना तस्याः प्रामाण्यं नावगम्यते।। तत्र यत्पूर्वविज्ञानं तस्य प्रामाण्यमिष्यते। तदुपस्थापनमात्रेण स्मृतेश्चरितार्थता।। वहीं

15. न प्रमाणं स्मृतिः पूर्वप्रतिपत्तेरपेक्षणात्। अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षास्तु धारावाहिकबुद्धयः।। प्रकरणपञ्चिका

24   सच्चिदानन्द मिश्र

16. व्यवहारेऽपि पूर्वानुभव एव प्रमितिरनपेक्षत्वात्। न तु स्मृतिः, नित्यं तदपेक्षणात्। गद्यपद्यात्मक न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि 4/1 पृ.507

17. नन्वेवमनुमानमप्यप्रमाणमापद्येत, मूलप्रत्यक्षानुविधानात्; न विषयभेदात्। वहीं

18. आगमस्तर्हि न प्रमाणम्, तद्विषयमानान्तरानुविधानात्; न प्रमातृभेदात्। वहीं पृ.508

19. यदि हि स्मृतिर्न प्रमितिः, पूर्वानुभवे किं प्रमाणम्? स्मृत्यन्यथानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न, तया कारणमात्रसिद्धेः, न तु तेनानुभवेन भवितव्यमिति नियामकमस्ति। वहीं पृ.510

20. अननुभूतेऽपि तर्हि स्मरणं स्यादिति चेत्? किं न स्यात्, न ह्यत्र प्रमाणमस्ति। वहीं पृ.510–511

21. तदप्रामाण्येऽपि पूर्वापरावस्थावदात्मप्रत्यभिज्ञातप्रामाण्यादेव तदुपपत्तेः। वहीं पृ.512

22. स्मृत्यनुभवयोरप्रमाप्रमाव्यपदेशस्तान्त्रिकाणां सापेक्षत्वनिरपेक्षत्वनिबन्धनः। तत्त्वचिन्तामणिः प्रत्यक्षखण्ड पृ. 398

23. स्मृतिरपि मानान्तरमेव, अर्थनिश्चयहेतुत्वात्। न्यायलीलावती पृ.620

24. ध्येय है कि मीमांसक प्रमुखतया कुमारिल भट्ट ज्ञान के द्वारा विषय में ज्ञातता या प्राकट्य नामक फल की उत्पत्ति स्वीकार करते हैं। उसी के कारण किसी वस्तु घट आदि का ज्ञान होने के उपरान्त हमें 'ज्ञातो घटः' ऐसा अनुभव होता है।

25. फलाभावेन ज्ञप्तिपारतन्त्र्याभावात्। न्यायलीलावती पृ.620

26. इच्छाविद्विषये परापेक्षायां ज्ञानत्वव्याघातः। वहीं

27. तत्तावच्छिन्नं हि स्मृतिरर्थमाकलयति, सा च यदि पूर्वानुभवस्यापि गोचरः, तदा तत्रापि तदित्युल्लेखः स्यात्, न च क्वचिदिदमिति स्यात्। न चेत्, स्मृतिरेव तत्रानपेक्षेति मानम्। वहीं पृ.621–622

28. तत्ता च न ज्ञातता, ज्ञातोयं सोयमित्यनयोरविशिष्टविषयतापत्तेः। वहीं पृ.622

29. लौकिकानां प्रामाणिकानाञ्च सत्यज्ञान एव प्रमाव्यवहारदर्शनात्। वहीं पृ.623

30. न ह्यत्र सत्यज्ञानत्वं सत्यानुभवत्वं वा प्रामाण्यं साध्यम्, यथाक्रमं सिद्धसाधनबाधयोः सत्त्वात्। वहीं पृ.624

31. प्रमाणाभियुक्तानां चाक्षचरणकणभक्षादीनां स्मृतौ प्रमाणव्यवहाराभावात्,....पूर्वानुभवापेक्षतयैव वा विषयप्रतीतिनियमात्, इच्छादिवत्। वहीं पृ.624–625

32. तत्ता चातीतज्ञानवैशिष्ट्यमतीतसमयावच्छेदो वा, स चानुभवोत्तरकालमवभासत एव। वहीं पृ. 626

33. तस्य च वृत्तितामन्यतोऽनुसन्धाय तदिति तद्वाचकोल्लेखी व्यवहार इति। वहीं पृ. 628

34.	इदन्तानुल्लेख्यनुभवप्रभवस्मरणे धर्मान्तरमेव तत्तया भासते। अत एवायं घट इति न स्मरणम्।
	अत एव सर्वा स्मृतिरयथार्था अयथार्थानुभवा च। तत्त्वचिन्तामणि, प्रत्यक्षखण्ड पृ.884

35.	यद्वा नेयं यथार्था तथाहि स्मृतिः स्वविषयवर्तमानत्वविषया अतीतानागतागोचरप्रतीतित्वात्
	प्रत्यभिज्ञावत्, प्रतीतित्वाद्वा घटोस्तीति प्रतीतिवत्। अत एव पाकरक्ते श्यामोयमिति
	धियोऽयथार्थत्वव्यवहारः लौकिकानां श्यामत्वस्य वर्तमानत्वेनावगमात्। वहीं पृ. 887

36.	यद्वा स घट इति स्मृतौ तत्ताविशिष्टस्य वर्तमानता भासते। वहीं

37.	नैयायिक कल्पना को मानसप्रत्यक्षरूप मानते हैं, परन्तु वह तदभाववान् में तद्वत्ता को विषय
	करती है। इस कारण प्रमा नहीं है।

श्री अरविन्द दर्शन में मनुष्य का
स्वरूप एवं उसकी नियति

श्रीप्रकाश पाण्डेय

मानवता का इतिहास उच्चतर मूल्यों एवं आकांक्षाओं से परिपूरित है। मनुष्य दीर्घकालिक भौतिक उपलब्धियों के बावजूद अपने वर्तमान से असंतुष्ट है। कारण कि वह कुछ उच्चतर लक्ष्यों की कामना करता है। यद्यपि कि ये लक्ष्य उसके वर्तमान ढाँचे से मेल नहीं खाते जिसके कारण उसे उसका वास्तविक लक्ष्य दूरस्थ प्रतीत होता है। इस प्रकार उसके वर्तमान अस्तित्व एवं उसकी आकांक्षाओं में विसंगति है। परन्तु विसंगतियों में संतुष्ट बने रहना पशुभावमय अंश के लिए तो संभव है, किन्तु पूर्णतया प्रबुद्ध मन के लिए संभव नहीं है। श्री अरविन्द के अनुसार, "उस अतिप्राचीन काल में जब मनुष्य में सप्रकाश विचारों का आविर्भाव हुआ, उसने एक महान लक्ष्य की अभीप्सा की। ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि यह लक्ष्य उसके लिए अनिवार्य और चरम है। कारण कि यह संशयवाद के दीर्घतम युगों के बाद भी विद्यमान रहता है और जब—जब इसे दूर हटाया जाता है तब—तब यह फिर लौट आता है। यह लक्ष्य जहाँ तक उसके विचारों की पहुँच सम्भव है उच्चतम भी है। यह लक्ष्य उसके सामने ईश्वर, ज्योति, अमरता सत्य, आनन्द, अमृतत्त्व के रूप में प्रगट हुआ। अतः इनकी अभीप्सा करते हुए वह ईश्वरान्वेषण में प्रवृत्त हुआ, उसके भीतर सुपूर्णता के प्रति अन्तर्वेग उठा, वह शुद्ध सत् तथा अमिश्रित आनन्द की खोज में प्रवृत्त हुआ, मरणशील मानवसत्ता में गुह्यभाव से अमरता रहती है, यह आभास उसे हुआ।"[1] पाश्चात्य दार्शनिक 'सुकरात', 'प्लेटो', 'अरस्तू' आदि ने भी इसी रहस्योद्घाटन का प्रयास किया। इसीलिए वर्गसाँ, ने बुद्धि की सीमित शक्ति पर प्रहार किया। फिर भी अनुद्घाटित रहस्य यथावत् रहा। परिणामतः रहस्यवाद की उत्पत्ति एवं विविध धर्मों का प्रादुर्भाव हुआ। "ईश्वर, ज्योति, अमरता के रूप में जो ज्ञान का प्राचीनतम सूत्र था, वह आज भी ज्ञान का अंतिम सूत्र होने का दावा कर रहा है।"[2] इसी तथ्य की

ओर 'ईशोपनिषद्' ने भी संकेत किया है। यथा– 'सत्य का मुख सुनहरे ढक्कन से ढका हुआ है। हे! पोषक सूर्य! सत्यधर्म के लिए, दृष्टि के लिए उसे हटा। हे सूर्य! अपनी किरणों को व्यवस्थित कर, उन्हें एकत्रित कर। मैं तुम्हारे परम आनंदमय रूप को देखूँ। वह जो पुरुष सर्वत्र है, वही मैं हूँ।'[3]

वस्तुतः इस संसार का महारोग यह है कि यहाँ मनुष्य अपनी यथार्थ अन्तरात्मा से अपरिचित है। वह संयोग और वियोग से युक्त जिस संसार में रहता है, वहाँ अपनी यथार्थ आत्मा से नहीं मिल पाता है। वह वहाँ सत्ता के सार तत्त्व को, चेतन सत्ता के सार तत्त्व को और आनंद के सार तत्त्व को, प्राप्त करने का प्रयास तो करता है, किन्तु इनके बजाय विरोधी स्पर्शों और प्रभावों के समूह को प्राप्त करता है। यदि वह उस सार तत्त्व को प्राप्त कर ले तो वह इन स्पर्शों और प्रभावों के जमघट में भी एकतम वैश्वसत्ता, वैश्वशक्ति, और वैश्वआनंद को पा लेगा। श्री अरविन्द के शब्दों में "मनुष्य की जो वर्तमान कालीन पशुभावमयी और अहंभावमयी चेतना है उसमें ब्रह्म को जानना, उसे प्राप्त कर लेना और वही हो जाना, अपने स्वरूप प्रकाश वाले धुँधले भौतिक मन को पूर्ण अतिमानस प्रकाश के रूप में परिणत कर देना, शारीरिक पीड़ा एवं भावावेगात्मक दुःख से आक्रान्त जो केवल क्षणिक तृप्तियाँ हैं उनके स्थान पर शान्ति एवं स्वयं सत् आनन्द का निर्माण करना, ...उसमें अमर जीवन को खोजना और प्राप्त करना यही उसकी नियति है।"[4]

किन्तु स्वभावतः प्रश्न उत्थापित होता है कि मनुष्य ऐसा क्यों नहीं कर पाता जिससे वह स्वयं में गुह्य आत्मस्वरूप को पहचान सके? उक्त प्रश्न के समाधान में श्री अरविन्द की मान्यता है कि वस्तुतः मनुष्य सप्तविध अज्ञान–मौलिक, विश्वात्मक, अहंभावात्मक, कालिक, मनोवैज्ञानिक, संगठनात्मक एवं व्यवहारिक से प्रभावित है। किन्तु हमें इस अज्ञान के निषेधात्मक पक्ष को नहीं ग्रहण करना चाहिए। श्री अरविन्द की मान्यता है कि "अज्ञान कोई भयंकर प्रमाद और पतन नहीं अपितु सप्रयोजन अवतरण है।"[5] इसी माध्यम से अतिमन की मध्यस्थता में ब्रह्म प्रसारण, उन्नयन, एवं समाकलन की प्रक्रिया द्वारा सृष्टि करता है। संक्षेपतः वही (ब्रह्म) अवरोहण की प्रक्रिया द्वारा स्वयं को अतिमानस के माध्यम से जड़ जगत् में भी प्रक्षिप्त करता है और पुनः जड़ से प्राण, मन और फिर ऊपर सच्चिदानन्द

के रूप में भी प्रगट होता है। किन्तु हमारा भौतिकवादी मन यह स्वीकार करने के लिए तैयार ही नहीं होता। कारण कि वह स्वयं भी अज्ञान की ही तो उपज या उसका अवान्तर रूप है। वरन् अज्ञान की कोई वास्तविक स्थिति नहीं होती। वह मात्र प्रतिभास है। अतः यदि मानव मन की संवीक्षा की जाय, तो हम पायेंगे कि वह एक बोझ एवं तनाव का समवेत रूप है। बोझ है अतीत का एवं तनाव है भविष्य का। इन दोनों से मुक्त होना भी मानव प्रयास का एक अंग होना चाहिए। भविष्य का तनाव बहु रूपों में हमारे मन को जकड़े हुए है। एक तो हम वर्तमान में जीते नहीं (अतिसूक्ष्म होने के कारण) और भविष्य में कोई जी नहीं सकता। जीना सदा आज और अभी है। जिस कल की बात हम करते हैं, वह कल्पना के अतिरिक्त और कहीं भी नहीं है और न ही कभी रहेगा। कल कभी नहीं आता। जो आता है, वह आज है, अभी है। फिर भी हमारा मन जीता है कल में। इस प्रकार पूर्वकालिक कल और आगामी कल की लम्बी धारा की कल्पना मन पर बैठती जाती है, उसे खींचती चली जाती है। इस प्रवाह में हम इतने अभ्यस्त एवं आदी हो जाते हैं कि इसका बोझ कितना ज्यादा है, इसका हमें पता ही नहीं चलता। हमें केवल उन्हीं बोझों का पता चलता है, जिनके हम अभ्यस्त नहीं होते। अतः कल में जीने की जो हमारी मनोवैज्ञानिक भूल है, उसे समझकर ही सम्भवतः हम पूर्वकालिक एवं आने वाले कल दोनों से मुक्त हो सकते हैं। किन्तु मुक्त हो जाने का यह कदापि अर्थ नहीं है कि हम कल के लिए कोई योजना ही न बनावें, क्रियाशील ही न हों। क्योंकि क्रिया उतनी ही सफल होती है, जितना कि कर्त्ता क्रिया में होता है। अन्यथा अक्रिया में जाने से क्रिया बन्द नहीं होती अपितु कर्त्ता ही मिट जाता है। गोया कि इस स्थिति में हमारे सामान्य अनुभवों एवं आध्यात्मिक अनुभवों में वैपरीत्य दृष्टि गोचर होता है और हम यथार्थ के परिवर्त्य रूप का अधिग्रहण कर लेते हैं। परिणामतः हम जीवन के दो मिथ्या भ्रमों— अतीत एवं वर्तमान में एक साथ जीते और मरते हैं।

वस्तुतः ऐसा इसलिए है कि मानव मन सीमित, परिसीमाओं में आबद्ध है। अतः स्वविस्तारण एवं अवस्थान्तरों में वह जो कुछ ग्रहण करता है, उसे ही प्रबलता के साथ महत्व देता है। वह सत्ता की समस्त भूमिकाओं को सीमित रूप में ही देखता है। ऐसी स्थिति में वह कभी–कभी अज्ञेयवादी भी

हो जाता है। उसे यह नहीं मालूम कि "ब्रह्म निष्क्रियता एवं सक्रियता को युगपत् धारण करता है।"[6] वह अज्ञेय है, फिर भी वह सत्ता की समस्त अवस्थाओं, चेतना के अनेक रूपों एवं क्रियाओं में दृष्टिगत होता है। वस्तुतः यहाँ मानव मन को बल इसलिए भी मिल जाता है कि विभिन्न उपनिषद् भी अज्ञेय को ही अनिर्वचनीय, अरूप, अनाम[7] आदि रूपों में अभिव्यक्ति करते हैं। किन्तु इससे यह नहीं समझना चाहिए कि मानव मन की एवम् अज्ञेयवादी परिणति त्रुटिपूर्ण है क्योंकि जिस मानव मन ने सकल अनन्त को अस्वीकार किया है, उससे ही हम सत्ता, अनंत एवं एकतमतत्त्व को भी मानने का आग्रह कर सकते हैं। इस स्थिति में उपनिषदों की भावात्मक समन्वयात्मक शिक्षा का ग्रहण अपरिहार्य होगा। श्री अरविन्द के शब्दों में "वह उपनिषदों की भावात्मक समन्वयात्मक शिक्षा ही है, जिसने देखा कि सत्, असत् एक दूसरे का विनाश नहीं करते अपितु ऐसे चरम विप्रतिषेध हैं, जिनके मध्य से हम अज्ञेय की ओर झाँकते हैं।"[8] "अविद्या द्वारा मृत्यु का तरण कर विद्या द्वारा अमरत्व को प्राप्त करते हैं।"[9] "सम्भूति द्वारा मृत्त्व को पार कर असम्भूति द्वारा अमृतत्व को प्राप्त करते हैं।"[10] हालाँकि बुद्धि द्वारा निर्णित विषयों, मन–व्यापार के दोषों से बचना बड़ा दुष्कर होता है क्योंकि मन मात्र इन्द्रियजन्य ज्ञान एवं प्रत्यक्ष दृष्टिगत भौतिक पदार्थों को ही यथार्थ मानने का आदी होता है। वह सहजता से यह स्वीकार नहीं करता है कि 'अपने सारतत्त्व में देवता वह एकतम सत् है, जिसे ऋषि भिन्न–भिन्न नामों से पुकारते हैं (एकम् सद् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति), सक्रिय रूप में वही वृहत् सत् और ऋत् में प्रतिष्ठित है और उससे ही सभी उद्भूत होते हैं।'[11] श्री अरविन्द की दृष्टि में सूक्ष्मतर मनोवैज्ञानिक ज्ञान हमें बतलाता है कि यह हमारी सत्ता के उत्तल तथ्यों पर आश्रित है। वस्तुतः जगत में मनुष्य का अस्तित्व इसलिए है कि वह उसमें रहता हुआ चेतना का इतना पर्याप्त विकास कर ले कि उसमें पूर्ण दिव्य आकारान्तरण सम्भव हो जाय। जीवन में ईश्वर को परिपूर्ण करना मनुष्य का मनुष्यत्व है। वह पशुस्वभाव जीवन और उसकी क्रियाओं से यात्रारम्भ करता है, परन्तु उसका लक्ष्य है, दिव्य सत्ता, दिव्य जीवन।[12] किन्तु इसका कदापि यह अर्थ नहीं है कि हमें अपने आधार रूप भौतिक जीवन (शारीरिक जीवन) का त्याग कर देना चाहिए तथा आध्यात्मिक जीवन के आकर्षण में शारीरिक

जीवन की उपेक्षा करनी चाहिए। वर्ना यह सत्ता का आंशिक ग्रहण होगा। इसीलिए 'शरीर को आत्मा का घर कहा गया है।'[13] इस परिवर्तनशील वस्त्र को धारण करने वाला सनातन आत्मा है। दूसरे पंचतत्त्व जिससे कि यह देह बना हुआ है, ऐसा श्रेष्ठ उपयुक्त द्रव्य है जिससे कि यह आत्मा निरन्तर अपने वस्त्रों को बुनता है और अपने लिए अनंत प्रकार के भवनों का निर्माण करता है। गीता में भी आत्मा की सनातनता का यही अभिप्राय है।[14] श्री अरविन्द भी इसी तथ्य की पुष्टि करते हैं। "जीवन एक ग्रन्थि है। इसमें चेतना के तीन सामान्य रूप – व्यक्ति, विश्व और विश्वातीत एक साथ सम्बद्ध हैं।"[15] अतः विश्वातीत की प्राप्ति के साथ व्यक्तिगत एवं विश्वीय सत्ता को बनाये रखना असंभव नहीं है।

यही कारण है कि श्री अरविन्द केवल सन्यासवादी या केवल भौतिकवादी प्रवृत्ति का निरसन करते हैं और प्रतिपादित करते हैं कि यदि विश्व में जीव का अस्तित्व भ्रम है तो मोक्ष का कुछ भी अर्थ नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि अद्वैतवाद भी जीवात्मा एवं ब्रह्म की एकता की पुष्टि करता है (जीवो ब्रह्मैवनाऽपरः)। उसको पृथक् मानना अज्ञान है तथा उस पृथकता के भाव से मुक्ति पाना, ब्रह्म के साथ एकत्व का अनुभव ही मोक्ष है,[16] कारण कि सर्वत्र आत्मा, ब्रह्म को एक ही स्वीकार किया गया है।[17] अतः व्यक्ति, विश्व एवं विश्वातीत का जो सच्चा सम्बन्ध है, वह हमारे अज्ञान के कारण हमसे छिपा रहता है। फिर ज्ञान प्राप्ति के उपरान्त जीव की आन्तरिक एवं बाह्य दृष्टियों में और फलस्वरूप उसके कर्म की भावना, परिणामों में उत्कृष्ट परिवर्तन हो जाता है। श्री अरविन्द के शब्दों में विश्वातीत की व्यक्ति में सचेतन अभिव्यक्ति ऐसा साधन है जिसके द्वारा समष्टि को, वैश्वमानव को भी आत्म सचेतन होना होता है। इसलिए ज्ञानी व्यक्ति का विश्व में रहते हुए कर्म करते रहना विश्वलीला की अनिवार्य आवश्यकता है।[18] "कारण कि "पशु एक ऐसी सजीव प्रयोगशाला है, जिसमें प्रकृति ने मनुष्य का निर्माण किया है, ऐसा कहा जाता है। मनुष्य भी भलीभाँति एक ऐसी ही सविचार और सजीव प्रयोगशाला है जिसमें और जिसके सचेतन सहयोग से वह अतिमानव के देवता के निर्माण की इच्छा रखती है।"[19] हमारी व्यक्तिगत सत्ता का एक भाग ऐसा है जिसके विषय में हम सर्वथा अज्ञान में रहते हैं। जितना कुछ हम अपने आप को जानते हैं

हम केवल उतना ही नहीं अपितु उससे अत्यन्त अधिक हैं, जिसे हम नहीं जानते हैं। "हमारा क्षणिक व्यक्तित्व, हमारी सत्ता रूप समुद्र के ऊपर एक बुलबुले के समान है।"[20]

इस प्रकार विश्व और व्यक्ति यही दो प्रधान दृश्य रूप हैं जिनमें कि अज्ञेय अवतीर्ण होता है और जिसके द्वारा उसे प्राप्त करना होता है। कारण दूसरे मध्यवर्ती तत्त्व केवल उन दोनों की क्रिया से ही उत्पन्न हुए हैं।[21] मन सीमित होने के कारण प्राण द्वारा प्रदत्त पदार्थों को वर्गीकृत कर स्वानुकूल बनाता है। परन्तु परम पूर्णतर रहस्य के ज्ञानोपरान्त प्राण, मन का मध्यान्तर समाप्त हो जाता है। उसे यह ज्ञात हो जाता है कि विश्व ब्रह्म का अनंत देश में प्रसार है और व्यक्ति उसी सर्वब्रह्म का चैतन्य रूप है। दूसरी बात यह कि हमारी वर्तमान चेतना विश्व के मूल्यों को जिन रूपों में ग्रहण करती है, व्यावहारिक दृष्टिकोण से तो ये मूल्य मानवानुभव एवं उसकी उन्नति के लिए तो ठीक हैं, किन्तु विश्व मूल्यों का सर्वत्र यथातथ ग्रहण अपेक्षित नहीं है कारण कि ''वैश्विक चेतना की ऐसी भी अवस्थाएँ हैं जिनमें मृत्यु अमर जीवन का परिवर्तित रूप है, दुःख वैश्वआनन्द रूपी जल का प्रचण्ड वेग वाला विपरीत प्रवाह है। परिसीमन अनंत का स्वयं अपनी ओर प्रत्यावर्तन है। अशुभ–शुभ का अपनी सम्पूर्णता की ओर चक्कर काटना है।"[22] फिर भी हमें व्यावहारिक मूल्यों को भी स्वीकृति प्रदान करनी चाहिए। श्री अरविन्द भी स्वीकार करते हैं कि "एक विशेष दृष्टिकोण से यह कहा जा सकता है कि जीवन एक व्यक्तिगत वस्तु है, किसी वैश्वसत्ता का प्रतिरूप और किसी बलशाली प्राण–ब्रह्म का श्वास–प्रश्वास नहीं है।"[23] दूसरी ओर वह विश्व ही है जिसके द्वारा व्यक्ति अपने रूप का अनुभव करने के लिए प्रेरित होता है। विश्व व्यक्ति को जीवन के रूप में प्राप्त होता है। जीवन एक क्रियात्मक शक्ति है जिसके सम्पूर्ण रहस्य पर व्यक्ति को अधिकार प्राप्त करना है। वह परस्पर टकराने वाले परिणामों का ऐसा समूह है, बीजभूत ऊर्जाओं का ऐसा आवर्तन है जिसके भीतर से उसे एक उच्चतम व्यवस्था को और एक अभी तक प्राप्त सामंजस्य को खोज निकालना है। मनुष्य की प्रगति का अन्ततोगत्वा यही अर्थ है।[24] सर्वपल्ली डॉ. राधाकृष्णन् भी परोक्ष रूप से स्वीकार करते हैं कि मनुष्य–मनुष्य का निरीक्षक हो गया है।"[25] "वह मानव पुत्र ही है जो परमेश्वर को अपने भीतर

मूर्तिमान रखने की सामर्थ्य रखता है। किन्तु वह जिसमें निवास करता है, तथा जो उसे होना चाहिए और होना है इन दोनों के साथ सामंजस्य नहीं रख पाता। वर्ना ऐसी स्थिति में ही यह ज्ञान होता है कि ''दुःखादि किसी पतन के दण्ड स्वरूप नहीं, अपितु मानव प्रगति के अवबन्ध हैं, जिस कार्य को पूरा करना है उसके ये सर्वप्रथम अंशक हैं।"[26] इस प्रकार मनुष्य के नियति सम्बन्धी विचारों का जैसा कि वह स्वयं का अतिक्रमण कर सकता है और केवल यही नहीं अपितु सम्पूर्ण दिव्य उच्चता को भी प्राप्त कर सकता है का जो विवरण श्री अरविन्द दर्शन में मिलता है वह किसी भी पाश्चात्य अथवा आधुनिक विचारकों में मुश्किल है।"[27] पी.टी. राजू तो पाश्चात्य विकास सिद्धान्त को श्री अरविन्द का ही सिद्धान्त कहते हैं।[28]

मानव स्वरूप की विवेचना करते समय उसके उस अपरिहार्य पक्ष का विवेचन अप्रासंगिक न होगा जिसके कारण वह स्वयं को ही सब कुछ मान लेने का भ्रम पाल लेता है। वह है– अहंकार और द्वन्द्व। कारण–मन भी उसकी नियति का ही एक आवश्यक उपकरण है। श्री अरविन्द इस अहंकार और द्वन्द्व की व्याख्या भी अपने विकास सिद्धान्त के ही परिप्रेक्ष्य में करते हैं। इनकी मान्यता है कि "सब कुछ ब्रह्म ही है तो दुःख अशुभ, परिसीमन केवल विकृतिकारी चैतन्य की ही अपनी अभिव्यक्तियाँ हो सकती हैं। यही वह चैतन्य है जो स्वयं को ज्ञान के क्षेत्र से अज्ञान के क्षेत्र में अवरोहित करता है।"[29] चैतन्य का यही रूप यहूदियों के धर्म ग्रन्थ 'बाइबिल' के उत्पत्ति प्रकरण में काव्यमयी भाषा में मनुष्य के पतन का रूपक बनाकर वर्णित किया गया है। यही विभाजक चेतना अपने साथ जीवन–मरण शुभ–अशुभ दुःख सुख तथा पूर्णता और अभाव आदि समस्त द्वन्द्वों की परंपरा को ले जाती है। यहूदियों के ग्रंथों में वर्णित 'आदम' से तात्पर्य है 'पुरुष', वह जो 'प्रकृति' से लुभायमान है तथा हौवा से तात्पर्य है 'प्रकृति' जो 'पुरुष' के आकर्षण का केन्द्र है। गीता भी इस आशय की पुष्टि करते हुए कहती है कि "पुरुष प्रकृति में आकर्षित होकर प्रकृति के गुणों का उपभोग करता है।"[30] किन्तु भौतिक चेतना में अवतरण का उद्देश्य केवल तभी पूरा होता है जब कि मानस चेतना उस उच्चतर ज्ञान को पुनः प्राप्त कर ले – जो द्वन्द्वों में संगति करता है उसमें तादात्म्य करता है, उन्हें दिव्य एकत्व का प्रतिरूप बना देता है।[31] इसीलिए पृथ्वी पर ईश्वर का

अवतरण (साम्राज्य) केवल एक रूपक मात्र नहीं है अपितु विशुद्ध ढंग से मानव प्रकृति के लिए अनुकरणीय है।[32] इसीलिए वर्गसाँ कहता है कि "व्यक्ति की परम स्थिति जीवन धारा के साथ एक हो जाना है। ईश्वरत्व को प्राप्त करना है।"[33] तब प्रो. मैत्रा पूछते हैं कि ईश्वर के साथ इस तादात्म्य का क्या अर्थ है? क्या इसका अर्थ सर्वेश्वर में मात्र विलीनता है? यदि हाँ, तो यह नियति कोई भी उत्साह पैदा नहीं करेगी। हाँ, केवल एक ही बात से हम संतुष्ट हो सकते हैं, वह यह कि उसके सानिध्य से हम दिव्यता को प्राप्त कर लेते हैं। किन्तु क्या वर्गसाँ हमें इसका आश्वासन देता है?

वस्तुतः मनुष्य का परम्परागत मन संकल्प–विकल्प के तानेबाने से बुना हुआ है, सदा अतीत के चिन्तन तथा वर्तमान में रहने का ऐसा आदी हो गया है कि उसके लिए पारलौकिक सत्ता की कल्पना सुगम नहीं है। इसके विपरीत बुद्धि सदैव से यह मानने के लिए बाध्य है कि सत् पहले से विद्यमान है।[34] उसकी ओर हम अज्ञान से होते हुए प्रगति कर सकते हैं, अविद्या से मृत्यु को पार कर विद्या से अमरत्व को प्राप्त कर सकते हैं[35] क्योंकि "ईश्वर ही सब प्राणियों के हृदय में रहकर अपनी माया से प्राणिमात्र को यंत्रारूढ़ जैसे घुमाता है।"[36] यही कारण है कि श्री अरविन्द स्वीकार करते हैं कि "यदि हम मिथ्या ज्ञान, शोक एवं दुःख के कारणों को जान लें तो हम कुछ अंशों के साथ उनके निरसन का प्रयास भी कर सकते हैं। कारण कि ज्ञान शक्ति है और साथ ही प्रभुत्व भी। अतः वही सम्भवन के आनन्द के लिए अवरोहित होता है।"[37] श्री अरविन्द यह भी स्वीकार करते हैं कि जिस प्रकार शान्ति, निश्चलता, सक्रियता को अनुमति प्रदान करती है उसी प्रकार असत् सत् को अनुमति प्रदान करता है।[38]

इस प्रकार हम देखते हैं कि अहंकार एक ऐसा मध्यवर्ती तत्त्व है जो उस अनिर्धार्य समग्र[39] से जो कि अंधकारमय एवं अरूप है तथा जिसे हम अवचेतन कहते हैं और जिसे 'ऋग्वेद' में पदार्थों का हृदय समुद्र[40] कहा गया है, उस एकतम सच्चिदानन्द को सचेतन के बहु के रूप में उन्मज्जित होने में समर्थ बनाता है। जीवन–मरण, सुख–दुःख, हर्ष–शोक सप्तविध अज्ञान, मिथ्याज्ञान, शुभाशुभ– ये द्वन्द्व अहंकारमयी चेतना की सर्वप्रथम रचनाएँ हैं जो हमें अनुभूत होती हैं।[41] किन्तु ये सारे विभेद मानव मन के

स्तर तक ही प्रभावी होते हैं। फिर अतिमन जो प्रकृति में मुख्य रूप से विद्यमान है, के अवतरण से अधिमन के स्तर तक जो क्रिया अज्ञान के आधार पर अग्रसर होती थी वह अब ज्ञान के आधार पर प्रवर्तित होगी। परिणामतः आध्यात्मिक मनुष्य विज्ञानमयप्राणी एवं अपरा प्रकृति पराप्रकृति में परिवर्तित हो जायेगी।

वास्तव में मानव मन जो कुछ जानता है उसे यह ठीक उसके परिवर्त्य–रूप में ही जानता है। कारण यह सप्तांग अज्ञान से ग्रसित है। किन्तु जब यह अपनी उच्चता में पहुँचता है तब यह समस्त विभेदिक परम्परा से दूर अतिमन द्वारा विज्ञानमय विकास को प्राप्त कर लेता है। यह विज्ञानमयप्राणी समस्त विभेदिक परम्परा से भिन्न उसे एक अंग के रूप में स्वीकार कर एकत्व एवं समग्रता का पोषक होता है। श्री अरविन्द के शब्दों में "विज्ञानमय विकास प्राण की समस्त आकांक्षाओं को इनकी पूर्णतम अभिव्यक्ति में उठा ले जायेगा। वह भौतिक पदार्थों का उपभोग करते हुए किन्तु बिना आसक्ति के यह अनुभव करेगा कि वह पदार्थ ब्रह्म का ही रूप है,"[42] प्राण परमसत् की ही चित्शक्ति का रूप है, जो विकास की त्रिविध प्रक्रिया– आरोहण, अवरोहण तथा समग्रता द्वारा परिसीमित है।

श्री अरविन्द के अनुसार, प्राण सारात्मना एक ही विश्वीय ऊर्जा का एक रूप है। यह उस ऊर्जा की भावात्मक और निषेधात्मक दो रूपों वाली क्रियात्मक गति या धारा है। यह उस शक्ति की ऐसी अविच्छिन्न क्रिया या क्रीड़ा है जो कि रूपों का निर्माण करती है, उद्दीपनाप्रद अविच्छिन्न प्रवाह के द्वारा ऊर्जा प्रदान करती है, उसके द्रव्य के विघटन और पुनर्नवीकरण करने वाली अविरत प्रक्रिया के द्वारा उन्हें अस्तित्व में बनाये रखती है।[43] अतः स्पष्ट है कि द्रव्य का विघटन और पुनर्नवीकरण, स्थिति और परिवर्तन, जन्म, मृत्यु, प्राण की सतत् प्रक्रिया है। सभी अपना नवीकरण करते हैं, कुछ भी नष्ट नहीं होता। वनस्पति, पशु एवं मानव के प्राण में कोई मौलिक अन्तर नहीं है। वही शक्ति अपने को वनस्पति में अवमानस संवेदन, कामना संवेदन और कामना इच्छा के रूप में, विकासशील पशु में आत्मचेतन संवेदन और मनुष्य में मानस इच्छा और ज्ञान के रूप में अभिव्यक्त करती है। प्राण वैश्व ऊर्जा का एक ऐसा सोपान है जिसमें निश्चेतना से चेतना की ओर संक्रमण किया जाता है।[44] इस प्रकार

प्राण–व्यापार की तीन भूमिकाएँ हैं– जड़, जीव और प्राण। अवचेतन, चेतन और आत्मचेतन। अतः परमाणु से लेकर मनुष्य तक सर्वत्र सारात्मक एक ही प्राण का अस्तित्व दृष्टिगोचर होता है। परमाणु में सत्ता के द्रव्य और क्रिया अवचेतन अवस्था में रहते हैं। वे अवचेतन द्रव्य और क्रिया पशु में सचेतन अवस्था में पहुँच जाते हैं। वनस्पति का प्राण इस विकास में दोनों की बीच की भूमिका है।[45]

वास्तव में हमारे भीतर अन्तरात्मा या चैत्य तत्त्व वैसे ही हैं जिस प्रकार कि प्रत्येक दूसरा विश्वीय तत्त्व हैं। इसी प्रकार दो प्राण भी हैं– प्रथम बाहरी जो भौतिक देह में अन्तर्ग्रस्त है तथा द्वितीय, जो जीवन की अन्तस्तलीय शक्ति है। साथ ही दो मन भी हैं। एक वह जो हमारे उत्तल तल पर रहता है और हमारे विकासमान अहंकार की सृष्टि करता है। दूसरा वह जो अन्तस्तलीय अन्तःपरिचेतन में है। यह हमारा सच्चा मनोमय है। इसी प्रकार हमारे भीतर द्विविध चेतनतत्त्व रहता है। एक है– उत्तलीय सकाम आत्मा तथा दूसरा है अन्तस्तलीय चेतनतत्त्व। यह ज्योति, प्रेम और हर्ष की शुद्ध शक्ति है। यह हमारी सत्ता का परिष्कृत सारतत्त्व है जिसे हम अपनी चैत्यसत्ता के नाम से गौरवान्वित करते हैं। हमारे बाहरी रूप के पीछे रहने वाला हमारा यह यथार्थ अन्तरात्मा है।[46] हमारी सत्ता के जो बाहरी रूप हैं वे हमारी लघु अहंकारमयी सत्ता के रूप में है; अन्तस्तलीय रूप हमारे विशालतर सच्चे व्यक्तित्व के विरचन हैं। अतः यह अन्तरात्मा चैत्यतत्त्व की, सदा सत्य, न्याय, सौन्दर्य की और प्रेम, सामंजस्य तथा हममें जो कुछ भी दिव्य सम्भावना है उस सबकी ओर इंगित करता रहता है और जब तक ये वस्तुयें हमारी प्रकृति की प्रधान आवश्यकता नहीं बन जाती हैं, तब तक वैसा करता रहता है। हममें वह चैत्य व्यक्तित्व ही है जो कि साधु, संत, ऋषि के रूप में उपस्थित होता है। जब यह अपने पूर्ण बल को प्राप्त कर लेता है तब हमारी सत्ता को आत्मा और परमात्मा के ज्ञान की ओर, परमतत्त्व, परमश्रेय, परम ज्ञान, परम सौन्दर्य परम प्रेम और परमानंद की ओर, दिव्य उच्चताओं और विशालताओं की ओर प्रवृत्त करता है तथा हमें आध्यात्मिक सहानुभूति विश्वात्मक और एकत्व के स्पर्श के लिए खोल देता है।[47] इसी चैत्य तत्त्व को श्री अरविन्द ने विज्ञानमय प्राणी की संज्ञा दी है।

स्वभावतः प्रश्न उत्थापित होता है कि विज्ञानमय प्राणी के व्यक्तित्व में नैतिक मानकों का क्या स्थान है? वस्तुतः श्री अरविन्द नीत्शे के अतिमानव, जिसमें वह शनैःशनैः परम्परागत नैतिकता, परोपकार, दया, सहानुभूति, कृतज्ञता को ग्रहण करने के बाद पूर्ण होता है से भिन्न विज्ञानमय अवस्था में इसे अनिवार्य नहीं मानते हैं। उनका मन्तव्य है कि नैतिक मानकों का स्थान मानसिक स्तर पर होता है, पाप–पुण्य, शुभाशुभ में संघर्ष मानव प्रकृति में ही अनुभूत होते हैं। यही कारण है कि 'प्लेटो' ने 'मुख्य सद्गुण' 'अरस्तू' ने 'मध्यम मार्ग' 'काण्ट' ने 'निरपेक्ष आदेश' का सिद्धान्त प्रतिपादित किया है। किन्तु इसका कदापि यह अर्थ नहीं है कि विज्ञानमय प्राणी अनैतिक है। वास्तविकता यह है कि उसकी सम्पूर्ण नैतिक क्रियायें स्वभावतः प्रवर्तित होती हैं। यही कारण है कि श्री अरविन्द स्वीकार करते हैं कि हमारा योग मानवता के लिए नहीं अपितु दिव्यलोक के लिये है, का अर्थ हमें मानवता में दिव्यता के रूप में स्वीकार करना चाहिए।[48] श्री अरविन्द यह भी स्वीकार करते हैं कि जब एक बार विज्ञानमय विकास निष्पन्न हो जाता है तो सद्गुणों के मानकों की आवश्यकता नहीं रह जाती .....तब सब कुछ आध्यात्मिक आत्मप्रकृति का आत्मप्रवाह, स्वभाव का स्वधर्म हो जाता है।[49] दूसरा तथ्य जिसे श्री अरविन्द उद्घाटित करते हैं, वह यह कि कोई आवश्यक नहीं है कि विज्ञानमय प्राणियों की सम्पूर्ण जाति एक ही ढाँचे में ढली एक ही नमूने की होगी[50] तथा जीवन मुक्ति या विदेह मुक्ति ही मनुष्य की अंतिम नियति है। वस्तुतः यह आत्मा की मुक्ति नहीं अपितु स्वभाव की मुक्ति या अज्ञान के कृत्रिम तरीकों से मुक्ति है। अतः विज्ञानमय विकास (प्राणी) आध्यात्मिक विकास की चरमावस्था होगा तथा उसके लिए सम्पूर्ण विश्व यथार्थ होंगे। वह अपने में परम पुरुष का अनुभव करेगा।[51] वह सम्पूर्ण व्यक्तियों में अपने आप को देखेगा।[52] श्री अरविन्द के शब्दों में "वह जगत में और जगत् का होगा। परन्तु साथ ही वह अपनी चेतना का अतिक्रमण भी कर जायेगा और उससे ऊपर अपने विश्वातीत स्वरूप में भी निवास करेगा। वह विश्वात्मक होगा और विश्व में स्वतंत्र भी होगा। वह अपना व्यक्तित्व रखेगा किन्तु व्यक्तित्व के पृथक्कारी भाव से परिसीमित नहीं होगा।"[53] इसका परिणाम होगा वह सभी प्रकार के मोह, भय आदि से अप्रभावित हो जायगा।[54]

इस प्रकार श्री अरविन्द मनुष्य के सम्पूर्ण जीवन को उसकी यथार्थता में अभिग्रहीत करते हुए प्रतिपादित करते हैं कि 'समस्त जीवन अपने सारतत्त्व में एक वैश्व और अमरसत्ता की प्रक्रिया है। समस्त संवेदन और भावावेग अपने सारतत्त्व में वैश्व और स्वयं सत्, चित् एवं आनन्द की क्रीड़ा हैं। समस्त विचार और प्रत्यक्ष अपने सारतत्त्व में एक वैश्व और सर्वव्यापी सत्य का विकिरण हैं। समस्त क्रियायें अपने सारतत्त्व में एक वैश्व और स्वयं परिणामी शुभ की क्रमशः प्रगति हैं।[55] मानव जीवन का परम लक्ष्य है– आत्मा और ब्रह्म के दर्शन करके पहले आत्मा को प्रकृति के आवरण या बन्धन से मुक्त करना; विज्ञानमय लोक से विज्ञानमयतत्त्व का अवतरण करके मानवमन, प्राण और शरीर का दिव्य रूपान्तर करना, मानव जीवन को दिव्य जीवन के रूप में तथा मानव जाति को देव जाति के रूप में परिणत करना और इस प्रकार ब्रह्म की दिव्य सत्ता, दिव्य चेतना और दिव्य आनन्द की अधिकाधिक अभिव्यक्ति करते हुए उसकी पार्थिव दिव्य लीला में भाग लेते रहना एवं स्वर्ग को पृथ्वी पर उतारना तथा पृथ्वी को स्वर्ग के रूप में परिणत करना।[56]

<div align="right">
दर्षन एवं धर्म विभाग

काषी हिन्दू विष्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी 221005
</div>

सन्दर्भ एवं टिप्पणी

1. दिव्य जीवन, प्रथम भाग, पृ. 28.

2. वही, पृ. 28.

3. ईशोपनिषद्, 15, हिरण्यमयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम्।

4. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 28–29.

5. वही, द्वितीय भाग, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ. 362.

6. Dr. R.S. Mishra, The integral Advaitism of Sri Aurobindo, p. 72.

7. माण्डूक्योपनिषद्, 7, केनोपनिषद्, 1.3, कठोपनिषद्, 12.9. नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया।

8. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 76.

9. ईश., 1.1 – अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते।

10. ईश., 1.14, विनाशेन मृत्युं तीर्त्वा सम्भूत्यामृतमश्नुते।

11. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 242.

12. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 78.

13. महाभारत, शान्तिपर्व 15.17.8 – गृहाणीव हि मर्त्यानामाहुर्देहानि पण्डिताः।

14. गीता, 2.22.

15. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 79.

16. आत्मोपनिषद्, 31.

17. वृहदारण्यक, 2.5.19 – अयमात्माब्रह्म। ईश 16 – योऽसावसौ पुरुषः सोऽहमस्मि, छान्दोग्य 6.2.1 – सदेवसोम्येदमग्रमासीत्।
गीता 15.7 ...ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः।

18. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 80.

19. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 31.

20. वही, द्वितीय भाग, प्रथम खण्ड, पृ. 315, 316.

21. वही, भाग 1, पृ. 88.

22. वही, भाग 1, पृ. 100.

23. वही, भाग 1, पृ. 103.

24. वही, भाग 1, पृ. 91, 92.

25. Preface, Estern Religion and Western Thought.

26. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 95.

27. Prof. S.K. Maitra, The Meeting of the East and the West] p. 10.

28. Idealistic Thought of India.

29. छान्दोग्योपनिषद्, 3.14.

30. गीता, 10.20, 13.17, 10.42.

31. वही, 13.21.

32. Coted words, Sri Aurobindo in H.G. Wells, View and review.

33. Prof. S.K. Maitra, The meeting of the East and the West in Sri Aurobindo p. 102.

34. गीता, 2.16 – नासतो विद्यते भावो ना भावो विद्यते सतः।।

35. ईश, 1.11 – अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते।।

36. गीता, 18.19.

37. तैत्तिरीय 3.6 – आनंदाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रत्यभिसम्विशन्तीति.

38. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 67.

39. केन. 1.3, तैत्ति. 2.4, यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह। कठ. 1.3.15, माण्डू. 7.

40. ऋग्वेद, 4.58.5.

41. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 109.

42. दिव्य जीवन, द्वितीय भाग, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ. 407.

43. वही, भाग 1, पृ. 269.

44. वही, भाग 1, पृ. 280.

45. वही, भाग 1, पृ. 283.

46. दिव्य जीवन, भाग 1, पृ. 329.

47. वही, भाग 1, पृ. 336.

48. Prof. N.K. Gupta, The Yoga of Sri Aurobindo, part I, p. 9.

49. दिव्य जीवन, द्वितीय भाग, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ. 418.

50. वही, द्वितीय भाग, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ. 398, 399.

51. गीता, 15.7 6.29.

52. ईश., 6, यस्तु सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मन्येवानुपश्यति। सर्व भूतेषु चात्मानं ततो न विजुगुप्सते।।

53. दिव्य जीवन, द्वितीय भाग, द्वितीय खण्ड, पृ. 392.

54. ईश. 7, तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः।
तैत्ति. 2.9 – आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विभेति कुतश्चनेति.

55. दिव्य जीवन, द्वितीय भाग, प्रथम खण्ड, पृ. 108.

56. वही, प्रथम भाग, प्रथम खण्ड, पृ. 27 (Heaven and earth equalised would Join hands in the bliss of supreme).

EXTERNALISM AND INTERNALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND : SOME ISSUES

R.C. PRADHAN

The problem of externalism and internalism has remained intractable in contemporary philosophy of language and mind. Philosophers have been divided over whether the meanings and the mental contents are external or internal and whether we can understand language and mind with reference to the world or without any reference at all. Thus there has been a genuine problem whether we can make any sense of language and thought without some connection with the world.

In this paper I will try to locate the externalism-internalism debate in the philosophy of language and mind so as to show that the problem has arisen precisely because there has been assumed to be a gulf between language and mind, on the one hand, and the world, on the other. If we can in some way make this gulf minimal we can get rid of some of the problems raised by the philosophers.

I. THE EXTERNALIST STAND : RELATING MIND AND LANGUAGE TO THE WORLD.

The philosophical position that holds that language and thought are directed at the world and that they are intentionally related to the latter is known as the externalist position. Such a position can hardly be questioned except for the fact that sceptics challenge this epistemic position for fear of our being wrong in all our mental and linguistic representations of the world. It is the standard position of the sceptics that we may be having mental and linguistic representations of the world, but all of them may be false, because we may dream or we may be deceived by a demon,

as Descartes had argued in First Meditations.[1] But this situation can be easily denied because we are not dreaming all the time, nor are we always deceived in our representations of the world. Sometimes we may go wrong but not always. The sceptical challenge has been successfully met by externalist philosophers like Descartes, Kant, Wittgenstein, McDowell and many others who are firmly committed to the externalist position.

The externalist faces the main problem which is like this: we are not in the situation depicted in Descartes' First Meditation, that we are not either dreaming or in the state of being deceived by a Demon. But it is not easy to prove that we are not. That is the real issue. We cannot easily wriggle out of the situation without a firm commitment to externalism, Akeel Bilgrami explains the externalist position in the following passage:

A general characterization of the doctrine of extemalism is that the contents of an agent's beliefs are not independent of the world external to the agent. It is a denial of the view that intentionality is fully characterizable independent of the external world, or to put it in terms of Descartes's First Meditation, it denies the view that an agent's intentional contents would be just what they are even if it turned out that there was no external world. Externalism, so characterized, is an important about intentionality[2].

Thus stated externalism has the following points to make:

1. There is an intentional relation between the contents of the agent's belief and the external world.
2. The mental contents are not independent of the external world because they cannot remain what they are if the world does not exist.
3. The contents of beliefs are semantically evaluable only in relation to the external world.

4. Internalism of Descartes's First Meditation type is not acceptable.

The externalists are unanimous in saying that we do not need to bother too much about the possible question whether we are not dreaming always or whether the demon may not be deceiving us all the time. It is because such questions do not have a knock-down answer. All that we can say is that we are not dreaming all the time nor are we being deceived always. Our perceptual experiences regarding the world are true more often than not. All our activities, in short, our language and thought vouch for the fact that that we are in constant touch with the world.

II. WE ARE NOT LIKE BRAINS IN A VAT

Putnam's thought experiment regarding whether we are like brains in a vat[3] is worth considering in this context. The thought experiment is like this: suppose our brains have been taken away from our body and kept in a vat full of nutrients to keep the brains alive. Suppose further that a scientist manipulates the brain through a remote control device and produces experiences in the brains like the experiences we have in our normal life regarding the world. Thus the brains-in-vat experiences are very much like the normal experiences which we have in general. Now the question arises: Are the vat-experiences in any case regarding the world so that they can be true or false regarding the world? The answer is obviously No, because there is no way to establish that the vat-experiences are regarding the world as they have been manipulated by the scientist. The vat-experiences appear to be regarding the world but are really not. The brains -in-the- vat do not, however, know that they are not regarding the world at all. That is why the brains-in-the-vat are in constant illusions regarding the world. But those who are outside the vat know that all the vat- experiences are illusory. From this one can infer that even though the vat-

experiences appear to be regarding the world, they are genuinely not and so they are not true regarding the world at all[4].

Putnam very aptly argues that the above thought experiment shows that our thought and language are in direct relation with the world because we represent the world as it really is in terms of our concepts. The world is supposed to be independent of our mind and language because the world is the object of our linguistic and mental representations[5]. This is an externalist thesis which shows that are experiences of the world and their intentional contents are directly determined by the world. There is a causal relation between our mental contents and the world because in its absence the relation between thought and world would be magical[6] and not genuine. What externalism demands is a real and causally necessary relation between language and mind on the one hand and the world on the other. Putnam puts maximum stress on reference of our linguistic expressions to secure relation with the world.

The brain-in-the-vat argument puts the mind-world relationship in bold relief by denying that we are like the brains in a vat. It shows that it is inconsistent to believe that we are like brains in vat while we are in the actual world. The vat- world like the vat- language is in no way real and therefore there can be no question of relating the vat-mind with the world. The vat-mind and vat-world go together but they have nothing to offer so far as the relation between our mind and our world is concerned. The vat-English could have words like 'grass' and green' but they do not refer to grass and green in the real world. This is because these words in vat - English do not have a causal relation with the real objects in the world. Thus we have to accept that real world stands in actual causal relation with our mind and language and not in a fictional way.

The more we probe the mind-world relationship the deeper we find the relationship between mind and the world. Many-sided

are the ways the mind is related to the world; the causal relation is only one of them.

III. THE MENTAL CONTENTS AND THE TWIN EARTH ARGUMENT

The mind-world relationship has much to do with what mental contents we have in expressing our beliefs in language. These contents are the intentional contents which link our language and mind to the world. But the question is: Are these contents to be individuated internally or externally, that is, are to be located in the inner mechanism of the mind or they to be located outside the mind ? These questions have bothered philosophers across the centuries. The externalists like Putnam, Burge and McDowell have argued that the mental contents are determined externally by the world outside the mind and are therefore called the wide contents or the broad[7] contents.

Putnam's Twin Earth[8] example is one of the most referred to thought experiment which proves the point that the contents are dependent on the world and are external by nature. Suppose, Putnam says, there is Twin Earth exactly like the Earth in which my molecule by molecule duplicate or the *Doppelganger* exists. Now suppose there is on the Twin Earth something like water on the Earth. But while water on the Earth is H_2O water on the Twin Earth is XYZ. Let us call the Twin earth water twater which resembles water in all properties like quenching thirst except in its chemical composition. Thus on the Earth the word 'water' refers to water which is H_2O, while the word 'twater' refers to XYZ. However, my water-thoughts and the twater-thoughts of my twin look alike because our mental contents are the same, because both water and twater quench thirst. One could easily agree that the mental contents are the same because my twin is my duplicate molecule by molecule. The internalists will be happy to say that the

mental contents have nothing to do with the world and therefore they will be the same, whether they are water- thoughts or twater-thoughts. But Putnam does not agree with this interpretation of the mental contents.

Putnam argument is as follows: the thoughts, namely the water-thoughts and the twater-thoughts are different because what they refer to are different. When my twin refers to twater, he refers to XYZ , while I refer to water which is H_2O. This shows that the mental contents are determined externally by the objects in the world. Putnam writes:

What goes on inside people's heads does not fix the reference of their terms. In a phrase due to Mill, 'the substance itself completes the job of fixing the extension of the term[9].

Thus Putnam argues that the mental contents do not fix the reference of the terms in our language, even though they are important so far as the inner mechanism of the mind is concerned. The reference is fixed by the objects outside the mind.

Putnam goes to the extent of saying that it is not the mental contents which fix the meaning of the terms in our language. Rather reference determines the meaning of the terms. The so-called Fregean sense as an abstract inner content does not determine meaning. The classical notion of intension as opposed to extension has nothing to do with meaning. Meanings are not in the head[10], so to say. Putnam writes:

We have seen that the traditional theory of meaning is wrong; and this is why the literature today contains many different concepts (e.g. 'intension' and 'notional world') and not a single unitary concept of 'meaning' 'Meaning' has *fallen into pieces*. But we are left with the task of picking up the pieces. If intension and extension are not directly fixed by the notional world, then, *how are they fixed*?[11]

This shows that Putnam makes meaning accountable to the world because of its referential character and is not confined within the internal world of the mental contents.

Putnam is talking about the reference-based meaning and rejecting the traditional theory of meaning as sense or intension. The reason for this is that he feels it leads us nowhere because meaning is lost in the mental world. By that of course he suggests that meaning can be retrieved from the mental world by taking it back to the actual world via reference of the words and sentences to objects and states of affairs in the world. This is the only way we can makes meaning accountable to the world and get it fixed in the context of the world and the society in which the speaker is situated. Putnam makes semantics responsible to the society which evolves norms and concepts and makes reference to the world possible. Thus meaning and reference go external and make language the operational system in which words and sentences function.

IV. THE WIDE AND NARROW CONTENTS : THE SEMANTIC DIVISION

Putnam's account of the mental contents leads one to suppose that there must be two ways in which one can articulate the mental contents, that is, the contents of the beliefs and thoughts. The twin earth example is a clear case of the contents being externally determined in the sense that me and my twin earth duplicate might have the same mental contents like water-thoughts, but in fact they have different beliefs or thoughts because my belief is about H_2O, while duplicate's beliefs are regarding XYZ. The mental contents are the narrow contents which do not fix the meaning of the beliefs or thoughts; it is rather the external or wide contents which fix the meaning. The beliefs are about the world which make them true or false. Unless the external world enters into relation with the beliefs

and thoughts, no meaning and truth-conditions will be available. Thus the referential links with the world make the contents wide rather than narrow.

Putnam is in the company of Tyler Burge[12] in defending the wide contents as against the narrow contents. His argument is that two individuals might have the same narrow contents, but can differ widely in their beliefs because of the way the beliefs are related to the world. He emphasises the fact that it is the social world which fixes the meanings like the 'elm' and 'beech' because the experts know what is what. Burge's social externalism is fastened on his notion of the wide contents because of the fact that contents are determined by the society around us and not by the objects alone. The wide contents are such that they determine the meanings of the terms because of the fact that no term is meaningful in abstraction from the social context. Wide contents make the beliefs accountable to the world and therefore semantically evaluable. As Bilgrami says:

"To put the constitutive thesis of social externalism in a word: the linguistic practices of a community can often affect the individual mind in the sense that we attribute to an individual the same concepts as his fellows, even when he has quite divergent beliefs"[13]

That is, social externalism is constitutive of the concepts and meanings associated with the beliefs. The individual beliefs lose their identity in the web of socially constituted beliefs.

Those who oppose social externalism oppose the very idea of wide contents because they believe that contents are basically narrow being the contents of beliefs independently of the world. The narrow contents are individuated within the system of beliefs and not outside because each belief has its contents on its own. Fodor[14] who is a defender of the narrow contents argues that it is the narrow contents which determine meaning of the beliefs and

thoughts as they are anchored in the language of thought. He believes that there is an internal language which is the language of thought and it is this language which has a structure anchoring all the words. The beliefs are syntactically anchored in the language of thought and so are their contents independently how they are related to the objects in the world. That explains why the contents of our beliefs are narrow and not wide. Unlike the wide contents, the narrow contents are individuated in the mind or the brain which itself has a syntactic structure. They are supervenient on the computational states of the brain'[15]

There has been an effort notably by Bilgrami to argue for a unified content theory[16] that supports neither wide nor narrow contents. For him, there is only one content which is neither narrow nor wide. It is the one which is part of the belief but at the same it is relating to the world. As a content of the belief it is the mental or intentional content but for that matter is not narrow in the Fodorian sense because it is not individuated in the belief itself. For example, the belief regarding water is a belief regarding water and nothing else. In that sense it is wide in the accepted sense without denying its individual character. Thus content is unified in its structure rather than wide or narrow in an exclusive sense. In a sense, the same content is characterized as narrow from one perspective and the same is characterized as wide from another perspective. But this bifurcation is warranted because we do not have two sets of contents to contend with. The bifurcation is handiwork of those who look at mind and language from two points of view, one externalist and the other internalist. We find in Descartes these two perspectives. From a subjective point of view, there is no necessity making our thoughts dependent on the world, while from the objective point of view, there is necessity of making thoughts dependent on the world for their semantic valuation. Bilgrami does not need the bifurcation because the subjective and

the objective aspects coalesce in the same contents which are individuated without being exclusively mental or indfividualistic[17].

V. THE WORLD AND THE SPACE OF REASONS

The contents being mental as well social are not a new theory. It is already anticipated by Wittgenstein and McDowell in many ways. Both have argued from different angles that what we call mental is also at the same time social and normative. In that what we call the contents are already constituted by the grammar as in Wittgenstein and by the space of reasons as in McDowell.

Wittgenstein takes it as his primary task to take the beliefs and thoughts as having a grammatical structure[18] in which the contents are placed. Such contents are not in the head for the reason that language is the place in which they are located. Contents of the belief "It is raining" are in the belief itself which is linguistically expressed. Here there is no way we can take the content out of the belief and call it either narrow or wide. They are grammatically constituted within the belief-language-game but they are also about the world. The rain in the world is the object of the belief which is outside language and yet it is constituted by grammar. The relation between the belief and the world is constituted within grammar and so there is no internal and external divide between contents. The belief-contents are already contents about the believed objects. In that sense, where is the place for the division between the wide and narrow contents.

Wittgenstein does not make a semantic division between what we think or intend and what we intend or think about, i.e. the objects of belief and intention. The two sides of the semantic content, namely the internal and external fall within the space of grammar[19]. That is say, within the space of grammar, what the belief-content is and what it is about. This division between the

inner and the outer simply gets blurred because of the nature of the belief itself. No amount of effort to keep the belief dissociated from the world is possible because it is not logically or grammatically possible to do so. The language-game concerning belief does not allow this to happen. In all cases of intentional use of terms such as "intending" "expecting", "thinking", etc are grammatically so made that in every case of such use, we have the conjunction both what we have as the contents and the objects outside the contents. Grammar is thus the uniting force in all cases of language-use.

The so-called distinction between wide and narrow content is buried within grammar because, as McCulloch[20] points out, the contents of the beliefs and thoughts surface only within the framework of the world and the forms of life. Beliefs and contents being in the world are integrated together such that it is difficult to dissociate one from the other. The mental and non-mental both are constituted within grammar.

McDowell pursues Wittgenstein's approach in his conception of the contents being placed in the space of reasons[21] very much like the space of grammar in Wittgenstein. For him, any belief or perception or thought is already constituted within the space of concepts and so is given a certain necessary structure within the space of reasons. This resists the beliefs against being alienated from the space of concepts so that their contents are already in a public space. The narrow contents as well as the wide contents are conceptually organized and so there is no necessity of making a choice between either or both of them. All contents are conceptual and so there is already a conceptual space in which the objective world itself is constituted[22]. So what is narrow in the accepted sense as belonging to the mind is also wide being already in the open space of the world. This conceptual link between mind and

the world makes it sure that we have no place for narrow psychology which intends to keep the narrow contents self-contained in the mind.

McDowell has a larger picture in which the human mind is not in the head and it spreads its conceptual framework across the world in the sense that the world itself is placed within the conceptual space. McDowell writes:

In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in is *that things are thus and so. That things are thus and so* is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgement: it becomes the content of a judgement if the subject decides to take the experience at face value. So it is conceptual content. But *that things are thus and so* is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the: it is how things are[23].

Thus we have the scenario of the contents of experience and judgement being an aspect of the layout of the world . That is, the layout or the structure of the world is already anticipated in the structure of experience, in this picture, the wide and the narrow contents get integrated into the conceptual contents. McDowell observes:

Although reality is independent of our thinking, it is not to be pictured as outside an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. *That things are thus and so* is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of an experience is not misled, that very same thing, *that things are thus and so*, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world[24].

Thus we can find that both the narrow and the wide contents merge together in the space of concepts or the space of reasons, according to McDowell.

VI. MEANING AND THE WORLD ORDER

What transpires from the above discussion is that there is a necessary relation between our concepts and the world which is

represented in the concepts. The concepts are expressed in language and so there is a necessary relation between language and the world. Kant, Wittgenstein and McDowell have taken this necessary relation into account while explaining how we represent the world in our conceptual system. What is real in the world is already bound up with what conceptual and linguistic representations we have.

The question of meaning being related to the world order has been highlighted by such philosophers as Frege, Wittgenstein, Davidson, Dummett, Putnam and Fodor in their account of sense and reference in various ways. Though meaning is variously conceived by the philosophers, there has been a vital link between meaning and reference, on the one hand and the world on the other. Especially, reference has been always regarding the world because it is via reference that many expressions in language have their meaning, especially proper names, natural kind terms, etc. Meaning and reference are two sides of the same semantic structure[25]. It is because of this that Putnam holds that meaning like reference is world-dependent as his Twin Earth thought experiment. All the externalists in meaning theory hold that it is the world which constitutes meaning of the world- referring expressions[26]. Fodor writes:

What determines their meanings is *which things in the world the theory connects them to*. The unit of meaning is not the theory; it is the world/symbol correlation *however mediated*[27].

The world-symbol correlation is important for fixing the meaning of such terms as 'water', 'tiger', etc. The mediation by a theory or by a Fregean sense is left open in the above passage in view of the fact that meaning has to be a combination of the Fregean thought-content or sense and the reference to the appropriate object in the world. The Fregean sense is present in any

explanation of meaning because without it no reference can be determined.

But the main question is: Can the world really determine meaning if meaning is already embedded in language? That is, if meaning is the normative structure of language, can the world contribute to this structure? The externalists have a point in saying that the objects in the world are the correlates of the words in language and so have to say in the meaning of these terms. But is that all about meaning? Is there not something purely normative or grammatical about meaning which is not accountable to the world as Wittgenstein[28] suggests? This point needs to be probed further because what we call the world may be already organized in accordance with the conceptual structure of which meaning is a part.

Let us take up the suggestion of McDowell that the world is in the space of concepts and that what we call real is accountable to the conceptual structure we have. If the world is conceptually organized, then we have no reason to say that the world causally determines the meaning of the words in language. There is no causal relation between the meanings and the objects in the world. Reference may be causally determined but not meaning. Meaning itself is presupposed by any reference to the objects.

VII. CONCLUDING REAMRKS

The two contending theories of meaning, namely externalism and internalism have opened up two ways of looking at meaning. While internalism takes meaning as part of the mind and the conceptual system including language, externalism pushes it beyond language into the world. If we take either as true we may miss the many-sidedness of meaning itself. Meaning is absolutely about language and its use, but it also tells us what we mean in our language when we use words about the world. In some sense, the

world is brought in for considerations in the total picture of meaning. But the world cannot be the source of meaning nor can it causally determine meaning because in that case meaning itself will be lost[29].

Department of Philosophy
University of Hyderabad,
Hyderabad (A.P.)

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Vol. 1 trans. E.S.Haldane and G.R.T.Ross (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911).

2. A. Bilgrami, *Belief and Meaning* (Blackwell, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA, 1992; Paperback 1994), p. 2.

3. See H. Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981), Chapter 1.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Cf. Ibid. on the magical theory of reference.

7. See Jerry Fodor, *Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind* (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, England).

8. See Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in *Mind, Language and Reality* (Philosophical Papers Vol. 2) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975), pp. 215-271.

9. Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, p. 25.

10. See Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in *Mind, Language and Reality*, pp. 223-227.

11. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 29.

12. See Tyler Burge, "Individualism and Psychology", *The Philosophical Review*, 95 (1986).

13. Bilgrami, op.cit., p. 23.
14. See Fodor, op.cit. See also his "A Modal Argument for Narrow Contents", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 88. No. I (Jan.1991), pp. 5-26.
15. Ibid.
16. Bilgrami, op.cit
17. Ibid.
18. See Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, trans. A.Kenny (Blackwell, Oxford, 1974), Chapters IX-X.
19. Ibid.
20. See Gregory McCulloch, *The Mind and Its World* (Routledge, London and New York, 1995), Chapter VIII.
21. Cf. McDowell, *Mind and World* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, England, 1994; reprinted 1996), Lecture I.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 26.
24. Ibid., p. 26.
25. See "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in *Mind, Language and Reality*.
26. See McCulloch, op.cit.
27. Fodor, *Psychosemantics*, p. 125.
28. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, p. 184.
29. This paper was part of a lecture under the same title delivered at the Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University.

HOW TO DEAL WITH THE EQUAL-AND-UNEQUAL OTHER? : THE THERAVĀDA BUDDHIST APPROACH

PRADEEP GOKHALE

With the two basic premises that (1) man is an unsocial social animal and (2) the other is both equal as well as unequal to us in diverse respects, the paper explains the Buddhist doctrine of brahmavihāra as a systematic way of dealing with others in a moral way. The paper develops in three parts:

(1) In the first part the author discusses the critical response of Buddhism to the Brahmanical approach to equalities and inequalities. Here the author explains how Buddhism criticizes the hierarchical approach of Brahmanism and in what sense the Buddhist approach can be called egalitarian.

(2) In the second part the author discusses the constructive approach of Buddhism to equalities and inequalities which is manifest in the doctrine of four sublime attitudes called brahmavihāras. Drawing on the transactional psychological analysis of four life positions given by Thomas Harris in his book, I'm OK You're OK, the author reconstructs these life positions as objective conditions and explains the four sublime attitudes as moral responses to them.

(3) In the last part the paper raises some related issues. Here he compares the Buddhist doctrine of brahmavihāras with the Pātañjala-Yoga concept of four bhāvanās and juxtaposes the Buddhist doctrine with the doctrines of anattā and śūnyatā.

I. Stage-Setting

HOW to behave with the other is a problem. Should I simply deny the existence of the other? Can I do so? Some philosophers

have tried to do that. They have shown that from a logical point of view we cannot establish the existence of the other. On the other hand the defenders of common sense would say that such a skeptical argumentation involves at least a pragmatic contradiction. But why are skeptics inclined to question the existence of the other in spite of a pragmatic contradiction? It is either because they believe that logic can be detached from life so that it is possible to conduct logical-intellectual exercises for intellectual satisfaction without any implications for actual life or may be some of them want to achieve some psychological satisfaction by isolating themselves from others at least for the few philosophical moments. The underlying conviction behind the latter may be that self-assertion or self-esteem is possible only by denying others at least temporarily or it may be that perfection in self-realization is possible only in a non-dualistic experience in which the other appears as illusion or does not appear at all. In the case of the other-negating self-realization, it may not be just the denial of the other persons or other beings but it may be a part of the denial of external world as a whole. Such solipsistic-idealistic positions are seriously maintained by some philosophers by maintaining a distinction between different realms or levels of existence, by distinguishing between what is ultimately real and what is empirically or conventionally real. Here the difference between western and Indian philosophical traditions seems to be that in the former such an ultimate realm of existence, idealistic or solipsistic, was regarded as intelligible or thinkable by those who argued for it, but not empirically achievable, whereas in the latter such a realm of existence was regarded as achievable in a kind of mystical experience, a kind of meditative trance.

But in both these cases when it comes to the level of common sense or to the level of ordinary experience and practice, the recognition of the external world and also of other persons

becomes inevitable. However, the question of recognition of the other and denial of the other occurs even at this level though in a different way. At this level, recognition of the other would mean recognition of the other as someone equal to us, as someone with whom we can share things or ideas or plans and denying the other would mean denying such a status to the other. In fact recognizing and denying the other in this sense occur simultaneously in interpersonal relationship. I want to suggest further that this two-fold relation (of recognition and denial) with the other becomes possible because of the dual nature of a human being as an unsocial social being. Here I want to suggest that both socialness and unsocialness are natural to human person. They are inseparably related to each other and also, in a loose sense, imply each other.

Because of socialness one mixes with others, communicates with others, assimilates oneself with others and tries to establish a sharing relation with others. But this sharing relation has serious limitations. Generally there are certain things, ideas and plans one has, that one does not like to share with all others. One likes to reserve them for oneself or for a selected few. Just as one likes to assimilate oneself with others, one also likes to differentiate oneself from others. One likes to realize oneself as unique in some important respects. This uniqueness implies inequality with others and taken in comparative or competitive spirit can indicate one's superiority or inferiority to others.

Hence social-ness which is indicated by sharing relation, sense of equality and communication is necessarily surrounded by a sense of inequality and uniqueness which indicates isolated-ness and unsocialness. But this unsocialnesshas a natural tendency to be communicated and shared in a social framework and hence it leads to a social manifestation. Social-ness and unsocial-ness in this way lead to each other, 'imply' each other (though not in the strict logical sense).

This dual character can give rise to moral issues. For instance the feeling of equality with others may not always be healthy or morally sound. An envious or conceited person feels unhappy over equality, because he likes to see himself to be above others. The feeling of inequality too can give rise to moral issues. It develops envy or jealousy if the inequality amounts to superiority of the other and may cause conceit and sadistic pleasure if it amounts to inferiority of the other.

In fact the issue of dealing with the other is more complex than this. It is not just the question of dealing with the equal *or* unequal other but with the equal *and* unequal other and the unequal other is not just superior *or* inferior other but superior *and* inferior other.

In what follows I want to discuss the Buddhist approach to equalities and inequalities and the moral issues concerning them. This approach of Buddhism is a part of its more general approach, regarding the question as to how a person should look at the world at large consisting of things and beings and also at oneself. Secondly this approach has both a critical and a constructive dimension. At critical level it is a response to materialism, Brahmanism and asceticism. At constructive level it advocates a path leading to emancipation, the path which is variously described as middle path, noble eight fold path and the three fold training consisting of morality, meditation and insight. I will not be concerned with all these aspects in this paper, though they are all interconnected, but I will concentrate on the aspects most relevant to the issue of equality and inequality involved in interpersonal relation. The discussion will be divided into three parts-

(4) In the first part I will discuss the critical response of Buddhism to the Brahmanical approach to equalities and inequalities

(5) In the second part I will discuss the constructive approach of Buddhism to equalities and inequalities which is manifest in the doctrine of four sublime attitudes called *Brahmavihāras*.

(6) In the last part of the paper I will raise some related issues and make some observations.

II. Buddhist Criticism of the Brahmanical approach

The Brahmanical approach to the issue of equality was complex. In the Vedic literature itself we see a tension between Brāhma a texts which advocate ritualism and the Brahmin-dominated social order and the Upani adic texts which criticize ritualistic way of life and assert *Ātman-Brahman* nature of all living beings. In spite of such a tension there is also a tendency to arrive at a compromise between hierarchy and equality. This is seen in *mok a*-centric schools of the Bramanical tradition such as Sā khya and Vedānta. On metaphysical level they accept equality or unity among all living beings. While concerned with the nature of empirical or embodied selves, however, they emphasize inequalities governed by *var a*, caste,gender and other factors. Hence from the ultimate point of view all were equal, but from empirical point of view, which was important for all practical purpose, all were unequal. The inequalities among human beings were supposed to be created by Brahmā/Prajāpati or by the law of *Karma*. They were supposed to be determined by birth and unsurpassable in the present life.

The Buddhist approach to equalities and inequalities was different from this in some fundamental respects. Buddhism did not accept *ātman* or any such eternal metaphysical mark of equality or unity among living beings. But it accepted equality among them in terms of their mental and physical constituents viz. *Nāma* and *rūpa* which were generally divided into five aggregates or *skandha*s. Buddhists also believe that Buddha addressed his first

sermon not only to the five *bhikkhu*s but to animals and celestial beings around him who understood it and benefited from it. *Jātaka* stories tell us that Gautama, the Buddha in his many previous births lived animal life but manifested and developed different moral-spiritual perfections, i.e.,*pāramitās*. Such stories, however, are mythological and should be interpreted in some figurative way. The main thrust of the Buddha's message which is relevant for our purpose, remains anthropocentric. Of course Buddhism is not anthropocentric in the sense in which Semitic religions are, according to whom humans have intrinsic value and animals have only instrumental value. Animals in Buddhism have intrinsic value insofar as they can be reborn as humans and humans can be reborn as them. Hence there was an undercurrent of equality flowing through different species beings. However the main focus of attention in Buddhism was human beings mainly because of the intellect, communicative ability and the potential for *nirvāṇa* that they had and the animals lacked. Hence all living beings were treated as moral objects – as objects of *mettā* and *karuṇā* (i.e. loving kindness and comparison) whereas, human beings, unlike animals, were also moral agents, as potential extenders of *mettā* and *karuṇā* to all.

Of course one can say that this idea of different realms of living beings with an undercurrent of equality and with a special emphasis on human beings as moral agents is a common feature of Brahmanical as well as the Buddhist tradition. But there are two important points of difference between the two traditions.

(A) The higher and lower status of species beings according to Brahmanism is supposed to be attained through good and bad actions respectively where goodness and badness of actions is determined according to the prescriptions and prohibitions of the scriptures such as *Veda*s and *Smṛti*s. Though those prescriptions and prohibitions included some moral principles

such as truthfulness and non-violence, they were dominated by other principles and rules which were ritualistic, dogmatic and discriminatory. As against this Buddhism, while giving norms for good and bad actions, emphasized moral-spiritual, rational and egalitarian approach.

(B) Brahmanical tradition imposed a hierarchical social order on the realm of human beings and this hierarchical order was treated as on par with the order of different realms of beings. Just as birth as a human being or an animal or as god is determined by *karma*, and then, it becomes binding throughout the respective life, the birth as a *brāhmaṇa* or *kṣatriya* or *śūdra* etc. is also determined by *karma* and is binding throughout the respective life. Just as transfer from one realm to another is not possible in the current life itself but is possible in the next life through rebirth which is determined by *karma*, similarly a transfer from one *varṇa* or caste to another is not possible in this life itself but is possible in the next birth which is determined by *karma*. This practical immobility or rigidity of the social order, as I have suggested before, was supposed to be laid down by God or Prajāpati/Brahmā through Vedas and subsequently elaborated by the sages like Manu through the *smṛti*s.

The Buddha through his different dialogues criticized this idea of hierarchical social order by pointing out that human species is one and different *varṇas* or castes are not different species which would rule out inter-caste mobility. Hence the so-called higher and lower status of certain *varṇas* and castes was the dogma of the *brāhmaṇa*s imposed by them on the society.

It is well understood here that when Buddhism held that human species is one and that in a sense all humans are equal, it was not advocating an order based on economic equality to be measured quantitatively. Though Buddhist economic approach was

not egalitarian in the strict sense of the term, it did have an egalitarian implication insofar as the Buddha was in general opposed to oppression and exploitation. This is implied in *Kūṭadantasutta*, where the Buddha refers to a prescribed way of performing sacrifice, a sacrifice without oppression, exploitation and violence. Similarly though the Buddha did not directly advocate political equality of all humans, his view had a political implication because he emphasized the ideas of a righteous ruler (*dhamma-rājā*) and also supported the culture of communication and consensus when he praised the republic state of Vajjins.

But the notion of equality which is central to the Buddha's teaching is expressed through his wish of the form: "May all beings be happy, may all beings attain well-being (*Sabbebhavantusukhino,bhavatusabbamaṇgalamm.*)." Now the question is: how can such a wish imply egalitarianism? Can we say that all can be equally happy? Can happiness be measured? Can one's happiness be compared with that of another? I suppose that here only qualitative judgment and qualitative comparison is possible and not quantitative one. Happiness here is not sum-total of pleasures acquired by fulfilling different desires; it is not a quantifiable happiness of Benthamian type. Happiness that Buddhism accepts as the goal of life is not derived by fulfilling egocentric desires; it is derived from ego-less-ness and freedom from cravings, i.e. from *tṛṣṇā-kṣaya* and the realization of *anattā*. Two persons living in different socio-economic conditions and having different material abilities can be egoless, craving-less and equally happy in this sense.

Hence when we are talking of Buddhist egalitarianism, the question is not whether we are materially equal or unequal, but the question is: what is our attitude towards those equalities and inequalities? One can develop attitudes towards equal and unequal other which can make us as well as others unhappy. On the other

hand one can develop attitudes towards equal and unequal other which can make us as well as others happy. One of the doctrinal contexts in which the Buddha elaborated on such an attitude was the doctrine of four *Brahmavihārās*, i.e., the four sublime attitudes.

III. *Brahmavihāras* : Sublime attitude to Equalities and Inequalities

The four sublime attitudes accepted in Buddhism are *mettā*, i.e. friendliness or loving kindness; *karuṇā*, i.e. compassion; *muditā*, i.e. gladness and *upekkhā*, i.e. detachment or equanimity. In the early Buddhist dialogues and also later works like *Visuddhimagga* these sublime attitudes are discussed as the objects of meditation. As objects of meditation they assume the form of wishes or thoughts that one is supposed to develop in one's mind. For instance, meditating on 'loving kindness' towards someone means wishing and thinking in a concentrated way so that the other may be happy. Meditating on compassion towards someone means wishing or thinking consistently that the other's suffering or deficiency may be removed. Meditating on *muditā* towards someone means thinking continuously that success or excellence that the other has achieved is welcome. *Upekkhā* towards someone is thinking that whether there is pleasure or pain in someone's life, it is impermanent and insubstantial and hence not worth being attached to. Buddhism holds that these sublime attitudes are called immeasurable (*appamāna* or *appamaññā*) meaning thereby that they are to be addressed to all beings belonging to all directions indiscriminately and impartially. The practice of *brahmavihāras* in this way is a meditative practice, a practice in cultivation of mind. But since the general principle accepted in Buddhism is that mind is the fore-runner of all actions, these attitudes cultivated in mind are expected to be translated into speech and physical behavior as well.

Early Buddhism not only gives the four general principles of sublime attitude as the four objects of meditation, it also gives a technique of developing the attitudes gradually, step by step, starting with the easiest objects, covering ultimately the most difficulty ones and consequently all objects making thereby the four attitudes truly immeasurable as given in Table I below.

My main point here is to see how this fourfold model suggests to us a way of dealing with equalities and inequalities. I would like to discuss the issue with reference to the fourfold framework of interpersonal situations. Thomas Harris, a psychiatrist, in his book, *I'm OK You're OK,* describes four life positions as,

(1)   I am OK, You are OK.

(2)   I am not OK, you are OK

(3)   I am OK, you are not OK

(4)   I am not OK, you are not OK.

Harris' treatment of the theme implies that these life-positions are subjective approaches to life one develops through the way one is brought up in the infancy and childhood. They are shaped by the treatment that a child gets (by way of stroking, scolding, negligence, etc.) from parents and the people around it. According to Harris 'I am OK, You are OK' is the ideal life position based on thought, whereas other life positions are based on feelings. Moreover, as he maintains, the 'universal position of early childhood' is 'I am not OK, you are OK' which the child may retain in later period or the child may develop one of the other positions depending upon the up-bringing it receives. Harris also holds that whatever life position one may develop, it need not be regarded as permanent or ultimate. An unsatisfactory life position can be transformed through efforts into satisfactory one or ideal one.

The above fourfold framework is relevant for understanding Buddhist conception of interpersonal relations, but for that we may have to consider the 'life positions' of Thomas Harris as the four types of objective conditions. For example it is a fact that I am better that some other person is some respect and the other person may be better than me in certain other respect. Similarly I and the other may be both deficient in some respect and both are also well off in certain other respect. Here 'being better' or 'wellness' can be understood in a general sense including the aspects such as material wealth, power, intellectual success, moral strength and spiritual achievement. (In ultimate analysis Buddhism would regard moral-spiritual parameters of measuring wellness as superior to others.) In a way we have to accept these objective conditions of wellness /better-ness or otherwise as facts of life. But the matter does not end there. The main question is what should be our attitudes to these conditions. The doctrine of sublime attitudes is partly an answer to this question.

Buddhist treatment of the fourfold framework would become different from that of Harris also in another respect. Harris discusses these life positions in the context of the psychological development of a child. From this point of view, 'I am not OK, you are OK' becomes the initial life position. Buddhism looks at these positions from moral and soteriological point of view. From this point of view the initial condition would be'I am not OK, you are not OK'. So let us begin with this condition and see how Buddhism deals with the fourfold framework.

(1)   'I am not OK, you are not OK' is the condition implied by suffering as the first noble truth stated by the Buddha. According to this condition all are subject to suffering. Again the question is what should be our attitude to this universal condition. There can be healthy as well as unhealthy response to this condition. For example frustration, sadism, cynicism

and pessimism would be unhealthy responses to the condition 'I am not OK, you are not OK'. Buddhism advocates a healthy response to this condition according to which we should go to the root of the matter, which according to Buddhism is craving and misconception which exists in ourselves, throw away the root by following the noble eightfold path and become free from suffering. Buddhist way includes efforts to make oneself as well as others happy. Hence developing *mettā*(loving kindness, friendliness) with others becomes an important part of it.

(2) 'I am OK, you are OK' is similar to the earlier condition in that both refer to 'equality' between I and the other. But the equality of the earlier kind is not satisfactory or desirable, whereas the equality of 'I am OK, you are OK'-type is apparently of satisfactory or desirable type. But even to this condition a healthy and an unhealthy response is possible. For example an ambitious person may not like to see that others are equal to him. He may develop ill-will or hatred to the other who is equal to him. As against this,*mettā,*i. e., loving kindness would be the healthy attitude to such a condition. In *mettā* we are wishing that the other be happy, we are rather sharing our happiness with the other.

(3) Now the third and the fourth condition are uneven conditions; they are the conditions of inequality. The third condition is 'I am OK, you are not OK'. One may respond to this condition in a healthy or unhealthy way. The unhealthy way would be unkindness, cruelty or sadistic pleasure. The healthy way would be compassion, i.e., *karuṇā. Karuṇā* can be regarded as a bridging principle which stimulates one to bring the deficient one near to oneself. *Karuṇā* in this sense can be called an extension of *mettā* to the situation of downward inequality

(4) Now the fourth possible condition, again an uneven condition, is of the type 'I am not OK, you are OK'. Again one can respond to this condition in a healthy way or unhealthy way. The unhealthy way would be jealousy or aversion. The healthy way would be *mudita, i. e.,* gladness. Through *mudita,* one tries to develop a sharing relation with the other by appreciating the other's excellence in success. *Mudita* in this sense can be called an extension of *metta* to the situation of 'upward inequality'.

Though *karuna* and *mudita* seem to be two symmetrical principles, one being a response to downward inequality and the other to upward inequality, there is an, important difference between the two. *Karuna* is not just a passive response to the suffering of others or a deficiency of others but it is also supposed to lead to sincere efforts on the part of the agent to remove the deficiency in the other. In *mudita* on the other hand we are just accepting and welcoming the success or the excellence of the other but not trying to remove our deficiencies and bring ourselves (materially) to the level of others. This asymmetrical relation between *karuna* and *mudita* arises in Buddhism because of the emphasis on egolessness on the part of the agent. [Of course developing oneself, achieving successes and excellences (spiritually in *bhikkhu*'s life and materially as well as spiritually in householder's life) is a natural process and Buddhism does not seem to be against it. But such an activity of self-development in the framework of *brahmaviharas* is not to be performed with the spirit of unhealthy competition]

An interesting question can arise about *mudita*. Through *mudita* we develop joy about the success of the other. But suppose we come to know that the other person has achieved success through unjust means. Should one still develop joy? Probably one should not. Because the use of unjust means is a moral defect in the

person, which I should not certainly welcome. Here the proper attitude should be that of *karuṇā* rather than *muditā*. But the question is more complex than this. Because the person may not have used wrong means and only wrong means and he may not have used them willingly. Hence his success may have some aspects which can be welcome. A mixed attitude of *karuṇā* and *muditā* could be more appropriate in this context.

In this way the first three sublime attitudes in the Buddhist doctrine of *brahmavihāras* can be understood as the healthy responses to the different conditions of interpersonal relations. The last sublime attitude viz. '*upekkhā*,' which can be understood as detachment or equanimity, is a regulating principle in the sense that it defines and demarcates the scope of the other three principles. Here the idea is that *mettā*, *karuṇā* and *muditā* as the sublime attitudes are worth practicing only insofar as they are qualified by equanimity or non-attachment. In fact even their nature and scope is to be defined and demarcated in the light of the principle of non-attachment.

Here the distinction between far-enemies and near-enemies of *brahmavihāras* made in *Visuddhimagga* (See the Table II below) is significant. Far enemies of the sublime attitudes are the unhealthy attitudes diametrically opposed to them. It is easy to distinguish the sublime attitudes from them. Near enemies of sublime attitudes, on the other hand, are un-sublime attitudes, but because of their close similarity with the sublime attitudes they can be confused with the sublime attitudes. For instance *mettā* is impartial, self-less love, but it can be easily confused with attached or sensuous love which is partial and self-centered. Similarly compassion, which, as a sublime attitude, is selfless and impartial, can be confused with mundane sorrow arising from the attached concern for some near and dear one. *Muditā*, the sublime joy, which is selfless and impartial, can be confused with joy as partial

attitude expressed towards the success of a near and dear one. Hence the near enemies of the three sublime attitudes are attitudes similar to the sublime attitude in their content, but are not sublime because they are not qualified by *upekkhā*.

Upekkhā in this way can be regarded as the higher principle which controls the other three principles. Now one can ask: is it advisable to practice just *upekkhā* irrespective of other principles? That does not seem to be so at least in the framework of *brahmavihāras*. In fact the trio of *mettā-karuṇā-muditā* and the fourth principle viz. *upekkhā* are complementary to each other in such a way that both are supposed to control and balance each other. *Upekkhā* as the principle of equanimity and detachment is a negative principle without a positive content. The trio on the other hand is the three-fold concern for others with a definite positive content. This concern, as we have seen, is expected to be regulated by *upekkhā*. *Upekkhā* on the other hand, which is without a positive content is expected to be filled up with the positive content of the other three principles. The near enemy of *upekkhā,* therefore, is supposed to be indifference, that is, equanimity or detachment without the concern for others. Hence the relation between the trio and the fourth principle viz. *upekkhā* can be said to be that between the content and the form of the sublime attitude towards the other. The trio gives the content to the sublime attitude, but this content without the form of equanimity will be unregulated, undisciplined and therefore unsatisfactory. Equanimity is the form of the sublime attitude but if it is practiced without positive concern for others as its content, it leads to indifference, isolated-ness, a sort of unsocial attitude.

I believe that Buddhism through the doctrine of *brahmavihāra* presents before us the dream of kingdom of *brahmavihārins,* the society which is based not on competition but co-operation, not based of selfishness but aiming at selflessness,

based on concern for the other without attachment to the other. It provides us a way and also a technique to deal with equalities and inequalities in others in a moral and sublime way. How far this dream is practically possible is a question. The society in which we live is guided by different presuppositions according to which preserving and enhancing ego, progressing through competition, sensuous enjoyment and power struggle are regarded as essential to social life. A *brahmavihārin* in this society is as it were swimming against the stream. Hence establishing a society of *brahmavihārins* seems a utopia. But a peculiarity of this dream is also that it is possible for one to pursue it individually though the society at large is not for it. It is not paradoxical to talk about sublime individual life in an un-sublime society.

III : Some Issues arising from the doctrine of *Brahmavihāra*

The Buddhist doctrine of four sublime attitudes, though interesting and appealing, can give rise to several issues. It is necessary to open up some such issues and seek for their answers. In what follows I would like to make a few observations in that direction.

It is clear that though the doctrine of four sublime attitudes was first elaborated by the Buddha, it cannot be called a sectarian Buddhist doctrine. It is not surprising that the four-fold model of sublime attitudes was incorporated in some texts of Jaina Yoga and also in Patañjali's Yoga system. [In Patañjali's Yoga the four *bhāvanās*, i.e. the four meditative practices viz. *Maitrī, Karuṇā, Muditā* and *Upekṣā* are regarded as the means to tranquility of mind. The difference between Patañjali's version and the Buddhist version is that the former restricts the objects of the four meditative practices to happy, unhappy, meritorious and de-meritorious respectively, whereas the latter makes the objects of the four sublime attitudes all-pervasive.] The doctrine in its essence can be

accepted irrespective of one's religions affiliation or even without a sectarian affiliation. However, in spite of its general character, the doctrine can be called a religious doctrine.   By a religious doctrine I mean that doctrine which essentially stems from the presupposition of human imperfection, and promotes the path of self-disciplining and self surrender as the way to perfection. Buddhism being an atheistic system does not teach humility or surrender before God, but a deep sense of humility and self-surrender is advocated through the doctrine of ego-less-ness or *anattā*. The religious import contained in this doctrine can come in conflict with, for example, a political approach which regards human being as essentially a power seeking animal or someone trying to assert oneself and one's own rights. But this does not mean that Buddhism would be completely unsuitable for a political stand. Here I would like to suggest that the Buddhist doctrine of ego-less-ness should be read along with its egalitarian approach. It is true that while developing sublime attitudes one develops self-less love, but one also treats all as equal. Hence not only oneself it regarded as soul-less or *anattā,* everyone else is regarded to be so. Secondly though in the framework of sublime attitudes, human beings are not recognized as power-seeking, they are recognized as happiness-seeking.

What could be the political implications of the doctrine of *brahmavihāra*? One thing is clear that the morality implicit in the doctrine of *brahmavihāra* is neither egoistic nor strictly altruistic but universalistic. This universalism is reflected in the practice of *brahmavihāra* as well. For instance, when *mettā* is to be developed as a sublime attitude, it is not only to be developed towards all others but also towards oneself. In fact in the gradual development of *mettā,* oneself is the first object; and then it is to be extended to others including hostile beings. (See Table I below.) This universalistic egalitarian approach can lead to active politics of

social justice. It will naturally support the concept of a just society in which all are happy and no one is tortured or exploited. One who develops *mattā* and *karuṇā* can work hard for removing exploitation and bringing about just social order. However, while doing so his emotions will be under control because he has also developed *upekkhā*.

I have suggested that the Buddhist doctrine of four sublime attitudes emphasizes ego-less-ness which it derives from the doctrine of soullessness or *anattā*. The doctrine of soul-less-ness or *anattā* can give rise to many different questions. In Pali Buddhist literature we see a dual tendency towards *attā* or self. Sometimes 'self' is asserted when for instance it is said that one is the master of oneself "*attevaattanonātho*" or that "Be the island of yourself, be the refuse of yourself" "*attadīpābhavatattasaraṇā*" On the other hand self is denied when it is pointed out that I am not identical with any one of the five aggregates or all the aggregates together; neither I am beyond all these aggregates, nor someone who controls these aggregates.

Here one can distinguish between the use of the term *attā* as reflective pronoun and its use as a noun. The Buddha seems to use the term *ātman* as a pronoun but denies its use as a noun. As a pronoun '*attā*' means 'oneself'. It stands for person, who is simply understood as combination of five aggregates. The Buddha seems to imply here that the I-notion arises in the combination of five aggregates which can be used for all practical purpose for distinguishing between I and the other. But the I-notion does not refer to any substance which holds this combination together. This trend continues in Vaibhāṣika-Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools of Buddhism. For instance Vasubandhu in his early work *Abhidharmakośa* vehemently criticizes *pudgalavāda,* the doctrine of eternal person, but accepts the distinction between I and the other. In his later work he identifies person with a consciousness

series, and accepts plurality of such series. The distinction between I and the other is strengthened in these systems further by the *apoha* or exclusion theory of meaning. In all these cases, where the distinction between I and the other is maintained, the question of relationship between them becomes important and the doctrine of *brahmavihāras* is a part of the answer to this question.

Contrary to this trend we find in Mādhyamika Buddhism an attitude to dissolve all dualities including the duality of I and the other. It is maintained that nothing has its own essence, and since there is no own nature, there is no otherness as well. Since there is no self-nature (*svabhāva)* there is no other-nature(*parabhāva*)as well because other-nature is nothing but the self-nature of the other (*Madhyamakaśāstra*, '*Svabhāvaparīkṣā*', Verse 3). This is the Mādhyamika doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* – dependent origination or *śūnyatā*- essence-less-ness. It is difficult to see how the meditative practice of *Brahmavihāra*s will be possible in this framework. Probably all the objects of meditation will culminate into essence-less-ness as is generally done in Mādhyamika meditative practice.

Table I

Sublime attitude	Order of ----------- (1)	Meditative ------------ (2)	Application ------------ (3)	On --------- (4)	-------- -------- (5)
Loving Kindness	Oneself	Revered and Respected ones	Dearly loved friends	Neutral persons	Hostile persons
Compassion	Unlucky, Wretched ones	Evil-doing ones	Dear ones	Neutral persons	Hostile persons
Gladness	Companion, Dear ones	Neutral persons	Hostile persons	Rest--	-------
Equanimity	Neutral persons	Dear ones	Rest---	-------	-------

(Source: Nanamoli, Chapter IX, pp. 321-344)

Table II

Sublime attitude	Near Enemy	Far Enemy
Loving Kindness	Greed (Raga), Selfish love	Ill will
Compassion	Grief based on mundane life	Cruelty
Gladness	Joy based on mundane life	Aversion
Equanimity	Equanimity qualified by ignorance based on mundane life	Greed or Resentment

(Source: Nanamoli, Chapter IX, pp. 345-6)

Central University of Tibetan Studies
Sarnath, Varanasi-221 007 (UP)
E-mail:pradeepgokhale53@gmail.com

REFERENCES :

1. Nanamoli, Bhikkhu, The path of purification, Singapore Buddhist meditation Center, Singapore, 1956
2. Harris, Thomas A., *I'm OK You're OK*, Cox and Wyman Ltd. Reading, Great Britain, 1969
3. Vaidya P.L. (Ed.) *Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna,* The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1960.

SOME MYSTIC EXPERIENCES OF
JAINA TRADITION

MUKUL RAJ MEHTA

Hinduism & Jainism both accept mystic experience as means of attaining the highest goal by a practitioner (Sādhaka). The practice of mystic experience has been accepted as a super special action, which includes conduct, meditation and Tapa. Basically, result of the Yoga is same according to Hinduism and Jainism, and that is 'spiritual development'. Jainism does not recognize that the universe was created by any God or gods. The universe is eternal and uncreated. It is subject to integration and dissolution in its forms and aspects.

There are so many instances of extra-ordinary Yogika experiences by Tīrthaṅkaras,[1] Āchāryas[2] and other personalities[3] are available in Jainism. The basis of these beliefs is faith and experience. All the twenty four Tīrthaṅkaras have experienced several events of extra-ordinary Yogika experiences. Again there are several events of extra-ordinary Yogika experiences with the eleven Gaṇadharas, the direct disciples of Mahavira. So many Āchāryas are also in the list of personalities, who have experienced several events of extra-ordinary Yogika experiences. Twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras and eleven Gaṇadharas may be placed under pre-historic category. Āchāryas like Kundkund, Hemachandra, Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Mallavadi, Devanandi (Pujyapāda), Bhadrabahu II, Jinabhadragani, Manatunga, Haribhadra and Vadidevasuri etc. belong to ancient history whereas personalities like Ganesh Prasad Varni, Ratanachandji and Srimad Rajachandji etc. are related to contemporary period. Some of the references of

extra-ordinary Yogika experiences regarding Tīrthaṅkaras and other personalities are being mentioned here.

Rishabhdeva: Jainism begins with Rishabhdev "He was the first king of this age and also the first ascetic. Who also was the first ford-maker (Tīrthaṅkara), my salutations to that Rishabh Swami", says Āchārya Hemachandra. In the ancient Jaina scriptures it is mentioned that during many previous births, the soul that was to be Rishabhdeva had done prolonged spiritual practices. As a result of high degree of purity of thoughts and attitude as well as penance, meditation, charity and compassionate deeds it had earned highly pious Karmas. In his incarnation as Dhanna, the caravan leader, he had offered alms and services to ascetics and others. As doctor Jivananda he had taken ample care of world and became ascetic. As king Vajranath he had supported poor and desolate masses. After many years of public service, Vajranath renounced the world and became an ascetic. As a result of unprecedented spiritual practices, including religious studies, penance, tolerance, and meditation, he earned Tīrthaṅkar-nam and gotra-karma. These pious deeds of earlier births resulted in his taking birth as Rishabhdeva.

When this pious soul was conceived, mother Marudeva dreamt of fourteen auspicious things - 1. A beautiful and large white bull was entering her mouth. 2. A giant elephant having four tusks. 3. A lion. 4. Goddess Laxmi seated on a lotus. 5. A garland of flowers. 6. The full moon resplendent in the sky. 7. The scintillating sun. 8. A fluttering flag. 9. A golden urn.10. A pond full of lotus flowers. 11. A sea of milk.12. A space vehicle of gods 13. A heap of gems and 14. Smokeless fire. Nabhiraja was an experienced and scholarly person. When he heard about these dreams from Marudeva, he said, "Devi! You will born a highly

endowed soul who will show the path of peace and happiness to this world".

Once, Bahubali's son, Somprabh, was the king of Hastinapur. His son Shreyans Kumar saw a dream during the night that Suvarṇagiri, the golden mountain, had turned black and he had brought back its golden shade by washing it with pitchers filled with milk. He narrated his dream to his father and friends, but no one could interpret its significance. Shreyans Kumar was sitting in the balcony of his palace and brooding over the dream he saw last night. All of a sudden he heard the noise caused by happy masses that had seen Rishabhdeva entering the town. Thousands of citizens of Hastinapur rushed toward Rishabhdeva with gifts. Rishabhdeva did not even look at these things and continues his graceful walk in the direction of the palace.

When Shreyans saw approaching Rishabhdeva, he rushed to welcome his great grandfather. After bowing at the great ascetics feet when Shreyans looked at Rishabhdevas face he could not shift his gaze. He went into a state of meditative thoughts and suddenly he acquired Jāti-smaraṇa Jñan, the knowledge that opens up memories of the past births. In his past birth Shreyans was the charioteer of king Vajranath (the past incarnation of Rishabhdeva). This knowledge also made him aware of the duties of laity toward Shramanas. He realized that Bhagavana Rishabhdeva had been wandering around without food or water due to prevailing ignorance of the people regarding ascetic norms.

With due reverence he requested Rishabhdeva, "Prabhu! I am honored by your presence. I have just received 108 pitchers full of fresh sugar-cane juice that are pure and suitable for you in all respects. Kindly accept the juice and break your fast". Rishabhdeva extended his cupped palms and Shreyans poured the sugar cane juice from a pitcher. Rishabhdeva broke his fast and

the skies reverberated with the sound of divine drums and divine applauds, "Hail the alms giving!" The gods also showered gems, flowers and perfumes. This was the beginning of the tradition of religious charity and alms giving. In memory of this incident, the third day of the bright half of the month of Vaishākha is celebrated as Akṣaya Tritiya festival. The Jainas specifically celebrate it as the breakfast day after the penance of Varshi Tapa (one meal and fast on alternate days for one year).

For several years Rishabhdeva continued his harsh spiritual practices, completely ignoring his body and other mundane activities. On the eleventh day of the dark half of the month of Phālguna he was meditating under a banyan tree in the Shakatmukh garden outside Purimtal town, close to Ayodhyā. Around forenoon he transcended to the purest higher state of meditation. The intensity of his practice caused the removal of the knowledge and perception obscuring Karmas as well as the illusory Karmas. As a result, he attained omniscience, the purest and enlightened state of soul and became a Jina.

When Rishabhdeva attained omniscience the whole world was filled with a soothing glow for a moment. Numerous gods descended from heavens to pay their respects to the Tīrthaṅkara. They also created the Samavasarana, the divine pavilion. King Bharata also proceeded toward the divine assembly riding an elephant and taking along his grandmother Marudeva. Apprehensive about the hardships of the ascetic life of her son, Marudeva was relieved when she beheld the scintillating face of Rishabhdeva sitting in the divine assembly surrounded by happy and dazzling gods. The vision of her son floating on the spiritual peak triggered the flow of spontaneous joy in the heart of Marudeva. This mundane joy slowly turned into the ultimate bliss and she acquired omniscience. Coincidentally, at the same moment

she completed her age and Rishabhdeva made the announcement that Marudeva had become a Siddha.

Ajitnath: After a twelve-year period of deep meditation and other spiritual practices he attained omniscience on the eleventh day of the bright half of the month of Pausa. The gods created the divine pavilion and Ajitnath gave his powerful and magnetic discourses. Thousands of people accepted the path of renunciation.

Parshvanath : One day Parshva-muni was standing in meditation under a banyan tree in an Āshrama outside a village. The evil god Meghmali, (Kamath of earlier birth) through his evil powers became aware of this. Driven by the hatred of earlier births, Meghmali arrived at this spot where Parshva-muni was standing in meditation. He took the form of a ghost and tried to disturb Parshva-muni with his extremely loud and fearsome laughter. When Parshva-muni remained unmoved, Meghmali inflicted pain on him by attacking in the form of various animals. Parshva-muni tolerated all these afflictions with equanimity. Meghmali's anger reached its peak. Now he created dark and dense clouds in the sky. The sky was completely covered by dark rain-bearing clouds. With fearsome rumbling and thunder and lightening, it started raining heavily. Meghmali caused so much rain that it flooded the whole area. Parshva-muni tolerated the torture of this heavy rain. He was still unmoved in his meditation. At this peak of the suffering, the throne of god Dharanendra trembled. He came to know about the incident through his divine powers and reached the spot with Padmavati. One of these snake-gods created a platform under the feet of Parshva-muni and the other a shelter of its multiple hoods over his head. Dharanendra admonished Meghmali who then fell at the feet of Parshva-muni and sought his forgiveness.

Mahavira : Observing the details of Bhagavan Mahaviras twelve-year period of spiritual practices, it becomes evident that his practices combined four qualities-1. Deep and undisturbed meditation. 2. Rigorous penance. 3. Extreme tolerance of pain and 4. Ultimate equanimity. It was the tenth day of the bright half of the month of Vaishākha. Twelve years five months and fifteen days had passed since the beginning of Mahaviras spiritual practices. Mahavira sat in meditation under a Saal tree in a garden on the bank of Rijubaluka River. Sitting on both feet with knees touching his chest, he was feeling calm even in the burning summer sun. Focusing all his physical, mental and spiritual energies he was engaged in deep and pure meditation. Gradually the sun was setting in the west and within the soul of Mahavira, the sun of omniscience was rising.

As soon as the dark clouds of four deeply binding Karmas scattered, the all-enlightening sun of omniscience dawned. The physical world was being enveloped by the darkness of night but the spiritual world was being filled with the light of infinite rays of knowledge. The endeavor had reached the summit of success and attained the goal. Mahavira had become Bhagavana (God), Jina (Victor), Sarvajña (all knowing), and Sarvadarshi (all perceiving). As soon as he became omniscient, a soothing light spread in the three worlds for a few moments. The living world was filled with a strange feeling of unknown bliss. After a twelve and a half year long period of extreme spiritual practices, Shramana Vardhaman acquired the ultimate perception (Kewal Darshana), and ultimate knowledge (Kewal Jñan or omniscience). To greet and praise the first ray of the divine sun of Mahaviras infinite knowledge, innumerable gods and goddesses from heavens landed on the earth. By doing Vandana of Prabhu Mahavira they celebrated the ultimate attainment (Kaivalya). Traditionally a Tīrthaṅkara

preaches the religion of equanimity (Ahimsmā) immediately after his gaining omniscience. To take advantage of the first divine discourse of Mahavira the gods created the divine pavilion (Samavasaran) on the pious banks of Rijubaluka river. Numerous gods were engaged in listening the discourse.

Indrabhuti Gautama Swami : Amongst the eleven Ganadharas, Indrabhuti Gautama was the first and foremost. In Pavapuri, a city of Bihar, there was a prosperous Brāhmin named Somil. Once, he decided to organize a great sacrifice. He wanted all the well-known learned men to come on that occasion. Indrabhuti Gautama, who was the most learned Brahmin of that time, was going to be the presiding priest. His equally learned brothers, Agnibhuti and Vāyubhuti, were going to sit by his side. Vyakta and other well known Pandits were also scheduled to remain present on that occasion. Somil had come to know about Sudharma and had sent the invitation to him. Sudharma did not wish to miss the opportunity to attend that great sacrifice. Moreover, he was eager to see the Gautama brothers. He therefore, willingly accepted Somil's invitation. At the appointed time, the sacrifice started in right earnest. Oblations began to be offered together with the recitation of the appropriate verses. As the sacrificial smoke rose towards the sky, they noticed the celestial vehicles coming down. Indrabhuti and other priests were satisfied that they could persuade the celestial beings to come down to accept the oblations. They were, however, disappointed to see that the vehicles had diverted their direction and were descending at the other end of the city. They could not make out why, leaving their great performance, the vehicles were bound towards a different destination.

What had happened was that after attaining omniscience, Lord Mahavira had arrived at Pavapuri that very time. The

heavenly beings were therefore coming down to pay their homage to the Lord and to listen to his sermon. Indrabhuti was surprised to know that. He had never come across anyone more knowledgeable than himself. He therefore guessed that Mahavira might be a fraud who could have somehow impressed the heavenly beings. It was therefore necessary to counter his tactics immediately. With that intention, Indrabhuti went towards the camping ground of the Lord. As he approached, the Lord welcomed him by calling his name. Indrabhuti was astonished that the impostor even knew his name. But as he looked at the Lord, he was impressed by his personality. His pride began to melt. The Lord soon asked him, 'Gautam, a doubt still lurks in your mind about the independent existence of the soul. Isn't that?' Indrabhuti was surprised to hear those words, because he did have such a doubt. The Lord then quoted the relevant Sutra and explained that there was no reason to hold such a doubt. With that clarification, the doubt of Indrabhuti was eradicated. Thereupon, he decided to accept the Lord as his Guru. So falling at the feet of the Lord, he requested to be accepted as a pupil. The Lord was pleased to accede to the request and initiated him as the first pupil. As Indrabhuti did not come back, his brothers Agnibhuti, Väyubhuti and other Pandits like Vyakta went to the Lord one after another. The Lord welcomed them, and, pointing out their doubts pertaining to the soul, he gave them the convincing replies. All of them were satisfied with the Lord's elucidation and became his pupils along with their own followers.

Jambuswami : In Rajagriha there was a wealthy merchant named Rishabhadatt who was also known as Arhadas. His wife Dharini alias Jinmati gave birth to a very handsome son. in The boy was named Jambu. He developed a very high sense of detachment and decided to renounce his worldly life. His parents were of course not happy about his renouncing at such a young

age. All of them pressed Jambu to give up his intention. They pointed out the rigors of ascetic life that he would not be able to face. They also told him that it is very hard to lead the life of a Yogin and advised him to lead a comfortable family life, however, he remained firm. The parents thought that he would change his mind, if he gets married. They therefore insisted upon his getting married before renouncing. Jambu agreed on the condition that he should be allowed to renounce the day after his marriage. Since the girls to whom he was engaged were very beautiful and attractive, every one thought that he would surely gain attachment for them, if once married. The elders therefore accepted that condition.

The wedding took place on a grand scale. Jambu's parents and those of the girls vied with one another in show of their prosperity. No effort was left out to make the wedding a memorable ceremony. Highly distinguished guests graced the occasion. Jewelry and other precious gifts that were adorned upon the newly weds. Rajgriha had rarely witnessed such pomp and splendor. Every one congratulated Jambu for getting such beautiful and glamorous wives and wished him perfect happiness. At night Jambu was in elegantly decorated bedroom along with his wives and the elders heaved a sigh of relief.

Jambu was however not at all affected by the glamour nor did the beauty of those lovely girls overcome him. He had made up his mind to renounce the next day and wanted to make use of the night for orienting those girls for the purpose. He sat in front of them and started explaining the purely temporary and transitory character of life and everything pertaining to that. At that time in the locality of Rajgriha, there was a burglar named Prabhav. He came to know of the fabulous treasure accumulated on the occasion of Jambu's wedding and had decided to grab it. At dead of the

night he came to the place along with his followers and saw that every one had gone to sleep because of the exhaustion of the ceremony. He asked his colleagues to pick up the valuables as he proceeded towards Jambu's bedroom for the jewelry on the bodies of newly weds. From a little distance, he heard Jambu talking to his wives. He could not believe that the newly weds were still awake. He came close to the door and tried to listen expecting exciting love gossip. To his utter astonishment, Jambu was talking about the true nature of life. His words were so forceful that Prabhav could not stop listening.

Jambu's talk was appealing not only to his wives but also to Prabhav. He started thinking that he had fallen out with his parents and others for the sake of some possessions and was leading the nasty life of a burglar, while here was a young boy planning to give up everything that he had easily gained. Jambu's talk was still going on. The more Prabhav listened, the more he hated himself. His men came to him with bundles of valuables, pointing out that it was getting dawn and they should leave. But Prabhav was not listening to them. He had developed contempt for his current life and was keen to change it. Ultimately he told his followers to leave him alone, because he had decided to give up burglary. They could therefore go on their own. All of them were upset at that. They said that they would not go anywhere without him. If he was giving up the occupation, they were also willing to give it up. By that time Jambu had finished. His wives were convinced of the futility of the worldly life and had decided to renounce with him. Then Prabhav came inside and said that he had come up for the burglary but had decided to renounce after listening his talk to his wives.

Bharata : Sometimes, very small incidences become turning points of the life and people gets detached and lead a life of Yogin.

Such was the case with great ruler Bharata. Once the ring came off of his finger while he was in his dressing room one day. He noticed that the finger looked rather odd without the ring. By way of curiosity he took all of the other rings off and saw that all the fingers looked odd. Then he took off his crown and other ornaments that used to decorate his ears, neck, arms etc and looked in the mirror. He noticed that he did not look as impressive as he used to look.

This incidence created a chain of thoughts within him. 'I consider myself as handsome and impressive, but all that impressiveness merely arises from the ornaments etc. that do not belong to the body. The body itself is made up of blood, bones etc. which happens to be disgraceful but look attractive only on account of the skin in which they are wrapped. Then, how come I am so captivated of it? Moreover, the body does not stay forever and is going to decomposed sooner or later. At that stage I will have to leave every thing.' He thus realized that nothing in the world inclusive of his body really belonged to him. In that case he thought, 'Why not go away with my attachment of all the temporary things and instead focus on something that lasts forever like my father?' Thus, he developed acute detachment for the worldly life. This led to the rise of true enlightenment from within and as a result he attained omniscience in that very room.[4]

When we come to the ancient history, among the most famous of all Jain Āchāryas, **Kundakunda** is the celebrated author of the renowned books Samaya-sāra (Treatise on the True Self), Pravachan Sāra (Treatise of Lectures), Niyama Sāra (Treatise on Pure Rules), Panchāstikāya Sāra (Treatise on Five Universal Components) and Aṣṭa Pāhud (Eight Steps), which is a collection of eight texts. The story of Kundakunda is also surrounded by legends – it is even said, he could walk in air.

Hemachandra was one of the founders of Yoga literature in Jainism. Gnanarnava by Shubhachandra and Yogaśastra by Hemachandra are the important works of Jaina Yoga literature. There are several instances of Hemachandra's Yogik power mentioned at various places.[5] He removed the disease of king Kumarapal of Gujarat by his Yogika powers.[6] Once, Kumar Pal took vow that he will not move out of Patanagar during Chāturmāsa. At the same period, king of Garajan, Mohammad- the Sultan of Gajani decided to attack Gujarat. It became difficult for king Kumarapal to survive with his vow. He rushed to his Guru Hemachandra and narrated the problem. Hemachandra gave words to the king and sat in Padmāsana position in deep meditation. After some time, a flying object came through sky in which a man was sleeping. He was none but the king of Garajan whom Hemachandra had dragged by his Yogika power and made him not attacking Gujarat.[7]

Siddhasena was the writer of famous Jaina texts like Sanmatitarka and Nyāyāvatār etc.. Many occasions of Yogika experiences by Siddhasena are available in Jaina literature. Once Vikramaditya, the king of Avanti, was coming riding on an elephant to the same way from which, Siddhasena was coming with his followers from opposite direction. Just to examine the extra-ordinary Yogika power of Siddhasena, king Vikramaditya offered his mental Namaskāra to him from a good distance. On reaching nearer, Siddhasena blessed Vikramaditya very loudly. Vikramaditya then asked "Whom are you blessing without Namaskāra ?" Siddhasena answered "I am blessing you in reply to your offered mental Namaskāra to me". Vikramaditya was very much fascinated and offered huge financial donation which Siddhasena refused to accept.[8] According to another incidence, once in Avanti, Siddhasena entered in a Shiva temple and sat down

without praying or offering Namaskāra to Shiva. The priest of the temple requested him to offer Namaskāra to Shiva but he refused to do so. On the complaint, king Vikramaditya himself reached there and ordered him to do so. Siddhasena then sat in front of the statue of Shiva and started reciting prayer of Parshvanath in poetic language. The statue of Parshvanath originated there when he recited eleventh Shloka of 'Kalyāṇa Maṅdir Stotra'.[9] A number of instances of divine events regarding Siddhasena are available in Jaina literature.

An interesting divine event of Yogika power is associated with **Mallavadi**. The preparation of 'Dwadashāra Nayachakra' by him was also because of his attaining unusual Yogika power by deep meditation and hard Tapas. **Achārya Samantabhadra** was a great Yogi and scholar of Jainism. Once he was suffering from a disease called 'Bhasmak'. Then he took shelter in the Shiva temple of Kashi. There he used to get around forty kilograms of food every day, which was being offered to Shiva by his followers. With this much of food daily, he was recovering from the disease. This news reached to the king also, who himself came to the temple to know the reality and threatened Samantabhadra. Samantabhadra started reciting Slokas in the praise of Tīrthaṅkara Chandraprabh. As a result, the Shivalinga was blasted and a shining figure of Chandraprabh appeared there. Samantabhadra created Jaina philosophical and religious literature like Devāgamastotra, Svayaṁbhustotra, Jaina-stuti-ṣaṭak and Ratnakarand shravakachar.[10]

Devanandi Pujyapada was also believed to be the possessor of a number of Yogika powers. He had earned the 'Aushadh-riddhi' by Yogika practices. Once when the water, by which he washed his feet, contacted iron and the iron was converted into gold. He was also able to enter into the bodies other than him

(Videh-gaman).[11] He was detached from the world when once he perceived a frog in the mouth of a snake. Pujyapada practiced Yoga for a long time and achieved many extra-ordinary experiences. Once he lost his sight completely which he regained by Yoga. In another occasion, he taught Nagarjuna the 'Padmavati-mantra' by which Nagarjuna achieved the method of making 'Siddhs-rasa' from special plant and created gold out of it, and was proud of it. Just to bring him out of pride, Pujyapada displayed creation of 'Siddhs-rasa' from several ordinary plants. This all was only because of his hard practices of Yoga.[12]

In another instance, **Āchārya Bhadrabahu II** once told Varahamihir that his newly born son will die on the seventh day from his birth and role of a cat was also predicted in this event. It came true. Acharya Bhadrabahu II gained this kind of extra-ordinary astrological power only because of hard practice of Yoga.[13] Ten Niryuktis are his contribution to Jaina literature. **Āchārya Jinabhadragani** recovered 'Mahānīsheetha sūtra', which was almost destroyed by several insects. To save and recover it, he meditated continuously for fifteen days and praised to the founder deity of Mathura Stupa. As a result, he was helped to save and recover the 'Mahānīsheetha sūtra'.[14] **Āchārya Manatunga** was once suffering from severe illness. Then he practiced Yoga and achieved a Mantra of eighteen letters and successfully recovered from his illness. Creation of 'Bhayahara-stavan' was result of this Yogika experience.[15]

Shri Ganesh-prasad ji Varni : There are only a few personalities who become exceptionally great and respectable for all by their good behavior & good deeds. Saint Shri Ganesh-prasad ji was such a personality of the present age. He has contributed very much for the expansion of Jaina culture and Jaina ideals. He was born in a non-Jaina family and yet he worked for Jainism. He

was deeply attracted by the principles of Jaina religion and he preached Jainism for the whole of his life. He established many Jaina educational institutions and promoted Jaina way of life in thoughts and conduct as well. He was learned and yet very simple. He was kind towards all living being.

Once, from Mathura, he started to go on the pilgrimage of Sametshikhar in the scorching heat of the month of Jyesthā (i.e. May). While doing a Parikramā, going round of the high hills of Sametshikhar, he lost his way and suffered severe thirst. His mind was yet at peace. Sitting in Yogika-mudra, he remembered Lord Parshvanath and he had before his eyes a pond full of clean and sweet water in that forest. He drank the water and became free from thirst. This was really a surprising event. At the old age of about eighty seven years, Varni ji was not able to move freely in those days. He could not observe several vows. He, therefore, decided in his mind to begin with Samadhimaran (Sallekhana vrata, fast unto death). He stopped speaking and moving much and reduced his eating almost to nil. He was performing rites of Samādhimaraṇ and its regulations. Varni ji kept laid down on his bed almost for the whole day in deep thinking and total peace of mind. During the last eighteen hours, he remained away from all touches, desires and attachments. Though there were various irregularities and pains in his body, which was extremely weak, the internal awareness of Varni ji was very strong. He left his body quite peacefully on the eleventh day, on September 5, 1961.

Yogi Varni ji was once traveling by bus from Sagar to Drongiri and had a ticket of the front seat. Asked by the driver to leave his seat to provide place to the Police Inspector, he got a disliking for such dependency and took the vow not to travel by motor, train etc. for the whole of his life. He had great love for the country. He had donated his only wearing apparel, the Chadar, at a

public meeting held in connection with Āzād Hind Army at Jabalpur in 1945. It was immediately auctioned for Rs. 3000/- for raising the funds for the army. Āchārya Vinoba Bhave had much regard and admiration for him. Saint Mother Anandmayi of Bengal paid him a visit at Varanasi and expressed profound respect for him as a spiritual and ethical saint. Late President Dr. Rajendra Prasad had also met him and expressed respect for him.

Shri Ratnachandraji : In 1897, Shri Rayshibhai at the age of seventeen, was granted Muni Dīkṣā in the large presence of many saints, mendicants and nuns of all-around Jaina Sangh. Rayshibhai established Shri Gulabchandraji Maharaj as his great teacher and adopted the name of Shri Ratnachandraji Maharaj. He started developing his power of concentration by Yoga-sādhana since 1907. He started writing Bhavanaṣṭaka and Kartavya-kaumudī in Sanskrit during the monsoon of 1908. He was unusually intelligent, he could grasp difficult subjects very easily and could anticipate circumstances very well. He went on earning success after success and could acquire power to perform eight Avadhan, seventeen Avadhan and fifty Avadhan during the first year itself (Avadhan means the power of concentration, power of doing or remembering many things at a time). He could mind to several things at a time and this is an exceptional power in human beings. The man possessing extraordinary power of memory can achieve such a success. He had received inspiration and encouragement from Shrimad Rajchandraji. Because of his deep study, repeated meditations and unusual power of understanding, he could acquire power to perform one hundred Avadhan very shortly. After sometime, he made experiments of this power at Gurukul Pañchakula and since then he was known as Bharat Bhushan and Shatavadhani.

He was well studied in languages, grammar and poetics and hence he could complete the stanzas of poetry in Sanskrit and Gujarati spontaneously. His ability in this respect is clearly seen in his discourses with the great poets and learned personalities. The blind great man, i.e. the man whose knowledge itself are his eyes, Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi while paying him tribute said, "He was a mendicant of his own class, he could mind hundreds of works at a time and it appears that the Gujaratis only have acquired such a power through inheritance". He referred to Sahasra Vadhani Muni Sunder Soori, Upadhyaya Shri Yashovijayaji, Shri Gatulalji, Shrimad Raichandraji, Shri Shankarlal Shastri, Muni Shri Santbalji and many other saints and scholars of Gujarat, some of them had been in the 15th century. While thinking spiritual, the power of a person does not depend on how many Avadhan he is able to perform at a time, but on his learning, his seriousness, his thinking and meditation. The power of performing Avadhan should not be a source of earning popularity but it should be helpful in acquiring holiness of soul, deep and long meditation and heart-felt prayers so that development of soul can be achieved.**[16]**

Shrimad Rajchandra: Shrimad Rajchandra's full name was Shri Raichandbhai Ravjibhai Mehta. He was born in 1867 A.D. at Vavania in Saurashtra. In 1874, he obtained Jātismaraṇa jñāna (Knowledge of an event or events of foregone birth or births, obtained through exceptional memory). In Samucchaya Vayacharya, Shrimadji writes: "I was born on Sunday, Kārtika Śukla Pūrṇimā (15th day of Kārtika), Vikram Saṁvat 1924. Therefore today, I have completed twenty two years. In this apparently short span of life, I have experienced much about the soul, the nature and mutations of mind, the integrity of speech, the physical body, the wealth, various impressions of the variegated or multicolored wonderful world formations of various orders, many

worldly ups and downs and the causes of everlasting misery and unhappiness. All these have been experienced by me in many ways".

In reply to a question from Padamshibhai, his friend in Bombay as to, whether Shrimadji possessed the mysterious knowledge of his past lives, he replied: "Yes" and then he explained as to when and how he obtained it. It is a pictorial description. Shrimadji said: "When I was seven years old, an elderly man named Amichand, well-built, heavy and strong, a neighbor in my village, suddenly expired of a serpent bite. I did not know what was death. I asked my grandfather as to what was the meaning of death. He tried to avoid the reply and advised me to finish my meals. I insisted on a reply. At last he said: "To die means the separation of the soul from the body. A dead body has no movement, it contaminates and decays. Such a dead body will be burnt to ashes near a river-bank as it has ceased to function." Thereupon I went silently to the cremation ground and climbing a Babul tree I saw the whole process of burning of the dead man's body and I felt that those who burnt him were cruel. A train of thoughts started on the nature of the death and as a result I could recollect my previous lives." It is but natural that death and disease are the great humanizing forces in individual and social life. It is by being conscious of them that we develop modesty and humility in our behavior and we reduce our attachment to worldly life. By meditation on death we realize the supreme and sole importance of knowing and experiencing the Ātman. Therefore Jātismaraṇa jñāna is very helpful in developing detachment from the world, and a spiritual affection for eternal imperishable ever-living soul.

In 1897 A.D. at the age of 30 years, he wrote his famous poem in which he thanked the day when he realized unique peace. He has described in the poem the order of his spiritual

development as : "In 1874 A.D. I obtained the Jati Smarana jnana. In 1875 A.D. I began to advance on the spiritual path from the point I had already reached in my previous life. In 1886 A.D. I developed a spirit of complete resignation and detachment to the mortal body and the rest of the world." He also says therein: "In my very young age I knew the nature of the final reality and this suggested to me that henceforth I had no future birth nor will I have to fall back from what I had already gained in spiritual life. I easily reached the state of the soul which would require long study and spiritual practice for others." In a letter he says: "I realized that when in infinite stretch of time in the series of my past lives I felt that I could not live without my dearest and nearest; but I could live without them in those lives too. This proves that my affections and attachments were based on ignorance."

Shrimadji by his mystic powers of clairvoyance and telepathy, mind reading, etc. learnt that two persons from Kutch were on their way to Rajkot to meet him. So he requested Dharshibhai to allow these two guests to stay with him and Dharshibhai readily agreed to do so. Thereupon Shrimadji went to receive the two guests and welcomed them by their names. When the guests asked him as to how he knew their names and about their coming to meet him, he replied that all this was possible by the infinite powers of the soul. These two guests, named Hemrajbhai and Malsibhai, having heard of the exceptional talents of Raichandbhai, had come to persuade him to go to Kashi for higher education but when they came to know of the wonderful spiritual powers possessed by Raichandbhai, they dropped their idea.

The twelve sentiments to be cultivated from his book Mokṣamālā are : 1. Everything in the world except the soul is transitory and subject to destruction. The soul alone is, in its

nature, eternal. 2. In the world none can protect a living being from death. Therefore the only shelter one should seek in life is true religion. Religion alone can be man's savior. 3. The soul has been passing through a chain of births and deaths and it is high time for it to think of its freedom from Saṅsāra - a cycle of births and deaths. One should consciously realize that the soul's nature is freedom and so it is but natural to think of its salvation from Saṅsāra. 4. The soul has always been and is alone. It will suffer the fruits of its deeds and it is the lone pilgrim. 5. All souls are independent and none is really related to the other. 6. This body is unholy, it gives out and absorbs many unholy and impure substances. I, as a soul, am quite independent of my body, which is subject to disease and death. 7. Attachment, avarice, ignorance, sense of futility, etc. are binding the soul. 8. One should devote his time to acquire knowledge and meditation and thereby save oneself from the bondage of fresh actions. 9. To act with full knowledge of the nature of the Self is the way to cut the knot of binding actions. 10. To think of the fourteen worlds in which the soul wanders in bondage. 11. To determine that a man cannot attain the right knowledge of the nature of the Self while living the worldly life. Even if such knowledge may be had, conscious abidance in the true nature of the Self will become difficult. Hence, one should feel intense obligation of the enlightened Guru who explains the true nature of the Self. 12- Therefore one should be grateful for the rare possibility of obtaining the right preceptor of religion and one should not delay in following his advice. Shrimadji writes about the Mokṣamālā that a reader, on deep thinking and reflection on the subjects discussed in it, will find his way to salvation.

In 1887 A.D. Shrimadji went to Bombay and there, in Faramji Kavasji Institute and at other places, he performed various

memory feats and all the newspapers in Bombay gave wide publicity and praise to these performances. In one of the memory feats he was shown twelve books of different sizes and told their names too. Then he was blind-folded and he used to touch a book he had seen before and immediately call out its name. Dr. Peterson who presided over the performance had nothing but admiration and praise for this outstanding feat. On another occasion he was shown different food dishes and just by looking at them he told in which there was less salt, without touching the dishes or tasting the food.Had Shrimadji lived a long life, he would have been happy to see his friend Mohandas Gandhi, the herald of Indian freedom, liberating India from British bondage by the Jaina method of truth and non-violence. Gandhiji says: "I have drunk to my heart's content the nectar of religion that was offered to me by Shri Raichandbhai". Shrimadji was an embodiment of non-attachment and renunciation. He has written only that which he has experienced.[17]

According to Jainism, the soul has inherent capacity for emancipation. But this capacity remains dormant and inactive unless and until it gets an opportunity for expression. The soul is roused to active spiritual exertion when it is reminded of the great mission that it has to fulfill. The particular changes (Pariṇām) of the Jiva from the stage of Mitthyātva or ignorance to the stage of Keval or perfect, through several mystic experiences.

Department of Philosophy & Religion
Banaras Hindu University
Varanasi- 221 005

REFERENCES :

1.   Illustrated Tīrthañkara Charitra by Shri Amar Muni
2.   Jaina Dharma Ke Prabhāvaka Āchārya by Sadhvi Sanghamitra
3.   Jaina Legends
4.   Jaina Story book, Pravin K. Shah
5.   Life of Hemachandracharya's translation
6.   Prabaṅdhachintāmaṇi, p. 243
7.   Kumarapalacharitra, p. 213, Hemachandracharya Jivanacharitra, p.85
8.   Prabhāvaka Charitra, p.56, Jaina Dharma Ke Prabhavaka Āchārya, p. 325
9.   Jaina Dharma Ke Prabhāvaka Āchārya, p. 330
10.   Jaina Dharma Ke Prabhāvaka Āchārya, p. 358-360
11.   Shravanabelgola Inscription No. 108-258
12.   Jaina Dharma Ke Prabhāvaka Āchārya, p. 347-357
13.   'ayam balah saptame divase nisheethevidalakiya ghatishyate', Prabandhakosh, Bhadrabahu – Varah Ch. P. 3, line 21
14.   Jaina Dharma Ke Prabhāvaka Āchārya, p. 377
15.   'surayah sarvopadravaharam tanmantragarbhitam bhayaharastvam kritva punarnavatam praptah', Puratan Prabandh-sangrah, p. 16, Jaina Dharma Ke Prabhāvaka Āchārya, p. 398
16.   Jaina Legends
17.   Life of Srimadrajachandra, H. Shah.

ĀCĀRYA ŚAṄKARA ON
ULTIMATE REALITY

BALESHWAR PRASAD YADAV

To study any philosophical system of thought we first of all try to know the particular ontology of that system. In it, we proceed to know the number and nature of substance, its reality or existential status. In Indian philosophy, the ontology primarily deals with the concept of reality viz., *Brahman, Īśvara* (God), Ātman (Self) and *Jagat* (the world) and its material being. In all these ontological contents, we seek after the real being as all these are not real in the same amount. They have different reality in comparison to one another. But ultimately the real substance is that which can satisfy all the questions emerged out of the whirls of ontological inquiries. The system of *Śāṅkara Vedānta* admits that *Brahman* is the sole Reality. It is the only substance that is real and the entire material world is relative and non-eternal and manifestations of this very reality.

To ascertain the existence and attribute of *Brahman* in accordance with *ācārya* Śaṅkara is very essential as it helps us know the whole philosophical foundation of his system of thought. It also helps us comprehend his epistemology and the nature of ignorance and knowledge, bondage and liberation as well as the means to achieve the ultimate goal of life. This paper tries to unfold the ontological reality as per the *Śāṅkara Vedānta*.

I. Śāṅkara Vedānta

The concluding portion of the sacred *Vedas*, i.e. *jñāna-Kānda* is referred to as the *Vedānta*. The *Vedānta* is also called the *Uttara-Mīmāṁsā* as it comes after the *Pūrva- Mīmāṁsā* or *Karma-Kānda*

portion of the *Vedas*. The philosophy of *Vedānta* is primarily based on the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Brahma-sūtra*. These trio grouped together is called the *Prasthānatrayī*. They occupy the prominent place in Indian philosophical thought. It has also influenced the life of Indian people to a great extent. The Vedic philosophy is based on the *Vedās*, while the *Vedānta* is based on the gist of the *Vedas*, which are the *Upaniṣads*. Taking this account into consideration, this philosophy is called as the *Vedānta*. Bādarāyaṇa, the aphorist of the *Brahma-sūtra* opined in his treatise that the main teaching of the *Upaniṣads* is predominantly monistic or non-dualistic, though what type of monism is taught in them is not easy to determine. He has also tried to refute the *Mīmāṁsā's* claim that the main objective of the *Vedās* is to practise ritualism along with the *Sāṅkhyan* dualism. The *Upaniṣadic* teaching was so highly ambiguous and mysterious that some expert *ācāryas* tried to systematize the *Sūtras* to reach an uncontradicted meaning of them. It also needed perusal of the *Bhagavadgītā* and *Brahma-sūtra* to constitute the philosophy of the *Vedānta,* and thus the *Vedānta* school came into existence in the lineage of the Indian philosophical tradition. The process of understanding and the systematisation accordingly took place in the distinguished *ācāryas* in more than one ways and therefore, the different schools of the *Vedānta* philosophy came up to us.

Most frequently, the *Vedānta* philosophy is understood as the *Advaita* School of *ācārya* Śaṅkara which is not right, but it is one of the several offshoots of the *Vedānta* philosophies, that is also called as the *Śaṅkara Vedānta*. Apart from this, the *Vedānta* philosophy was formulated as the *'Viśiṣṭādvaita'* of Ramanujācārya, *'Dvaita'* of Madhvācārya, *'Dvaitādvaita'* of Nimbarkācārya, *'Sudhādvaita'* of Vallabhācārya and *'Acintyabhedābheda'* of Mahāprabhu Caitanya.

All the above schools are classified under the *Vedānta* because they admit the fundamental philosophical concepts of the *Vedāntic* thought and advance their philosophical formulations on the basis of the *Prasthānatraya*. Out of these, the *Śāṅkara Vedānta* is a distinguished school. The truth which was initiated in the *Vedas* was culminated in the *Upaniṣads* and was completely systematized in the philosophy of Śaṅkara's *Advaitavāda* (non-dualism). His philosophy may be summarised through half a verse, i.e. *'brahma satyaṁ jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ'* – this means that *Brahman* is the sole Reality, the world is false and the individual self (*jīva*) is not different from the cosmic soul (*Brahman*). This is the central point of Śaṅkarite ontological deliberation on which this paper will focus extensively one by one.

II. *Ācārya* Śāṅkar on Reality (*Sattā*)

Ancient Indian deliberation on ontoligy has primarily been based on contemplative realisation. For ancient Indian seers contemplative realisation has brought forth clairvoyance for the knowledge of reality. The kind of realisation through which the Upaniṣadic seers reach the reality is seriously held by *ācārya* Śaṅkara. Though the linguistic expressions for revealing that reality in the *Upaniṣads* is in an aphoristic form and are put mostly in the direct speeches, while *ācārya* Śaṅkara has prepared the logical ground in the expository ways on the bases of the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtra* for communicating and disseminating the nature of reality to the others as well. Though he had already had the self-realisation (*aparokṣānubhūti*) of the real (*sat*) substance he served to a great extant in the realm of ontology[1] by structuring the consistent and well defended argumentative system about the concept of reality.

Ācārya Śāṅkara in full agreement with the *Prasthānatraya* holds the reality as non-dual (*advaita*) by refuting all kinds of differences concerning the substance theory (*tattva-sidhānta*). Now, the question is as to why is the reality held as non-dual? And if it be so, then which one should be taken for account? Whether it may be conscious element or non-conscious or inert is also a problem. *ācārya* Śāṅkara concentrating on these points tries to develop the principle of reality. He holds that 'real (*sat*) is that about which our intellect does not differ or contradict and unreal (*asat*) is that about which our intellect does differ or contradict[2]. On this criterion of the real, it is only the consciousness which stands suitably indefeasible. Each and every object of this creation does go through change and contradiction but the 'knower-as-consciousness' of flat object can never be taken as changing or contradictory. Therefore consciousness alone is the fit-vessel for being the real substance. The knower of knowledge cannot be refuted. The view as the viewer is also not refutable.[3] It is the consciousness which is an eternal substance and is never enveloped by the space and time. The substance which is covered by space and time can never be taken as eternal because that will have an end and beginning. Likewise real (*sat*) must be eternal (*śāśvata*) and absolute in ultimate sense because not taken in that sense the substance will never be indefeasible. Absolute is always non-dual. Hence the attribute of substance as absolute must be non-dual (*advaita*). All these characteristic features are competently viable for consciousness. These features are not consistently applicable for any other being as inert, unconscious material or a momentary flux. Thus *ācārya* Śāṅkara finally reaches the conclusion that consciousness alone is worth to be held as the real substance. For this, he holds the Upaniṣadic proclamation as *Brahman* to be the

exclusive reality, as it is the Absolute Consciousness which is all-comprehensive by its very nature.

Ācārya Śāṅkara takes the words 'real' and 'unreal' in their ultimate sense. For him, real means 'real for all time – past, present and future.' Likewise 'unreal' is also held in its ultimate sense of all time. Real is that which is indefeasible in all the three temporal locations of past, present and future (*trikāla abādhitvaṁ sat*). The feasibility of reality (*sattā*) as per his ontological deliberation is put in the three levels. *Brahman* is the Ultimate or Transcendental Reality (*Pārmārthika Sattā*). The notion of world viewed from this standpoint is false and viewed from the empirical standpoint the world stands as true, as it is the level of empirical or phenomenal reality (*Vyāvahārika Sattā*). Again the dreaming State appears as true, as long as the state of dream stands intact, as soon as we wake up, its apparent reality (*Prātibhāsika Sattā*) is falsified. Out of this trio, the transcendental reality is regarded as the ultimate reality as per Śaṅkara's non-dualistic ontology

III. *Brahman* (The Ultimate Reality)

Now, we have to explore into his Vedāntic thought that how he reaches the conception of ultimate reality by the exposition of *Brahman*. The first systematic expositor of Advaita *Vedānta, ācārya* Śaṅkara boldly establishes that there is an exclusive Reality of *Brahman*. He has conceptualised the theory of *Brahman* directly on the basis of the Upaniṣadic explorations. Though his self-realisation has also emerged in his exegesis (*bhāṣya*) on *Brahmasūtra* is evident enough to make him an original expositor of this doctrine. The ontology of Advaitism puts that *Brahman* is the sole Reality, the world is ultimately false, and the individual soul is transcendentally non-different from *Brahman*. *Advaita Vedānta* holds the twofold qualities of *Brahman* viz., essential

qualities (*svarūpa lakṣaṇa*) and accidental qualities (*taṭastha lakṣaṇa*). The internal nature of a thing which differentiates it from the other is called essential quality.[4] Despite not being an internal nature of a thing, if an incidental characteristic makes it different from the other is called an accidental quality.[5] This means that *taṭastha lakṣṇa* is an external or incidental property of a thing, while contrary to it, *svarūpa lakṣaṇa* is an internal or inherent property of that thing.

In *Advaita Vedānta*, the creationism (*sṛṣṭi-kartṛtva*) of *Brahman* is regarded as the *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*. Ācārya *Śaṅkara*, on the second aphorism of *Brahmasūtra*, i.e., '*Janmādyasya yataḥ*' has put his exegetical note to prove this above fact. He explains that '*Brahman* is that from which this world comes out, in which it grows up, and finally into which it comes back'. He tries to show that the scriptures reveal that *Brahman* is the cause of this world (*jagat*). Explaining the *Śrutivākyas* (scriptural statements) Śāṅkarācārya clears up this fact that "Brahman is that from which all these living being take *birth (ja),* by which they live up *(la),* and finally into which all they are absorbed *(an)".*[6] After taking support from the explanation of *Śrutivākyas* on his doctrine of *Brahman*, he tries to supply the strong argument on It. *Ācārya* Śaṅkara in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* tries to dismantle almost all illogical or hostile theories on creationism like '*prakṛti-pariṇāmavāda*' of *Sāṅkhya* School, '*paramāṇuvāda*' of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, and provided the sufficient ground for refuting '*brahmapariṇāmavāda*' of *post-Śaṅkarite Advaita Vedāntins*, and proves that *Brahman* is the exclusive cause of the world. In this sense of creationism, *Brahman* is associated with *Māyā* to be called as *Īśvara* (God). This further means that '*Brahman* with *Māyā* is the cause of world (*jagat*). In spite of regarding *Brahman*

as the creator of the world, Śaṅkarācārya has propounded the theory of *vivartavāda* (the doctrine of superimposition), and has refuted the theories of *asatkāryavāda* and *pariṇāmavāda*). According to him, there is no real production of the world. Its production is only an appearance (*ābhāsa*). This means that '*sṛṣṭikartṛttva*' (creationism) is truth on the basis of phenomenal level. On the basis of transcendental level, there is neither any creation nor a creator. Thus, to be the cause of the world (*jagatakāraṇtva*) is the conditional attribute of *Brahman*, and not the essential one. This is such an attribute of *Brahman* that does not contaminate the real nature of It. The above nature of *Brahman* is (Its) *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*.

Ācārya Śaṅkara tries to reveal the real nature of *Brahman* having stated the essential qualities of It. He regards *Brahman* in the sense as '*Saccidānanda*'.[7] *Saccidānanda* is analysed as: *Sat* (Pure Existence), *Cit* (Pure Consconsciousness), and *Ānanda* (Pure Bliss). This very characteristic is regarded in the scriptures as '*satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahma*'.[8] This means that *Brahman* is of the nature of *Satya*, *Jñāna* and *Ananta*. *Brahman* is Existence *(Sat)*; *Brahman* is Consciousness *(Cit)* and *Brahman* is Bliss (*Ānanda*). All above trio is not the attributes of *Brahman*. There are two reasons for it: Firstly, the trio is not taken as positive, but as negative. The existence (*sat*) negates the non-existence (*asat*), the consciousness (*cit*) negates non-consciousness (*acit*), and the bliss (*ānanda*) negates non-bliss (*anānanda* or *duḥkha*). Such a description or *Brahman* means that *Brahman* is not non-existence (*asat*), non-consciousness (*acit*) and non-bliss (*duḥkha*). Secondly, *Brahman* transcends all sorts of differences; hence there can be no imagination of the notions of the qualified and the quality. As a matter of fact, Existence, Consciousness and Bliss are not the

attributes of *Brahman*, but they characterize *Brahman*. These are not the three, but are one. These are ontologically one. That which is Existence is also Consciousness as well as Bliss.

Ācārya Śaṅkara tries to clarify the difference between these above two natures of *Brahman* through an instance[9] that follows: There is a herdsman who comes on the stage to play the role of a king. In the role of a king he conquers many kingdoms and rules them over. In reality the actor is a herdsman which is his essential quality (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*). But, he is a king, a winner and a ruler on the stage. This is his accidental quality (*taṭastha lakṣaṇa*).

According to Śaṅkara, the accidental nature of *Brahman* indicates only that *Brahman* is that unchangeable element which appears as this phenomenal world. But this does not entail that what is the nature of *Brahman*. He has explained the statements of *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* to characterize the nature of *Brahman*. *Ācārya* Śaṅkara emphasizes that the accidental nature of *Brahman* is true only when viewed with the phenomenal level. It is held so as to direct the ignorant for having a glimpse of *Brahman* to find eagerness towards It. But on the transcendental level, *Brahman* is beyond every determination. According to him, *Brahman* is immanent in this world as well as transcendent to this world. For those who have come to know the reality, there is neither real creation (*sṛṣṭi*) not a real creator (*sṛṣṭikartā*). The world is false when viewed on transcendental level, while it is true when viewed on phenomenal level, though for its existence it ultimately depends on *Brahman*. *Jīva* (the individual self) is also non-different from *Brahman*. It is only the ignorance due to which it differentiates itself from *Brahman* (the Cosmic Self).

Advaita Vedānta regards *Brahman* in two forms: *Para* (Higher *Brahman)* and *Apara* (Lower *Brahman*). *Para Brahman* is also called *Nirguṇa Brahman* and *Apara Brahman* as *Saguṇa*

Brahman. When *Apara Brahman* is conditioned by *Māyā* (the potency of *Brahman*), It appears as lower who is also called *Īśvara* or *God*. *God* is the personal aspect of the impersonal *Brahman*. The difference between the God and the Absolute, or *Īśvara* and *Brahman* is made on the basis of conditioning activity of *Māyā*. Śaṅkara derives this celebrated distinction on the basis of the Upaniṣadic perusal. *Īśvara* or God has phenomenal character. He is personal and by His will and power of *Māyā,* He begins to create *jīvas* or selves and the matters. He is also at the same time sustainer and destroyer of the world. He is the source and ultimate goal of everything. There is no ontological difference between *Īśvara* and *Brahman*. *Īśvara* is regarded all in all from the practical standpoint, so He is the object of devotion. He is inspirer and controller of moral life. *Brahman* is complete enough, the whole and eternal and stable, while God or *Īśvara* is with mobile and active character having based on the same elements of *Brahman*. The former is the reflection of the latter in *Māyā* (or Cosmic Ignorance), while *jīva* is the reflection of *Brahman* in *avidyā* (or individual ignorance). *Brahman* and *jīva* are also non-different essentially. They are only differentiated on the basis of delimiting power of *Māyā*. *Brahman*, limited or conditioned by *Māyā* is *Īśvara*, while *Brahman* limited by *avidyā* is *jīva*. The former view is regarded as 'Reflection Theory (*pratibimbavāda*)' and the latter as 'Limitation Theory (*avacchedavāda*)'. Some *advaitins* deem the relation between *Īśvara* and *Brahman* as such. But, *ācārya* Śaṅkara himself favours another theory on this relation which is called 'Appearance Theory (*ābhāsavāda*)'. According to this theory, *Īśvara* and *jīva* are the inexplicable appearance of *Brahman*. This happens to be so due to *Māyā* (the Cosmic Ignorance) or *avidyā* (the individual ignorance) or *adhyāsa* (superimposition). *Īśvara* and *jīva* are appearances (*vivarta*) of *Brahman* (the Supreme Reality).

Ācārya Śaṅkara further explains that *Brahman* is ultimately free from all sorts of differences (*bhedas*). It is non-different (*abheda*) existence. It transcends homogenetic (*sajātīya*), heterogenetic (*vijātīya*) and inherent (*svagata*) *bhedas*. For example, the difference between two cows is a *sajātīya bheda*; the difference between a cow and a horse is *vijātīya bheda*; and the difference between a hand and a leg of the same person is *svagat bheda*. Śaṅkara holds clearly that *Brahman* does not possess *sajātīya bheda* as there is no existence similar with It. It has no *vijātīya bheda* because there is no existence opposed to It; It has also not the *svagat bheda*. Thus *Brahman* is *nirguṇa, nirviśeṣa* and devoid of all the *bhedas* (differences).

In *Śaṅkarite Advaita Vedānta, Brahman* is indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). Hence, it is not subject to description or ideation. Therefore, *Brahman* can be apprehended or indicated by the negation only. When an object is indicated or implied by an attribute, other attributes or qualities automatically are negated, and thus becomes specific (*saviśeṣa*) and delimited (*sīmita*). So, the intellect or reason when applied to describe *Brahman* makes It specific and delimited. Therefore, the *Śrutis* suggest that *Brahman* should be described only by '*neti neti*' that means *Brahman* can be known only by negative method; or, 'It (*Brahman*) is not this, It is not this *(na iti)* ....' Here, it is worthy to note that to regard *Brahman* as indescribable does not mean that *Brahman* is unknowable (*ajñeya*). *Brahman* of *Advaita Vedānta* is of course beyond reason and logical explanation, but It is not unknowable. Śaṅkara says here that It may be apprehended through direct experiences (*aparokṣānubhūti*) dawned at by right knowledge. To know *Brahman* is to become *Brahman*. This is the ultimate goal (liberation) of life.

IV. The Concept of *Ātman* (Soul)

The conception of self or *ātman* has been very much important topic of inquiry in Indian Schools of philosophy. Though it has well been deliberated in the *Vedas* and the *Upaniṣads*, it has found the climax of its systematic theorisation in the philosophy of *Advaita Vedānta*. In this School *ātman* and *Brahman* are regarded as the two different names of the same Entity or Existence. Following the classical tradition of the ancient seers, Śaṅkara has tried to show the non-difference between *ātman* and *Brahman*. The major difference between the two is that *Brahman* has ontological significance in philosophy, while *ātman* is epistemologically momentous. It is also important to note that in a sound philosophical system of thought there is no logical opposition between ontology and epistemology, but they both should be in coherence with each other so as to make any particular thought logically and philosophically sound. Thus, in *Advaita Vedānta* also, the principles of *ātman* and *Brahman* are treated as logically sound. These two are known by the equation: *Ātman=Brahman*[10] in the Upaniṣadic philosophy which is the establishment of the Śankarite *Advaita Vedānt* also. Through the explanation of this principle he has tried to show the role of soul in the process of attaining right knowledge. It also contains the related concepts of the so-called substance theory (*dravya sidhānta*) of philosophy.

There are primarily three significant objectives of explaining the concept of soul in the School of *Advaita Vedānta*: Firstly, Śaṅkara wants to show the identity between *Brahman* (the Cosmic Soul) and *ātman* (say *jīva,* the individual soul). Secondly, through this principle, he has tried to find the real nature of knowledge, and consciousness which ultimately leads one to the summum bonum of life, i.e. liberation (*mokṣa*). And, the third is to ascertain the

nature and number of substance so as to get the actual picture of Reality.

Ācārya Śaṅkara clears that the *ātman* as the Ultimate Reality is one without a second. It is ultimately identified with *Brahman* and phenomenally with *jīva*. His conception of soul may be explained in relation to '*Brahman*' and '*Īśvara*', 'consciousness', '*jīva*', and '*sākṣīn*'.

Śaṅkara develops his philosophy of *ātman* and regards it as *Brahman* and *Īśvara* with reference to the different standpoints. *Ātman* is *Brahman*, which is Unqualified Absolute, and the Qualified *Brahman* is *Īśvara*. In the state of ignorance *Brahman* is manifested as *jīva*, therefore, viewed transcendentally, *jīva* is also *Brahman* or *ātman*. The philosophy of Śaṅkara recognises *ātman*, *Brahman*, *jīva* and *Īśvara* as identical. There are the different names for the same entity with reference to the different states of knowledge. Like the *Upaniṣads*, Śaṅkara recognises *ātman* as pure consciousness. It is the self which is self-luminous and which transcends all kinds of dualities, trinities and the categories of thought. It is the Absolute Reality and Pure Knowledge. It is the Essence of everything. Everything else is relative and hence ultimately unreal. The self alone is not relative. It is, therefore, the only Reality, that is self-proved. It is the substratum of all knowledge and means of cognitions. As the pure consciousness, the knowledge is its very nature (*jñāna-svarūpa*). He who is the knower is the self, for he is the essence of all. The difficulty is that the human intellect tends to know everything as an object. But whatever can be taken as an object is essentially relative and, therefore, it is unreal. The subject or the knower can never be known in the form of an object. There is absolutely no difference between the knower and the knowledge. It is only the intellect that delimits or deludes the very nature of the self. Phenomenally it is

indescribable, since all descriptions and all categories fail to grasp it as a whole. The best way of describing it is, therefore, by the negative phrase 'not this (*neti*)', 'not this' (*neti*)..... But, positively the best that we can characterise it is as the *Saccidānanda*, that is, the Pure Existence (*Sat*), the Pure Consciousness (*Cit*), and the Pure Bliss (*Ānanda*).

Śaṅkara advances the proofs for the identity of *ātman* and *Brahman*. He says as per the derivation, "*Brahman* is that which is the greatest or which is infinitely grown up (*Bṛhattam*)".[11] *Brahman* is an Absolute Entity as It is the infinitely grown up, and that may be regarded as an Absolute. The same thing is applicable to the *ātman* or the self. The self is that which is all-pervasive (*sarvavyāpaka*).[12] Being all-pervasive the Self is also an Absolute Entity. But logically, the two entities at once cannot be regarded as an Absolute. The Absolute is always one. Therefore, *Brahman* and *ātman* are one and identical, and not the two. The *Mahāvākyas* of the *Upaniṣads* like, '*tat tvam asi*'[13] (that thou art)', '*ahaṁ brahmāsmi*'[14] (I am *Brahman*)' etc., also prove the identity of *Brahman* and *ātman*. What we can say and what we cannot say about *ātman* is also applicable to *Brahman* after being identified with each other. The phrase '*neti neti*' is applicable to both *ātman* and *Brahman* in the same way. But it should be never missed that all negations presuppose the points towards the positive *Brahman*. *Ātman* or *Brahman* is best described positively as the Pure Existence-Consciousness-Bliss all at once. The Existence, Consciousness and Bliss in *Brahman* are one and not the different. As Śaṅkara says, "The Real is the Rational and the Rational is the Real,"[15] and likewise, the Bliss is also non-different. All these three being unified and non-different justify the non-dualism or *Advaita* of Śaṅkara.

As in the previous concept of *Brahman*, we have already found that *Brahman* and *Īśvara* are ontologically one and the same. *Brahman* appears as *Īśvara* when enriched with the power of creation (*Māyā*). Likewise, *ātman* (or *Brahman*) when conditioned by individual *Māyā*, that is, *avidyā* or individual ignorance, it appears as *jīvātman* (individual self). Thus, *ātman* is essentially non-different from *Brahman*, *Īśvara* and *jīvātman*.

Now, we come to the conception of *ātman* or soul in which we try to ascertain it in relation to the concept of consciousness. *Ācārya* Śaṅkara admits *ātman* as the eternal light of consciousness. In his philosophy, *ātman* is identified with consciousness, as he says in his exegesis on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. "The *ātman* in the case of all creatures is well-known to be the inmost consciousness known directly, and is self-revealed."[16] According to Rāmānuja, consciousness is a substance (*dravya*), and still it is an attribute of the self, even as a ray of light, although it is a substance, it is an attribute of the lamp. The *Naiyāyika*, the *Vaiśeṣika*, and the *Prabhākara* Schools hold that consciousness is an attribute (*guṇa*) of the self. Kumārila holds that consciousness is an action (*karma*) of the self, since it is the product of its cognitive activity. The cognitive activity and its product, i.e., consciousness must be the same. The *Sāṅkhya* system admits that consciousness is the very nature (*svarūpa*) of the self (*puruṣa*) and it is not its attribute or action. Like the *Sāṅkhya*, Śaṅkara also holds that consciousness is neither a substance nor an attribute, nor an action of the self. The self is non-different from the consciousness, and hence both are identified. The self is characterised as the eternal consciousness. The Śaṅkarite treatment of the self as consciousness is thus akin to that of the *Upaniṣads*. He holds that *ātman* or consciousness is always the knowing principle, and cannot, therefore, become an object of knowledge; and an object is always

an object, and cannot become the subject or the knower. The subject and the object are essential for any kind of knowledge, and each is revealed or known in relation to the other. Things may exist independently of a subject but are known as objects only when they are presented to some subject. And in relation to the process of knowing an object, the consciousness is known or identified as the knower or the subject or the self. But *ātman* is different from the object of consciousness or that which is to be known or experienced.

According to Śaṅkara, *ātman* is the eternal light of consciousness. It is never an object of knowledge (*aviṣaya*), or there can be no knowledge of *ātman* in the ordinary sense of knowledge. The effort to grasp that Absolute Consciousness by any means of knowledge, intellect or determination is indeed to roll up the sky like leather or is to try to ascend the space like a staircase or is to look for the footprints of fish in water or of birds in the sky. Whatever we know or experience ordinarily about the consciousness in relation to the 'subject-object' or the 'knower-known' duality is not the very nature of the Absolute Consciousness, but is the conditioned consciousness. Thus, consciousness with respect to ascertain it is of two sorts: conditional and unconditional. Conditional consciousness has a subject (*sāśraya*) as well as an object (*saviṣaya*) and depends on perception, inference, and the like. As it depends upon subject-object duality it has only an empirical reality. It is represented through the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). It consists in the function (*vṛtti*) of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Therefore, the subjectivity or the egoity (*jñātṛtva*) must belong to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, or the phenomenal self (*jīva*) which is conditioned (consciousness) by the *antaḥkaraṇa*. While on the other hand, unconditioned consciousness is Pure and Absolute. It is both subjectless (*nirāśraya*) and objectless

(*nirviṣaya*). It does not depend upon anything else to realize its existence. It is identical with the Pure Existence (*Sat*) and Pure Bliss (*Ānanda*) at once. It is called *Brahman*. When the Pure Consciousness is conditioned by the ignorance or *avidyā*, the phenomenal self or *jīvātmā* appears through the duality of the subject and object, and instantly after the dawn of immediate intuition it disappears and the knowledge of Pure Consciousness or the Pure Self is revealed.

Śaṅkara also tries to throw light on the self with reference to *jīva* and *sākṣin*. For him, *ātman* and *jīva* are the different names of the same Reality with reference to the different states of knowledge. He draws a distinction between *jīva* and *ātman* not in general but in a phenomenal sense. *Ātman* or the Real Self is the transcendental, non-empirical and the metaphysical Reality; *jīva* is the empirical, psychological self and the phenomenal reality. *Ātman* is the eternal light of consciousness. *Jīva* is the eternal consciousness as limited by conditions like organism, sense-organs, *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra*. *Ātman* or the Real Self is the Pure Consciousness which is the presupposition of all experiences; it is presupposed by experience of all objects, and thus is entirely non-objective. But *jīva* is the subject and the object; the knower and the known; the ego and the non-ego. It, through the ignorance, appears as the false notion of the 'I', the 'me' and the 'mine'. *Ātman* is never an object of consciousness. *Jīva* is an object of self-consciousness (*asmatpratyaya*). It becomes an object of the self-consciousness, when it is delimited by the products of nescience, i.e. the body, the senses and the *antaḥkaraṇa*. When the false notions of 'I' and the 'me' are destroyed with the dawn of right knowledge, it ceases to be an object of self- consciousness and its very nature of pure consciousness is revealed.

Śaṅkara holds that ultimately there is no diference at all between *jīva* and *ātman*. The jīvahood remains only up to the state of nescience. As soon as the immediate intuition is attained, the inner self (*pratyagātman*) is apprehended[17]; and all the conditions as well as the apparent differences are destroyed, the shining of the Real Self is ascertained.

Like *ātman* and *jīva*, there is no ultimate difference between *ātman* (self) and *sākṣin* (witness). *Ātman* is the Absolute and Universal Self and in the individual it is the witness or *sākṣin* of all cognitions or of the various mental modes. Cognitions are born and die, but the witness consciousness or self is the everlasting and unchanging, which is ever present as the eternal seer of all the cognitions and actions. The self, by its very nature, is luminous and a consciousness which reveals itself and its self-consciousness both. It is also the witness of all cognitions and the notions of self-consciousness (*ahaṁpratyaya*).[18] Vācaspatimiśra clarifies in his *Bhāmati* that there is no distinction between *sākṣin* and *ātman*. The difference is only due to ignorance. The Pure Self conditioned by the intellects etc. is *jīva*, whereas its very nature is witness self or *sākṣin*.[19] *Jīva* is although non-different from *ātman*, it is phenomenally entangled as limited by certain adjuncts like the *buddhi* etc. The active agent which is the object of self-consciousness (*ahaṁpratyaya*) is *jīvātman*, the empirical self. The Absolute Self (*Paramātman*), who is the witness (*sākṣin*) of this empirical self, is not an object of the self-consciousness (*ahaṁpratyaya*).

Thus, *Brahman, Īśvara, ātman* and *sākṣin*, all are merely the different names of the same Reality with reference to the different standpoints. When the right knowledge (*Brahmajñāna* or *Brahmavidyā*) dawns, all the discriminations like above are destroyed and the Real Self or *Ātman* is revealed in the state of

liberation (*mukti*), and hence at that moment, there is no ultimate difference between the knower and the known as the knower himself becomes the known or *Brahman*.[20]

V. Summing Up

In the above discussion we have come to know that Śaṅkara's School of *Advaita Vedānta* is the climax of philosophical reflection in search of reality. For this purpose, he has well tried to theorise the principles of reality in advaitic way in which *Brahman* is the exclusive substance which is non-dual Reality. It is the Ultimate Truth which is realised or reached through the vanishment of ignorance and the dawn of the right knowledge; *Īśvara* is also *Brahman* conditioned with *Māyā*.

Ātman is another significant principle which is identified with *Brahman*. It is epistemologically more momentous theory which plays role in acquisition of knowledge and dispelling off the ignorance. It binds itself under the impact of *avidyā* and appears as *jīva* in the secular state, though ultimately untouched with it, *Ātman* is *Sat-Cit-Ānanda* by its very nature. The world (*jagat*) is appearance of this very Ultimate Reality.

Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidyapith,
Varanasi-221002 (U.P.) India
E-mail: bprasad.mgkvu@gmail.com

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Ontology deals with the science of reality, that is, the theory of substance. It is very often confused with the notion of metaphysics which is derived from a Greek phrase '*ta meta ta physica*'. This means 'beyond physics'. Metaphysics is always questioned with the problem of verification, while ontology is the statements of the

truth of reality. *Ācārya* Śaṅkara would like to label his philosophy of reality as the ontology rather than metaphysics.

2. *Bhagvadgītā* holds that *asat* (unreal) is not exiting and *sat* (real) is not absent or non-existing (*'nāsato vidyate bhāvaḥ nābhāvo vidyate sattaḥ'*, *Bhagvadgītā*, 2.16) *Ācārya* Śaṅkara puts here his exegesis on this point (*Bhāṣya* on *Bhagvadgītā, 2.15*), vide *'yadviṣāya budhiḥ na vyabhicarati tat sat, yadviṣāya budhiḥ vyabhicarati tat asat'.*

3. *"Nahi draṣṭurdṛṣṭeḥ viparilopo, vidyate. ya evahi nirakarttā tadeva tasya svarūpam"*, *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, 2.3.7 *cf.* Cartesian 'dubito ergo sum' or 'cogito ergo sum' that means the doubter or knower is always there when doubting or knowing takes place.

4. *Svarūpāntarabhūtve sati itaravyārtakaṁ svarūpalakṣaṇam.*

5. *Svarūpāntarābhūtve sati itaravyāvartakaṁ taṭasthalakṣaṇam.*

6. Vide Śaṅkara's exegesis on 'Tajjalāna', *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, 3.14.1; and also on 'yato vā imāni .... tadbrahmeti', *Taittarīyopaniṣad*, 3.2.

7. *Nṛsiṁhottaratāpani Upaniṣad*, 7. Vide, for the first time the term 'sat-cit-ānanda' was used at once here well before its use in *Śāṅkara* philosophy.

8. *Taittarīyopaniṣad*, 2.1

9. Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, 3.1.18.

10. Dasgupta, Surendranath, *History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1957), Vol.1, p. 45

11. *Niratiśayaṁ bhūmākhayaṁ bṛhatvād brahmeti viddhiḥ*, *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* on *Kena Upaniṣad*, 1.5.

12. *āpnotervyāptikarmaṇaḥ ātmā*, *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* on *Taitt. Up.*, p. 43.

13. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.8.7

14. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 1.4.10

15. *'Sattā eva bodhaḥ bodha eva ca sattā'* ("*Ātman* cannot be existence without intelligence or intelligence without existence"), see Radhakrishnan, S., *Indian Philosophy* (New Delhi : Oxford University Press), Fourteenth Impression, 2006), Vol.2, fn.1, p. 483

16. *Pratyeka cetanaḥ svasaṁvedyaḥ*, *Śāṅkara Bhāsya* on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 8.14.1.

17. *Na tāvadayamekāntenāviṣayaḥ......*, *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, 1.1.1, vide Śaṅkara's introduction.

18. *Śānkara Bhāsya* on *Brahma Sūtra*, 1.1.4.

19. *tasyopahitam rūpam jīvaḥ śuddham tu rūpam tasya sākṣi*, *Bhāmati*, 1.1.4.

20. *'Brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati'*, *Muṇḍkopaniṣad*, 3.2.9

AN ASPECT OF DAYA KRISHNA'S INTERPRETATION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: WHETHER NYAYA REALISM

KALI CHARAN PANDEY

This essay aims to delineate the zeal Daya Ji had to revive a new debate and discussion in Indian Philosophy and provide an alternate interpretation to its various issues–an interpretation which deviates from the established myths and prejudices.

In the pen-ultimate paragraph of *Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western*[1] Daya Krishna points out not only the purpose of the book but also clearly delineates as to what, according to him, is the new interpretation of Indian Philosophy:

"A real encounter with texts, is thus, not just a reconstruction of past thought but rather stepping into a living stream where the thought currents of the past, both visible and invisible, carry one into the future as they gently 'force' one mover in directions one had not dreamt of before. The encounter with 'history' is, thus, not a movement into the past as has generally been thought but rather a movement into the future because one has stepped into the living currents that flow from the past and have sufficient vitality and force in the present to carry one onwards into the future. At least this is what we have 'experienced' and the sensitive reader will find on every page the marks of this living encounter, leaving an exciting challenge to carry on the dimly-seen possibilities and develop it into directions which are only faintly indicated there."[2]

It is obvious from the above quoted thought of Daya Ji that he wished to reorient thinkers to a new interpretation of Indian texts in such a way that the tradition is interpreted not as a thought not of yesterday but as a thought of tomorrow. We have to see our

tradition not as a *dead-end* but as something with which we are living and more importantly as something which is also to be with us in future.

Thus Daya Krishna's concept of interpretation or reconstruction of Indian Philosophy is unique because it is based on unknown horizons – an extended textuality which does take into account not only 'present' and 'past' of the text but also futuristic attitude of assimilation of various perspectives of the text. For Daya Ji, this futuristic attitude is what lacks in the historians and philosophers of history because they adopt the set pattern and do not bother to build a futuristic vision. He says, "The deeper problem, however, relates to the principles of interpretation adopted in the 'construction' itself and the importance and the weightage given to different factors in the evidence itself. The justification of the principles of interpretation that are adopted by historians can, by the very nature of the case, not itself be a part of history-writing itself even though it is necessarily presupposed by it."[3] That is, historians try to build their construction on the basis of the available evidences of the past but they forget that there could be an alternative construction in which on the basis of futuristic interpretation of the evidences a counter-perspective of the same period could be done. It has been clearly stated in his book *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*: "A picture once built is difficult to dismantle, but the evidence and the argument slowly undermine it and the younger generation which is not so indissolubly 'wedded' to 'orthodoxy' as the older one, begins to be more open and responsive to the critique as it finds some substance in it."[4] Here Daya Ji admits that he attempted to design an alternative picture of the tradition of Indian Philosophy in his book *Indian Philosophy: A New Approach*. He also mentions about this issue in his book *Bhāratiya Darshana: Eka Naī Dṛṣṭi* and admits that this is not a Hindi version of the *Indian Philosophy: A New Approach* and

that it brings out the changing picture of Indian Philosophy.[5] In his book *Bhāratiya Darshana: Eka Naī Dṛṣṭi* he admits that the traditional interpretation of Indian Philosophy has inflicted an enormous injustice to the rich tradition of Indian Philosophy. This book is limited to Indian Philosophical developments till the period of Shamkara and Daya Ji admits that next story will be written in another part, if not by him then by someone else. And this statement puts a sense of responsibility on all of us to work towards a new interpretation of Indian Philosophy initiated by him. Daya Ji's new interpretation of can be gathered in his most of reflections in various contexts. Here we shall get a glimpse of such an interpretation in Daya Ji's debate with current Naiyāyikas on the issue: Whether Nyāya Realistic or not. The debate has been brought out here with the intention to reveal the methodology and characteristics of Daya Ji's new ways of interpreting Indian Philosophy. The new interpretation, as obvious from our discussions so far, is something which is free from orthodoxies, myths and established way of philosophizing and aims at revising a debate and discussion about our heritage in such a way which is futuristic in point of view and thus argues against the so called 'end of Indian Philosophy' perception.

Nyāya System has been defined as Epistemological Realism par excellence as contrast to Epistemological Idealism of Berkeley. In a current debate in *JICPR* (Reprinted again in *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, and Nyāya* and also in *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*), initiated by Daya Krishna, contemporary philosophers such as Arindam Chakraborti, J.N. Mohanty, N.S. Dravid, Sibjiban Bhattacharyya, and R.K Sharma have reformulated their arguments as to why Nyāya system is traditionally regarded as a realist. These thinkers of repute have formulated their own arguments in order to defend realistic characterization of Indian Philosophy. Here I take

up the basic thesis of Daya Krishna which puts a question mark on the so-called realistic characterization of Nyāya and further such questioning tries to show not only that there are idealistic elements in Nyāya but also that the usage of epistemological classification of schools and thinkers into Realistic and Idealistic, which perfectly works in the case of Western Philosophy, in case of Indian Philosophy is problematic. It is interesting to analyze the views of various scholars of contemporary Indian Philosophy and find out that their responses to Daya Ji are different from each other.

Some of these responses are very oblique and some are very direct (to the extent that they can be called even blunt). As N.S. Dravid puts it: "No indigenously trained student of Nyāya would even entertain the slightest doubt about the realistic character of Nyāya. Certain confusions seem to have engendered this doubt in Daya Krishna' mind."[6] And further, he has quoted Udayana from his *Ātmatattvaviveka*:

"When some person of perverted intellect discourses about the unreal (hare's horn, barren women's son, etc.) a sober, knowledgeable person cannot but remain silent."[7]

In the background of such a harsh criticism of even an attempt to question the established point of view that Nyāya is realistic, let us begin our exploration of the debate with Nyāya's view that 'everything that is real is knowable and nameable'. For Daya Krishna, "If we keep aside the issue of 'nameability' alone, then the contention that 'to be real' is 'to be knowable' seems suspiciously close to the idealist contention that *eesse* is *percipii*. 'To be is to be perceived' is the well-known Berkeleyan formulation in the Western tradition. 'To be perceived' of course means 'to be known' in this context."[8]

As Nyāya's position is 'to be knowable' and Berkeley's position is 'to be known' Daya Ji reformulates Berkeley's position in order to show its affinity with Nyāya and says that as in case of

God's *percipii* there cannot be sense perception and therefore for God *percipii* to be understood in terms of knowledge and not as perception. Thus 'to be' becomes 'to be known' or 'to be knowable'. It's 'to be known' for God and 'to be knowable' for human beings. For God there is no such distinction as between known and knowable.

In the above background of above argumentation with Daya's point of view about identification between Nyāya and Berkeley's epistemological positions, it is illuminating to note Arindam Chakraborti's viewpoint: "…the general Nyāya dictum that 'whatever is, is knowable' (*astitva* and *prameyatva* are coextensive) may mislead us to doubt that Nyāya is thing-realist. These two reminders should keep us away from that doubt. First, to be knowable is not to be known. Second, even when something is an object of knowledge it retains, according to Nyāya, its independence of and distinctness from knowledge."[9]

The responses of J. N Mohanty and N.S. Dravid to the above point of Daya Krishna's critique of Nyāya's Realism are slightly different from that of Chakraborti. For J. N. Mohanty, 'capable of existing' is different from 'capable of being known'. "It is not being said that whatever is capable of existing, is capable of being known. What is being said is that whatever exists is so capable. There is, as a matter of fact, no equivalent modalized concept with regard to 'existence' in the Nyāya system."[10] Mohanty uses term 'capable of being known' in place of Chakraborti's 'to be knowable' as the interpretation of Nyāya's *'prameyatva'* or *'jñeyatva'*. However, J.N. Mohanty's next point of such interpretation is debatable. For Mohanty, "The idealist thesis *'esse est percipii'* asserts the *identity* between 'existing' and 'being perceived'. The Nyāya thesis asserts, not identity, but *invariable co-occurrence* of the two properties: such invariable co-occurrence requires that the two properties be different."[11] Though Mohanty

accepts universal co-occurrence between real and knowable his interpretation of *Vyāpti* is that it's not a necessary relation, it's not an internal relation but it's an extensional relation of mere co-presence. So he says, "To say that there is a *Vyāpti* between S (smoke) and F (fire) is *not* to say 'It is impossible that there is a locus of S, in which F is absent', but rather to say, 'It is not the case that F is absent in a locus of S'. When the Nyāya holds that whatever exists is capable of being known, what it means to assert is not a logically necessary relation, but a factual relation of co-presence. Whatever exists is knowable, but *not necessarily so*."[12] Thus on the basis of his own formulation of *Vyāpti* Mohanty points out that the relationship between 'real' and 'knowable' is contingent and not necessary. Hence, Mohanty's contention, as against Daya Krishna's reformulation of Berkeley's *'eesse est percipii'* is that in Nyāya 'to be real' cannot be identifiable with 'to be perceivable' or 'to be knowable'. For Mohanty, in case of Nyāya *'jñeyatva'* stands for the knowledge which is not necessarily known through perception only but which can be known through inference as well. As against this, Berkeley's *'esse est percipii'* is limited to perception and cannot be arrived through inference. Mohanty's point is that there is no *Vyāpti* relation (logical necessity as generally known) between 'real' and 'knowable'. The relation is purely extensional between these two and such a relation is not a necessary relation but a universal co-occurrence. Over and above such extensional relationship no relation of internal necessity can be asserted between either 'real' and 'knowable' or between *hetu* and *sādhya* in *Vyāpti*. So interpreting Nyāya as a staunch realist system, Mohanty tries to establish that in Nyāya existence is not dependent on its knowledge in the mind of someone because the relationship between the existence of a thing and its knowledge is not of necessity but that a mere co-occurrence. Thus Mohanty adopts Humean notion of causality

(between the existence of a thing and its knowledge) in order to safeguard realist character of Nyāya.

In brief, although both Arindam Chakraborti and J.N. Mohanty reject Daya's equalization of Berkeley's 'to be is to be perceived' and Nyāya's 'to be is to be knowable', for former Nyāya's 'knowable' is not 'known' and for latter in Nyāya there is no logical necessity between reality and its knowability. As such both Chakraborti and Mohanty try to dissolve the idealist viewpoint that there is a necessary relationship between existence of a thing and its knowledge. The purpose of such dissolution is to counter Daya's identification between Berkeleyan *eesse est percipii* and Nyāya's criterion of existence as *prameyatva*. However, the differences between these arguments are remarkable. For Chakraborti Nyāya does not talk about 'known' but 'knowable' and even a knowable objects retains its existence independent from its knowledge. As different from this and in a much stronger realist thesis Mohanty holds that for Nyāya the *vyāpti* between existence of a thing and its knowledge is not a relation of necessity as we generally know but its actually just universal concomitance.

N.S. Dravid is much more elaborate and harsh on Daya's view that Nyāya's 'real is knowable' resembles to that of Berkeley's *eesse est percipii*. Dravid says, "In the Nyāya view things are sometimes known and sometimes not; when they are not known they are *knowable* because the possibility of their being known is not ruled out. Such is not the case with things in Berkeley's view. According to it, it is not enough for the reality of a thing that there should be a possibility of its being known. According to Berkeley the essence of things consists in their being actually known. Thus, things are totally dependent upon knowing for being real. But, for Nyāya knowness is an adventitious property of things."[13]

So Dravid's criticism of Daya Ji is different from that of Chakraborti and Mohanty as he brings out the adventitiousness of the knowledge as a property of things supposedly on the basis that consciousness is not an essence of soul but only an accidental property of soul in Nyāya. But here the problem is that if this is so then one can point out that there cannot be a distinction between 'knowness' and 'knowability' or 'knowable' in Nyāya as that which is known can only become knowable and there arise no question of knowing that which is not known. Then both 'known' and 'knowable' keep co-extensive domains. That is, adventitious nature of knowability prohibits such a distinction as between known and knowable. As such a distinction is the basis of Chakraborti as well as Mohanty's arguments, Dravid's position turns out to be not only contrary but actually contradictory from that: mutually they are contradictory from a categorical point of view and contrary in the context of Nyāya.

Another different line of argumentation in defense of Nyāya's realism and against Daya's above identification comes from Sibjiban Bhattacharya. Bhattacharya raises two basic points. First, for Sibjiban Bhattacharyya, Nyāya admits some eternal and uncreated objects such as substances, *Jātis*, *Samavāya*, *Viśeṣas* and *Atyantābhāva* which are not dependent on anything. That is, for Bhattacharya these objects are not dependent on their being known by someone. And Second, in the perceptual cognition, object is a cause of perceptual knowledge, hence it must exist prior to the production of knowledge. So, for Bhattacharya Nyāya's realism remains intact.

In his reply to the above respondents Daya Krishna first shows that there is disagreement among contemporary Naiyāyikas on the interpretation of 'real is knowable'. The disagreements and differences in the responses of Daya's critics itself is a proof that Nyāya's 'real is knowable' is problematic and therefore cannot be

taken as a proof that Nyāya is realistic. For Daya ji, "the 'difference' itself is indicative of the fact that it is not easy to determine what exactly is the Nyāya position….The difference and divergent points raised in the responses to the simple question raised by me suggests that the House of Nyāya is divided in itself, and that the ideas of a unique, unambiguous position of Nyāya is a myth, sustained only by the fact that scholars and students have unquestioningly accepted what is purveyed in the name of Nyāya in the text books on the subject"[14]

Daya Ji proceeds to reply each respondent. He shows that J. N. Mohanty's account of *Vyāpti* has serious problems. As indicated in the context of our discussion on Monhaty's response, Daya Ji also holds that Mohanty's notion of *Vyāpti* as a mere co-presence has no support. He rejects such an interpretation of the notion of *Vyāpti* on the ground that had that interpretation been the case there would not have been any need of the long debate on this issue in Nyāya tradition. Moreover, the notion of extensional Vyāpti for Daya Ji always faces an unresolved question: 'how is this *Vyāpti* established'? The problem remains even if on the basis of Mohanti's notion of *Vyāpti* it is accepted that there is a *Vyāpti* relation between existence and its knowability as 'to be real is to be knowable' is different from 'to be knowable is to be real'.

In his defense to Arindam Chakraborty's criticism that 'to be knowable' is not 'to be known', and therefore unlike Berkeleyan Idealism, Nyāya is a realism, Daya Ji distinguishes between simple and straightforward acceptance that there is a thing which no body knows, i.e. which is independent of all minds on the one hand, and on the other Nyāya's point of view that the object of knowledge is 'knowable'. Daya Ji says, "The straight way to realism would be to accept that there are, or may be, things which are not known or which need not necessarily be known by any finite or infinite mind. But this simple way does not seem acceptable to Nyāya and it tries

to wriggle out of the difficulty by maintaining that things may not be known but that they are certainly 'knowable' in principle. It not only fights shy of but actively rejects the possibility that something may be 'unknowable' in fact or in principle as it does not want to subscribe to this hard core contention of realism in the strictly epistemological sense of the term. For it, 'to be existent' or 'real' is to be necessarily knowable in principle. But what exactly is meant by saying that something is 'knowable' is never explained clearly."[15] Thus for Daya Ji such a view as that of Charkraborti which holds Nyāya as opting for the possibility of an object which is independent of all minds and therefore knowable but not actually known, is actually not a realistic thesis. More precisely this is so because for Nyāya existence is identified with 'known' or at least 'knowable' in principle. The 'knowable' in Nyāya cannot boost itself of being independent of mind because of its admission of the theoretical possibility of becoming knowable in future.

Next, so far as Dravid holds that there is a distinction between 'known' and 'knowable', his position is similar to the arguments of Chakraborti and Mohanty and therefore does not need any reply from Daya Ji. Further, as Dravid's view that 'numbers are products of the enumerative cognition, Daya Ji points out that it is not enumerative cognition but enumerative activity which gives rise to numbers.[16]

Defending his own position from the first point of Sibjiban Bhattacharya's attack that there are some eternal objects which does not depend upon anyone's cognition for their existence, Daya says that Bhattacharya seems to forget that 'all reals are objects of God's knowledge' which actually is Berkeleyan position.[17] For Daya Ji, as for as the second objection of Bhattacharya "that the Atman or the self does not possess consciousness as its essential property, this does not make Nyāya more realist than the acceptance of enumerable other such entities, if it is accepted that

they are necessarily the 'objects' of some cognition, whether it be that of God or of some other consciousness difficult for the *Ātman* concerned."[18] Thus for Daya Ji even Bhattacharya's objection does not safeguard Nyāya's realism.

Before proceeding further, let me put my point on Daya's above identification between Nyāya's 'knowable' and Berkeley's 'perceptible'. For me, there is a flaw in Daya's reformulation of Berkeleyan *eesse est percipii* whose purpose is to establish its identity with Nyāya's 'to be is to be knowable'. No above described respondent has noted this flaw. Daya Ji reformulates Berkeley's 'to be is to be perceived' in the context of God as 'to be is to be perceived' and as 'to be is to be perceivable' and as 'to be is to be knowable' and finally as 'to be is to be known' because God cannot have sense perception but only knowledge. But after getting 'to be is to be known' Daya Ji maintains that there is no distinction between Berkeleyan 'to be is to be known' and Nyāya's 'to be is to be knowable' as former is for God and latter is for human beings; as both of these turns out to be 'to be is to be knowable' in case of human beings. My point is that once Daya Ji has achieved the reformulated Berkeleyan aphorism 'to be is to be known' for God he cannot bring it back for common man. He cannot bring it back for common man because it has been achieved only through the instrumentality of omnipotence of God. So Daya's progression from 'to be perceived' to 'to be known' and 'to be knowable' is misplaced. There is a distinction between Berkeleyan 'to be known' and Nyāya's 'to be knowable'. For Nyāya it is 'to be knowable' and not 'to be known'.

To conclude the above debate my point is that there is no doubt that there are serious problems in Daya's identification of Nyāya's 'real is knowable' with Berkeley's 'to be is to be perceived'. But differences in the responses of contemporary Naiyāyikas are something which we must look into. We have to

see whether western connotations such as 'realism' and 'idealism' are applicable in toto to Indian thoughts or is there a possibility to revise our established ascription of such adjectives. The alternative option could be to either work towards Realistic Idealism or Idealistic Realism in case of designation of systems of Indian Philosophy or altogether refrain from looking at Western concepts so far as naming of indigenous thoughts are concerned.

Above discussions are just to show as to what kind of interpretation Daya Ji wishes for Indian Philosophy. It is an interpretation in which importance and space is given to the discussions of philosophical problems and not to the writing of a history of various schools of Indian Philosophy. He says, "Normally, most writers on Indian, including acknowledged scholars of the subject, present a picture of these 'schools' as if there were no issues or problems in respect of 'understanding' of what they are supposed to have said."[19]

Daya's critics have adjudicated his interpretations of various issues of Indian Philosophy as 'negative' and he is alleged of not 'doing philosophy in a typically Indian spirit'.[20] Likewise he has been criticized for writing in a 'provocative' manner.[21] Daya Ji is well aware of these criticisms. In his book '*New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*' he states: "My writings on Indian Philosophy have been usually dubbed as 'provocative', a convenient way of dismissing them lightly and not paying any serious attention to the content and argument contained in them. I may say, in all seriousness, that no article of mine has ever been written with the intention to shock or provoke any one, instead they have been the result of the surprise and shock that I have felt at the evidence that was there in the texts that have been commented upon for millennia and which openly contradict the usual picture presented by scholars and commentators all these years. In fact my own picture of Indian Philosophy was the usual one acquired from the

tradition and the 'shock' was the result of the encounter with the 'original' texts when I opened them accidentally for the first time."[22] Notwithstanding Daya's above reply, my point of view on this issue between J. N. Mohanti and Daya Krishna is that a 'provocative' writing could be a very insightful and need not be a superficial one. So to say about some writings as 'provocative' could well be a positive comment unless the critiques intention and context of criticism lies elsewhere.

It seems that these criticisms are superficial and not based on a well-thought argument. Of course, Daya's interpretation of Indian Philosophy is a peculiar one, but that does not mean that it is negative or against Indian Spirit. When one hurls such criticisms of negative interpretation, one is unaware of his own presuppositions of a particular conception of Indian Philosophy and therefore puts a blind eye towards other interpretations. Thus, the interpretation which does not commensurate with ones own presupposition, without proper investigation, is regarded as negative. Moreover, the idea of a 'typical Indian Spirit' is a misnomer and a myth which has been well taken up by Daya Ji in his essay 'Three Myths about Indian Philosophy'.[23]

Department of Philosophy
University of Lucknow, Lucknow-226007
Email: phkc@rediffmail.com

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Daya Krishna, *Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western,* General Editor, D.P.Chattopadhyaya, Vol. X, Part I, PHISPC; Centre for Studies in Civilisation, New Delhi, 2002, rpt. 2006.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 342.

4. Daya Krishna, *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur and New Delhi, 2001, p. 5.

5. Daya Krishna, *Bharatiya Darshana : Eka Naī Dṛṣṭi*, Rawat Publications, Jaipur and New Delhi, 2000, p. ix.

6. Daya Krishna, *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, and Nyāya*, ICPR, New Delhi, 2004, p. 235.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

8. *Ibid.*, p.226.

9. Arindam Chakraborti, 'Is Nyāya Realist?' in Daya Krishna, *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, and Nyāya*, op.cit., p. 231.

10. J. N. Mohanty, 'Is Nyāya Realism or Idealism' in Daya Krishna, *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, and Nyāya*, op.cit., p. 233.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. N.S. Dravid, 'Nyāya is Realist Par Excellence' in Daya Krishna, *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, and Nyāya*, op. cit., p. 240.

14. Daya Krishna, *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṁsā, and Nyāya*, op.cit., p. 276-77.

15. *Ibid.*, p.283.

16. *Ibid.*, p.293.

17. *Ibid.*, p.294.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

19. *Ibid.*, p.xi.

20. Harsh Narain, 'Daya Krishna on Indian Philosophy', in *The Philosophy of Daya Krishna*, eds. Bhuvan Chandel and K.L.Sharma, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1996, p.81.

21. J. N. Mohanty, 'Some Thoughts on Daya Krishna's 'Three Myths', in *The Philosophy of Daya Krishna*, op.cit., p. 68.

22. Daya Krishna, *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, op.cit., p. 5.

23. Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1991, pp.3-15.

AS ADHERENTS OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS TRADITION OR FAITH, HOW SHOULD WE CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS PERSONS OF OTHER FAITHS?[1]

ĀKE SANDER

Introduction

In today's increasingly globalized, multicultural and multi-religious societies, [2]persons that choose to embrace a particular religious faith, as opposed to atheism or agnosticism, will be increasingly called upon to answer the following question: how should we as religious adherents conduct ourselves towards those of different faiths?

When stated in slightly more concrete and elaborate terms, the question becomes: how should we as Christians or Hindus or Muslims, for example, think about the (theoretical and practical) content of other faiths and conduct ourselves towards those that follow them? What are our options in this regard? And among these, are there any that are preferable and why?

Let me emphasize at the outset that this short paper in no way aims to provide a comprehensive treatment of such a subtle, multilayered and complex question; indeed a project of this sort would require the length of an entire book. Nor does it intend to offer definitive answers to this or any other relevant question. Rather it sets for itself the more modest task of sketching out a way of thinking about the "religious other" that seems at least worth pondering within the framework of a modern multi-religious milieu. In the end, it is the responsibility of each and every individual that adheres to a religious faith to answer this question for her or himself.

Background

A primary characteristic of our post-modern times is the increasingly obvious presence of a diversity of competing belief- and value-systems. The point here being that in our ever-globalizing world, more and more people in more and more places are confronted with individuals from cultural, ethnic and religious traditions that differ from their own, thus forcing them to react tounfamiliar (or even contrary) beliefs, values, customs, rituals and manners. This is occurring not only in our ordinary social life-world due to increased international travel and global migration,[3] but also in the virtual worlds of international television and the Internet, which includes such features as YouTube, blogs, Facebook, tweets, twitters and so forth. All in all, this development has led to an unprecedented increase of interaction between people with different religions, ideologies, lifestyles and the like.

In short, globalization has fundamentally transformed the nature of most communities in the world, which up to about 50 years ago had been fairly homogeneous in terms of their basic thought, norm and value systems—a homogeneity that in many cases had been based on their respective religious traditions. Up to that time, most people unreflectively and unquestioningly accepted as a given the life-world they had been presented with in the course of their primary socialization(Sander 1988 sect. 3.5.3; Schütz 1973: 347f). [4]Over the last several decades, however, more and more aspects of our identity, pattern of interpretation and life-world have become a matter of individual choice (Berger 1980; Carrette & King 2005; Zhie 1989, Giddens 1990; Sander & Andersson 2009). According to thinkers such as Peter Berger, the process leading from "faith to choice" (1980: 28) has now reached a point at which people are not merely *allowed* to choose, but are

more or less *forced* to do so—a circumstance often referred to as the "postmodern condition". In this regard, Berger (1999) has noted that especially for those who value continuity, stability and predictability, the postmodern condition (with its existential angst and crisis of meaning) can be an extremely difficult, almost intolerable, state of affairs, and thus one that enhances the appeal of religious and other movements promising certainty and the continuance of traditional ways of life (cf. Karen and Aldridge 2004; Sander & Andersson 2009; Sander & Cavallin 2012).

What Are Our Options?

Given this situation, how should we, as human beings, conduct ourselves? How should we proceed when it comes to choosing our worldview, pattern of interpretation or however we want to term the largely unconscious conceptual structure through which we select, organize, constitute and perceive our life-world, and make sense of our existence within it?[5]

What options are at our disposal and what consequences do these have for our relationships with other people, our attitudes towards their beliefs and actions and our ways of dealing with them? Put in slightly more elaborate and personal terms: how should I respond upon the discovery that there are large numbers of persons that do not accept my most basic beliefs, values and convictions (e.g., my religious convictions)? And what does it mean to adopt a "rational attitude or standpoint" in such a situation? What is the reasonable and sensible thing to do?

- Totally abandon my "old" system of beliefs and convictions?
- Change my convictions (or the way I hold them[6]),arguing that they are not very important so as to tone down or totally disregard the conflict?

- Convince the others that my convictions and beliefs are better than theirs and thus should be preferred, even by them (i.e., try to change their minds)?

- Strive for harmony or consensus by reinterpreting my own religious beliefs in a way that avoids contradictions and conflicts with the others?

- Are there other alternatives that have yet to be mentioned?

In keeping with the more limited and modest goal mentioned at the beginning of this presentation, my attempt in what follows is not to develop a comprehensive treatment of the questions thus far raised and for which there are no easy answers. Rather my attempt will be to share some thoughts and offer a few suggestions concerning how we might derive a "reasonable, intellectually honest" answer to our primary question, which can be rephrased as follows: what can it mean to take responsibility for one's religious beliefs within the framework of a religiously plural situation?

The first thing to note in this regard is that this question consists of two slightly different components. How should the adherents of a specific religious tradition relate to and/or conduct themselves towards: 1) the specific *beliefs and confessions* of different religious traditions, as well as the rituals and other "practical" consequences that follow more directly from those beliefs; and, 2) the *adherents* themselves.

The first component has an *epistemological* focus in that it concerns the attitude a religious adherent adopts towards the *content* of different religions (i.e., their beliefs about various empirical and trans-empirical entities, their ethical guidelines, their rites, their mythologies and so forth). The second component has an *ethical,* and more practical, focus in that it concerns the attitude and behavior that a religious adherent adopts towards those that

adherer to, believe in and live according to a different religious tradition (regardless of the value he or she places upon that tradition).

In other words, it is important to distinguish between our *epistemological* and *ethical* relation to other religious traditions and their adherents. The primary focus of this paper will be on the first of these relations, while the second will be only briefly addressed.[7]

Are There More and Less "Rational" Attitudes to Choose From?

In addressing the matter of a religious adherent's attitude toward to the "content" of different religious belief systems, the first order of business is to delineate the possible alternatives. Which attitudes are available to choose from? The second order of business is to attempt to discuss which of these alternate attitudes might be "better" to adopt for one who is at least pretending to be interested in making the most "rational and intellectually honest" choice possible.

As I see it, the total number of attitudinal options appears to be quite limited. We can begin by attempting to delineate these and then narrow them down according to my own estimate of their degree of "reasonableness," an approach that at least begins to address the question of which might be "better" than others.

We should note here that the attempt to determine the "reasonableness" of various attitudes toward other religions presupposes that we have already come to terms with the more general and very thorny question of what it means to be a rational, intellectually honest person to begin with. In the context of this paper, the question could be posed as follows: what does it mean to take responsibility for one's religious faith? In this regard, we will briefly present some closing thoughts on the meaning of rationality

and what criteria might be used to measure the reasonableness of a conviction, a belief and so forth. Most of my examples will be drawn from relations between Christianity, Islam and Hinduism since these three traditions have experienced major macro, me so and micro inter-relational tensions and conflicts for long periods of time.[8]

The question of "religious conflict" and "relations between the Christian and the Islamic faiths" has been addressed by numerous academics from a variety of disciplines (e.g., history of religion, sociology, psychology, political science, etc.). The focus of this paper will be on the more philosophical aspects of the question, meaning, among other things, that our focus will be on the individual, existential (i.e., micro) perspective. Thus our point of departure will be the specific situation of individual persons and how we should believe, think about and, by extension, behave towards those that adhere to what we might consider to be foreign, unusual or discomforting religious traditions, worldviews, beliefs, interpretive patterns and so forth.

Possible Attitudes

Of the possible attitudes that can be adopted when the adherents[9] of one religious tradition come into contact with those of another religious tradition, I will here delineate six alternatives. After briefly presenting these alternatives, I will discuss some of the rationality criteria that, in my view, ought to be applied when one is confronted by other worldviews or patterns of interpretation. This will hopefully lead to a better, if highly tentative, understanding of what it might mean for a religious person to take responsibility for his/her own faith and beliefs.

Six basic alternatives

I begin this section by reiterating that there are only a limited number of reasonable alternatives when it comes to deciding how

we should relate to the content and adherents of religious traditions that differ from our own. At least in terms of my own analysis, the following six seem to be the most basic choices:

1. To abandon my own religious tradition/faith (or sub-tradition) in favor of the religious tradition/faith of the other;

2. To completely forsake adherence to any and all religious traditions;

3. To tightly maintain adherence to my original tradition, considering it to be *the only* true, correct and right faith, with all others being utterly false and mistaken;

4. To more loosely maintain adherence to my original tradition, considering it to be only *more* true, correct and right than the others, which are viewed as being *more or less* false and mistaken;

5. To consider all religious traditions (including my own) to be equally true, correct and right, at least on a "deeper level", but to maintain adherence to my original tradition/faith nonetheless;[10] and,

6. To suspend my judgment for the time being and abstain from taking a stand relative to the above five options.

An obvious question in this regard is how one religious tradition can be considered *right* or *true* (or more right and true[11] than any other). What do (can, ought) we mean by "right" or "true" when it comes to the types of statements that are common within religions? This, of course, is a question that can only be pursued in a more lengthy and comprehensive treatment of the subject; my point thus far is merely that I consider the above six alternatives to be the main ones at our disposal when we encounter people of other religious traditions.

At this juncture most readers will likely point out that there is at least one other alternative that I have thus far failed to mention, namely:

> 7. To create a new (hybridized) religious tradition by retaining certain elements of my original tradition and combining these with certain elements of one or several of the other traditions/faiths that I encounter (possibly even including elements of my own invention).

While acknowledging this option, I do not intend to pursue it here as this would lead us into the vast realm of religious change, New Age and New Religious Movements, thus taking us far beyond the scope of this paper. What can be said here is that from both a historical and an empirical perspective, this alternative seems to have been rather common. Religious traditions have encountered and influenced each other throughout history; perhaps even more importantly, rather than being fixed, static and wholly unalterable entities, they have always adapted to changing social, political and economic circumstances, and transformed accordingly. In metaphorical terms, they are more like flowing, meandering rivers than like monuments. Religious traditions, in other words, are not stone carvings passed from hand to hand throughout the ages; they are malleable spheres of faith – ongoing projects of adaptation to the time, place and circumstances in which they operate. Expressed more sociologically: religious traditions are primarily a dependent variable in the flow of historic change (Sander & Andersson 2009; Sander 2012).

Returning to the topic at hand, let us begin by pointing out one obvious but important prerequisite for the whole discussion about encounters between religions : one can identify and confront *another* religious tradition (or sub-tradition) *only if* there are identifiable *differences* between one's own tradition and the one

being encounter. If no such differences exist, how could the encounter be with another faith? Making determinations regarding what is and is not a *different* tradition, however, can be quite problematic since each religious tradition comes in a variety of forms and expressions. How large a difference must there be, and in what dimension of "religion" (belief system, mythology, ritual, etc.[12]), before we can claim that the tradition we are encountering is factually different, and not merely a variation of our own? Many Christians, for example, are inclined to include among their ranks all those who believe that Jesus is their savior, while others are determined to insist that only those who believe in their sometimes very obscure, specific and "fundamentalist" sub-tradition are the "true" Christians, while all other so-called Christians are actually "heretics" headed straight for hell.

It has been argued, on the other hand, that a more appropriate method of distinguishing one way of being religious from another concerns not the "substance" of an adherent's beliefs (i.e., which propositions describing "religious" states of affairs are held to be true), but rather "the manner in which" those beliefs are embraced (i.e., the religious orientation that is preferred (Beatson & al 1993; Whitley& Kite 2010)). In accordance with this approach, for example, one could claim that "orthodox, fundamentalist, literalist" Christians have more in common with their likewise "orthodox, fundamentalist, literalist" Muslim counterparts than they do with Christians who embrace their tradition in a more open-minded, flexible and quest-oriented way.[13]

While this brief discussion touches upon the importance of distinguishing between *intra*-and *inter*-religious differences, the focus of what follows will be exclusively trained upon the latter. However, most of the points that will be made are applicable to *intra-religious differences* as well.[14]

Taking Christians and Muslims as an example, the matter of inter-religious "confrontations" refers specifically to situations in which the involved parties explicitly observe and attempt to relate to perceived differences between the two traditions. Such differences can be either *theoretical* (belief *x* in Christianity and *y* in Islam cannot both be true at the same time) or *practical* (*r* in Christianity and *s* in Islam prescribe different, incompatible and irreconcilable ways of action in the same/similar situations). And the circumstances under which they are observed can be either *concrete* or *intellectual*. *Concrete* circumstances can be considered those in which a Christian and a Muslim factually encounter each other and must relate to what the other believes and/or practices; *intellectual* circumstances, on the other hand, can be considered those in which either a Christian or a Muslim notices inter-religious differences while, for example, reading a literary work in which the beliefs and/or practices of the other are described.

In order to experience another's religious beliefs and practices as being those of a *different* religious tradition, we must have some notion about what are considered to be the *necessary constituting characteristics* or *properties* of our own tradition in our own specific time and place. Put more plainly, we must have some idea about the "things" we must believe and/or do in order to consider ourselves and be recognized by others as members of a given religious tradition/sub-tradition. Regarding those "things" that we can choose to neglect, set aside or alter and still maintain our status, these can be called the *non-necessary constituting characteristics* or *properties* of our tradition.

Within Islam, for example, it is common to differentiate between the *Islamic* and the *Muslim* components of the tradition, where the former refers to those beliefs, practices, etc. that are considered prescribed in the *Shari'a* (the Quran and the *Sunna*) as

obligatory for all Muslims independent of time and space—i.e., those components that one cannot deny or neglect and still be considered a (good) Muslim. Muslim components, on the other hand, are far wider in scope, involving aspects of Muslim beliefs and practices that cannot be derived from the obligations of *shari'a*, but originate instead from various local, regional or national traditions and cultures—i.e., those components that vary over time and space (cf. Ramadan 1999; Larsson & Sander 2007: 169ff). [15]These sorts of components and distinctions exist within Christianity and Hinduism as well.[16]

This is not to say that in most cases of inter- (and, for that matter, intra-) religious conflict there is generally a very clear opinion among the involved parties about such an "essential core" of beliefs and practices that is supposed to constitute the real base of their respective faith (religious tradition).

The important thing in discussing which of the above-mentioned alternatives might be better than others is to begin from the thoughts, feelings and experiences of the religious adherents that are factually in the conflict situation, rather than from the detached, ivory-tower perspective of theologians and philosophers. In other words, the point of view of the believer must be taken seriously even if it is *confessional* and/or *normative*.[17]

The bottom line is that the question of who should be considered a Christian, a Muslim, a Hindu or whatever is unavoidable both for believers and for those within the field of academic studies. In attempting to answer this question, some may prefer to use normative or *confessional* criteria (as most insiders tend to do) while others may prefer descriptive criteria (the choice of most academics) instead. This, however, does not get us away from the fact that both types of criteria are in a sense *normative*. In other words, the question of who should be considered a Christian,

a Muslim, etc. is by definition *normative* in the sense that both academics within the field of religious studies and adherents within the framework of a given tradition must begin by forming a substantive (or normative) opinion about the criteria by which something can be called Christianity, Islam and so forth and someone should be counted as a Christian, a Muslim and so forth. (Even states like India that desire to remain "religiously neutral" must have some substantive criteria regarding what constitutes a religion in general and what constitutes specific religions, for example Hinduism. Freedom of religion legislation, for example, must begin with a preconception about what constitutes "a religion".[18]) For purposes of this discourse, however, we require neither a general definition of "religion" nor a specific definition of Christianity, Islam and so forth. The self-definitions of adherents should suffice.

The "Right" Religion

With this open definition of who can be counted as Christian, etc., it follows that there are different ways in which a religion can be *right.*

One option is that a religion can be right regarding its *content of beliefs,* for example its ideas about who God is, how to best contact God, what is a human being, etc.—i.e., right or correct (in the normal sense of the word) with regard to its ontological, epistemological, anthropological and soteriological assumptions.

Another option is that it can be right or correct regarding its *ethical demands or ideas* (its *norms and values*). By this I mean its conviction that the way of life it prescribes, if followed by a whole community, would lead to healthy, happy and self-realized individuals, to the "best" social relations, to the most happy, productive, affluent society, etc.

A third option is that it is right or correct in terms of its *rites and ritual*, meaning, for example, that the rites and rituals it prescribes are the ones that are most effective in giving human beings a path to liberation/salvation (or self-realization or whatever goal the tradition claims to be able to achieve for its adherents).

All of these things – to varying degrees and in various combinations – can also be what makes a religion the "right" one.

In this connection, the important question we must deal with is: *which differences* between mine and other religious traditions should I focus on in choosing between the six (or possibly seven) alternatives mentioned above?[19]

As I see it, one way of approaching this question is to think about what basic functions a religion and being religious (belonging to a particular religious tradition/organization) might have for human beings: What is "the point" of religions and being religious? What "good" do they do? Why do we have religions at all?[20]

Of all the suggested functions that religion and religiosity have been said to fulfill, I will suggest that the following is one of the most important:[21] all religious traditions (in the sense that I am speaking of here) want to describe the way that we, as human beings, ought to live the best, the right or the true human life. And in a religious tradition, this is always a life in accordance with an absolute and objective (i.e., independent of human discretion) transcendent (personal or impersonal) reality.

This is a life in accordance with the "will of God", "the Supreme Being", "the true structures of the universe", "the ground of Reality"—with *ens realisimum* (*Heaven, Dike, Dharma, Dao, Tien*, etc.). Religions, in other words, purport to be maps or blue prints for what they consider to be the "good, the right and the authentic way of life".

In the course of our lives we must all meet with sorrow, suffering, grief, guilt, death, pointlessness and the like. One of religion's major functions is to help us face and to some extent understand (see the meaning of or in) these things, and to give us practical guidance regarding how to cope with such existential moments.[22] In sum, religious traditions intend to give us answers to our most basic existential questions, to our questions of life (Sander & Andersson 2009).[23]

In short, religions (from the micro perspective) purport to give us answers to questions such as: who we are, where we come from, why we are here (on earth, and in our specific socio-economic circumstances, health circumstances, etc.), how we should relate to suffering, sorrow, distress, death, hate, love and friendship? How we, as human beings, are to live our lives and relate to our fellow human beings as individuals and groups (as well as to other beings and nature at large) if we want to live the right, the good or the authentic human life? The fact that human beings generally need and seek answers to such questions is, I think, the main reason religions exist.[24]

What distinguishes religions from other ideological systems that try to "sell" such "maps" is that they presuppose the existence of a *transcendent Holy* Realm beyond our empirical world and propose that the right answers to our questions of life can be found in that realm.[25] In other words, they have a *dualistic ontology* which claims that "everything in existence" is divided into two ontological spheres, with the *transcendent* realm being considered "Holy" (in the sense of Eliade and Otto), meaning more (or absolutely) real and normatively superior (or absolute).[26] Religious traditions, in other words, are distinguished by having a specific type of ontology.

They also presuppose that either through revelation, meditation, mystic experience or whatnot, we human beings can contact this transcendent reality and learn what it has to teach. Religions, in other word, also have a specific type of epistemology, which recognizes the validity of not only a "natural/rational" type of knowledge, but a "sub-natural/rational" and "supra-natural/rational" type as well.

They also include an idea about how the universe is "developing". Most religious systems propose some version of de-volution rather than e-volution, assuming some sort of original state of high harmony between the "will" of the transcendence and the immanent world, a golden age or paradise or the like that has degenerated over time. And they are variously optimistic about our possibility of being able to return to that ideal state, have various ideas about how (and when) it can be brought about, etc.

They all claim, however, that one of the most (if not *the* most) important tasks for us humans is to try to come in contact with, learn from and live in accordance with this transcendent, absolute realty (either directly through our own experiences or indirectly through the experiences of a religious elite and the codification of their experiences in scriptures like the Bible, the Koran and so forth).

Understood in this way, all religions contain *a definite opinion about our most basic existential problem,* namely that we lack this knowledge and thus do not exist (or live) in the right, correct or authentic relation to God or "the Real" or "the Holy"— i.e., to *ens realisimum.* If we can learn to do that, we are on the way to living a correct, authentic, right or true life. And if all of us are doing that, we are en route to the perfect world.

In sum, a *typical* religious person believes that: 1) there is something wrong with the human condition that needs to be

corrected; 2) there is a way of correcting it; and, 3) there is a true or correct way to live. This can be explicated by saying that apart from containing an ontology, epistemology, and theory of universal development, all religious traditions contain an anthropology.

Such an anthropology contains at least the following elements:

1. An idea about what we humans (whether male, female, Swede, Indian or whatnot) can optimally be if we realize our true potentials—an idea about *the ideal human condition*.

2. A diagnosis about the way we *de facto* are and are living, which, in comparison to [1.] above, is perceived as great *disharmony*.

3. An idea about the *causes* of (or reasons for) this disharmony, as well whether or not it can be overcome; normally, it is believed that the disharmony *can* be overcome, making it what can be called a *positive disharmony*.

4. An idea about the *cure*, an *ordination* of things to do (or follow) in order to overcome this disharmony.

5. An idea about where and when the ideal state can be reached—e.g., either in the here and now or in the afterlife (in some sort of transcendent existence).[27]

All religious traditions, in other words, claim that our lives are in *need of transformation, of salvation*. Different traditions may have different notions about how this can be achieved, but they all have some sort of idea about it.

The above point scan, of course, be variously focused: they can focus on the individual, the group or humanity at large; that is, they can prescribe the same ordination for everyone (be universalistic like Christianity or Islam), prescribe different ordinations for different groups (according to some criteria:

religious, cast, ethnicity, race, nationality, gender, etc.), or even prescribe different ordinations for different individuals (according to some criteria).

In other words, notions regarding transformation or salvation constitute one of the main parameters that different religious tradition can differ about. When talking about salvation, a few distinctions must be made; one can talk about:

1. Salvation *from* something (*avidya*, evil, selfishness, sin, etc.);

2. Salvation *to* something (union with God, absorption in Brahman, *Nirvana,* etc.); or,

3. Salvation *with the help of* something (belief in Christ's death and resurrection, meditation, following the commands of God to the letter, etc.).

The main idea, however, is that we have the possibility of changing or transforming from a defective (or deficient) to an ideal state *if* we follow a particular way or use particular means, and that "salvation" can be used to describe all three steps above.

Here it is most important to distinguish between *salvation as a goal* (in itself) and *salvation as a means* (to a goal)—i.e., the "road to salvation". In short, a road to salvation consists of the various ways or prescriptions by which a given religious tradition claims to be able to actualize its goal. Most of the time, when talking about salvation, we mean [2.] above. It is also important to note that different religious traditions can differ on all these points. They can, for example, propose different "roads to salvation" (*x* and *y*) and propose that they lead to either the same (*M*) or different (*M* and *N*) goals. They can also propose that there is only one road, but that it will lead to different goals for different individuals or groups. The permutations are many.

As I see it, some of the main ways that different religious traditions differ from each other are that they: 1) provide different diagnoses about the human condition; 2) have different ideas about the nature of the "ideal" human life; 3)have different ideas about the caus(es) of our "worldly" state; 4)prescribe different roads to salvation—i.e., different cures or means by which to achieve the ideal state (salvation as a means); and, 5) describe the end state (the goal of salvation) in different terms.

My suggestion is that what primarily distinguishes different religious traditions, thus giving rise to conflicts between them, is their view on salvation, which can be calleda "*soteriological inter-religious difference*". This refers to what they claim to be "wrong" with normal worldly human life as it is and what they prescribe as the cure (what humans must do to transfer themselves from the "bad" to the "good" condition). In many cases this has strong implications regarding the matter of how we should organize ourselves and live together as human collectives, meaning that it has socio-political consequences that can be a source of political conflict.

Now we have come a bit closer to answering the question of what it might mean to say that a given religious tradition is "right". Mainly, it has to do with notions of salvation and the ways of attaining it, meaning with views on salvation *as goal* and *as means*.

As should be rather clear, the "correctness" or "reasonableness" of a religious tradition's views on salvation (as goal and means) *presupposes* that certain ontological, epistemological and anthropological assumptions are correct— assumptions about: what exists, how we can acquire knowledge, what we can acquire knowledge about, what a human being is, etc. A particular road to salvation can only work if the particular truth

claims the tradition is making about the universe, knowledge and the human being are also true, and that certain things it deems to be important, of normatively high (or absolute) status, etc. are true as well. If, for example, God exists but is, in fact, a devil (as was argued by Hume (Hume 1991; cf. Hume 1963)), then Christianity falls apart. Of course, the same would hold true if God turned out to be entirely non-existent, etc. In sum, a particular theory of salvation can work (be said to be right or true)only if a large number of ontological, epistemological and anthropological conditions are also true. Thus for a religious tradition to be comprehensive and rational it must somewhere in its corpus of knowledge specify the *assumptions* that must be true in order for its theory of salvation to be true *and* present solid arguments and justifications in support of such claims. In other words, the claim that a given religious tradition's theory of salvation is "right" cannot be isolated from the fact that its more broad and general *ontological*, *epistemological, anthropological* and *ethical* truth claims must also be "right".

This should serve to clarify my view that when an adherent of one religious tradition is confronted by a different tradition (s) he should *primarily* consider its *soteriological* and, by extension, it s*ontological*, *epistemological* and *anthropological* theories in choosing between our six (or seven) different options. This, of course, does not mean that there are no other important differences that should be weighed (e.g., theoretical differences, differences in rites and rituals, social consequences and so forth). Nonetheless, my answer to the question of "what makes a religion right" (or "what it means to take responsibility for one's religious beliefs") primarily concerns the are as of salvation, knowledge and ethics.

Initially I identified "rationality" as another important criterion when it comes to thinking through the soteriological,

ontological, epistemological and anthropological presuppositions of our own religious tradition and comparing these with the presuppositions of others. In the closing section of this short presentation I will, of course, only be able to touch upon this much-discussed topic.[28]

Rationality and Religion

According to the standard or traditional view, being "rational" means "to exercise the ability of reason," thus placing discussions about rationality in the sphere of epistemology. How this plays out in various cases depends on what sort of "human behavior" we are attempting to assess. Here we can begin by dividing our inquiry into two main questions: What (types of) life-goals are *rational* to choose and pursue (e.g., the goal of religious salvation)? And what strategies are *rational* in attempting to achieve those goals? We must also look at the question of rationality vis-à-vis various areas of human activity (scientific thinking, choosing a life-partner, buying a house, choosing a religion or way of being religious, etc.). Leaving aside the question of rational goals for the time being, let us focus on the strategies for achieving those goals (although much of what is said below can be applied to both).

In most discussions concerning how to act to achieve our goals, "rationality" is roughly equated with "optimality"; we should choose the path that enables us to reach our goal with the minimum amount of cost in time, effort, money, etc. And since deciding what will optimally enable us to achieve our goals in a given situation requires correct beliefs and understandings of the world, ourselves, our capacities, etc., it is clear that before discussing the rationality of our actions we must first discuss the rationality of those beliefs and understandings. Moreover, since our actions are generally driven not only by our beliefs and

understanding, but also by our norms, values, feelings, desires, habits and so forth, we must consider the rationality of these things as well (cf. Kalberg 1980).

Thus one can generally and abstractly say that human beings act rationally to the extent that they hold correct beliefs about those properties of the world that are relevant to their goals and situation as well as about themselves as actors (i.e., their knowledge, limitations, psychological and physical skills, etc.). The more the individual knows about these things, the more rationally (in terms of instrumental rationality) the individual can act to achieve his/her goals. The holding of correct beliefs about the world, other people and oneself is undoubtedly an important element of rational action (cf. Kant's Theoretical rationality).

But what about the choosing of the goals we set for ourselves? Can certain goals be more rational to pursue than others? This obviously brings us back to the problem of correct beliefs about the world: whether some version of a religious worldview or some version of a strictly materialistic-atheistic-scientific worldview provides the more correct understanding of the world will certainly have a bearing on which goals are the more rational to pursue. But since we are unable to deduce an *"ought"* from an *"is"* (as noted by Hume), the problem also includes a normative component. In other words, to rationally consider which goals are the best to pursue, the actor must also have a well- (in) formed and thoroughly thought through *normative system* by which to judge the various options at his/her disposal. That is, the more complete, consistent and coherenta normative system one has, and the more completely, coherently and consistently one can apply it, the more rational one's choice of goals can be said to be. Thus a well thought through normative system is undoubtedly another important element of rational action.

The final factor I would like to highlight in this regard concerns the actor's ability to draw valid, justified and/or good conclusions (make correct inferences) from a limited amount of facts and information. This is an important factor since even the most knowledgeable among us have only a very limited knowledge of the world; we are all finite beings with limited intelligence and limited cognitive resources.[29]

In terms of the first criterion concerning our beliefs or understandings about the world, we have an important decision to make: should we, in a correspondence-theoretical way, tie rationality to so-called *true* beliefs (i.e., those that are normally taken as knowledge in the natural sciences) or to so-called *socially approved* beliefs (i.e., knowledge that is more subjective in nature)? My suggestion is that we tie rationality to the latter. The reason[30] is as follows: most individuals are born into an already well-defined and "mapped out" physical, cultural, social and religious life-world that has been established over a long period of history—a life-world that is then uncritically and unreflectively internalized via their processes of socialization and accepted as "*the Real*" understanding of the world.

> Man is born into a world that existed before his birth, and this world is from the outset not merely a physical but also a socio cultural one... [This] social world into which man is born and within which he has to find his bearings is experienced by him as a tightknit web of social relationships, of systems of signs and symbols with their particular meaning structure, of institutionalized forms of social organization, of systems of status and prestige, etc. The meaning of all these elements of the social world in all its diversity and stratification, as well as the pattern of its texture itself, is by those living within it just taken for granted (Schütz 1976: 229 f.).

Only a fraction of most people's knowledge originates from their own experience, with the major portion coming as their social heritage from parents and teachers; in other words, it is socially

derived. Since most people unquestioningly take for granted most of the knowledge that is passed down to them via their respective cultural, religious and social institutions, it can be described as socially shared and socially approved knowledge (cf. Schütz 1973:347f, 1976:229ff). This is why phenomenologists and constructivists such as Husserl and Schütz can claim that the life-world in which people generally live is not a "real" but rather a socially derived one. And yet, despite the fact that most cultural life-worlds can be perceived "from the outside" as being socially-constructed phenomena, they are reified by "those on the inside" and taken for granted as independent realities; indeed, it is on the basis of these socially derived life-worlds that individuals form (and are *expected* to form) their lives. Schütz puts it as follows:

> It is entirely irrelevant for a description of a world taken for granted by a particular society whether the socially approved and derived knowledge is indeed true knowledge. All elements of such knowledge … if *believed* to be true are real components of the "definition of the situation" by the members of the group (1973:348).

The idea that what is *believed* to be true has a practical impact on the world is not new; perhaps its most pregnant formulation can be found in the so-called Thomas theorem: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas 1928: 571-572).Given this, it appears that the only thing that can be asked of persons that attempting to rationally decide upon life-goals and how to reach them is to take the socially approved knowledge of their time and place (i.e., their subjective beliefs and knowledge) into reflective consideration.

This discussion, of course, has implications relative to our earlier discussion about how to make choices in the area of religion—i.e., about how we should relate to our own and other people's religious beliefs as well as how we should relate to and

behave towards the adherents of different religious traditions. Among other things, it indicates that we should reject the extremely influential Enlightenment theory of justification known as *evidentialism*, which holds that our *"reasons"* for adhering to a belief should be solely based upon hard, objective, scientific evidence (cf. Conee & Feldman 2004), meaning that this is the preferred criterion for the rational holding of a belief.[31] In keeping with William James and others, I will argue instead for what we can call *presumtivism,*[32] the opinion that it is justified (or rational) to hold the beliefs we hold until we are faced with counter-evidence or reasonable reasons for doubting those beliefs. It is, in other words, rational to adhere to any (reasonably coherent and consistent) worldview, religious or otherwise, and to hold and act upon the beliefs that "are included in and follow from" that worldview, so long as we are not faced with specific and reasonable reasons to doubt the truth of those beliefs.

One of the reasons for preferring *presumtivism* over and above *evidentialism* is economic.[33] I have argued that *causes*[34] rather than *reasons*[35] are responsible for most of the "content" of our pattern of interpretation and thus for the way we constitute our life-world; I have also argued that we receive the bulk of this "content" during our primary socialization—i.e., before we are old enough to question and reflect upon it. To the extent that these assumptions are true, it is also true that even if we eventually become aware of this state of affairs, few of us have the time, mental energy and capacity to skeptically view and criticize each and every one of our beliefs about the universe, God, life and so forth. With the possible exception of a few professional philosophers, evidentialism taken seriously would be a recipe for social suicide!

This is not to say that good reasons and evidence are unimportant to presumptivism; it is only to point out that

presumptivism accepts reasons and evidence other than "truth" and "falseness" in a natural-scientific, correspondence-theoretical sense. Presumptivism, in other words, leaves the door open for "practical" or "pragmatic" reasons and evidence of various kinds. It accepts that it can be relevant and rational to include, for example, moral, psychological, religious, social and political considerations and reasons when, for example, deciding how we, in a religiously plural situation, should relate to the beliefs, adherents, etc. of our own as well as other religious traditions.

One reason for this acceptance is my belief, as sketched above, that being religious is less about holding the right (true) cognitive beliefs about the universe than it is about getting practical help in living one's life and dealing with hard existential situations and problems like sorrow, suffering, guilt, death and meaninglessness. According to this, apart from considering the truth, probability or reasonableness of their cognitive beliefs, it is rational for religious persons to consider the ability of their religion/religiosity to guide them through the concrete practical, moral and existential difficulties that they are bound to encounter in their lives. This, I believe, is one reason that religious people often put more trust in religious rituals and leaders (religious elites or virtuosos) than in (epistemic) arguments and truth claims. They seem to be of the opinion that their religion's rationality (or irrationality) is not primarily connected to the correctness of its ideas (the truths of its formal theoretical statements of propositional beliefs and its ability to argue for these truths), but rather to their "practically usefulness" in helping them live their lives, especially in terms of coping with life's difficulties. This is also why important personages in their tradition (e.g., Krishna, Buddha, Jesus, Muhammad, etc.), and the stories of how they lived their lives, play such an important role in terms of why a particular tradition is chosen and how it is constructed.

What relevance does all this have for our ability to answer our initial question about how a religious person ought to relate to the beliefs, confessions and actions of those that adhere to other religious traditions? As already indicated, a model of rationality like the presumtivistic one offers guidance regarding how we ought to think when attempting to choose between the six (or seven) alternatives for what it is to "take responsibility for ones faith" in a religiously plural situation. The model, in other words, does not provide a specific substantive answer, but only guides our thinking when we, in our specific time, place and situation, attempt to arrive at such an answer. That is, I am afraid, as far as it goes.

To end on a more personal note : presumtivism, as presented here, has as its philosophical basis the kind of life-world relativism that Schütz seems to be arguing for.[37] According to this view, all arguments and justifications are made – and *have to* be made – from within the framework of one or another life-world and thus cannot be grounded in any "absolutely objective" position. As human beings, we simply do not have access to any *life-world-independent* position (to Nagel's (1986) *"view from nowhere"*) by which to compare the truth-value of various life-worlds. From this it follows that the best we can do is to try to think as rationally as we can about our problem from within our own life-world while remaining aware of the plurality of life-worlds that exist. By doing so we will likely end up with some version of the fifth of the above presented alternatives.

Department of Literature,
History of ideas and Religion (LIR),
University of Gothenburg,
Sweden.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. This paper was originally prepared and delivered as an oral presentation at the department of Philosophy and Religion, BHU, and has been only tolerably adapted to a written format. This explains its relative lack of references. The bibliography, however, contains those to whom I owe the most.

2. Although this particular discourse does not allow for a detailed discussion and evaluation of these processes, we can at least point out the more important sociological markers (or sub-processes) that are often singled out as being identified with globalization: *a*) individualization; *b*) privatization; *c*) relativization; *d*) de-differentiation; *e*) diversification of lifestyles and identities; *f*) ideological, ethnic, religious, social and geographic mobility (mass migration and diasporization); and, *g*) loss of the power of traditional authorities. Another of globalization's important and regularly mentioned features is: *h*) technological innovations such as the Internet and other forms of electronic communication, socializing and interactivity (Bauman 2000; Berger 1999; Beyer 2006; Karen & Aldridge 2004; Sander 2012; Sander & Andersson 2009; Sander & Cavallin 2012). The effects of globalization and post-modernization that are of particular interest here concern their ability to breed individualism, relativization, doubt and choice (Carrette & King 2005).

3. Today's worldwide total of foreign migrants stands at an estimated 214 million, up from 76 million in 1960 and 150 million in 2000 (cf Pew March -12). See also Sander & Cavallin 2012.

4. This will be discussed in a bit more detail in the last section of this paper.

5. This determinant of our thought and knowledge—the "mental" structures through which we constitute our specific understanding of ourselves, the world and our place and role in it—has many names in the literature, for example: *Weltanschauung*, definition of reality, preconception or *Vorverständnis*, belief/dis-belief system, pattern of interpretation*, habitus* and the like. Bourdieu (1977: 82-

83) describes this as a "system of lasting, transportable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, function at every moment as a *matrix of perceptions, apperceptions, and actions* and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to the analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems". For reasons described in Sander (1988, 2000), I will use the term "pattern of interpretation".

6. Here we are touching upon the important and intricate problem of the different ways that people can hold or be committed to various beliefs and convictions (in Religious Studies, the so-called religious orientation problem), a problem that social and other types of psychologists (for example Adorno 1950; Allport 1960; Rokeach 1960; Batson et al 1993, ch 6) have extensively written about, but that there is no room to discuss here.

7. Another social-psychologically important and interesting question concerns how to understand the relation between one's beliefs and evaluations on the one hand and one's willingness (or ability) to either verbally or physically act upon those beliefs and evaluations on the other. For example, should not acting towards other people in accordance with one's belief and value system be viewed as desirable or undesirable from a religious, psychological or any other point of view? In terms of this paper, the question specifically relates to other peoples' *religious* beliefs and behaviors. Unfortunately, pursuing it further would carry us beyond the limits of the topic at hand.

8. For Christianity and Islam, see: Sander 2010; for Hinduism and Islam, see: Berenschot 2011; Varshney 2002.

9. The matter of what it is to adhere to (belong to, embrace, be a follower of, etc.) a religious tradition – especially in terms of its more general formulation: what it is to be religious – is a much-discussed question that I cannot enter into here. I will only say that when using the phrase "adhere to a tradition" in this paper, I presuppose that it is not only in a purely cultural way, but that the tradition (with its beliefs, rituals, etc.) is of reasonable importance to the person and how (s)he constitutes his/her life-world and actually lives his/her life.

10. A strong proponent of this alternative is John Hick (see for example 1989).

11. The problems connected with the question of whether "truth" is a property that can exist in different degrees or whether it is a so-called "flat concept" cannot be entered into here. Suffice it to say that I believe there are ways in which one can meaningfully speak about beliefs, etc. as being more or less true.

12. Cf. Smart 1977; Sander 1988.

13. The general problem about what constitutes differences and resemblances within the world of religion/religiosity is a thorny and much discussed one that cannot be entered into here. I will only say that I belong to the "anti-essentialists" in this matter, and am therefore very skeptical of the usefulness of broad terms like Christianity, Hinduism, etc. as well as the resulting tendency to describe the religious map of the world in terms of "World Religions" and the like (Asad 1993; Fitzgerald 1990; King 1999, 2005). Unfortunately, in many contexts (such as this one) it is almost impossible to avoid this type of categorization.

14. Both can give, and have given, rise to serious problems. In the Muslim world, for example, it is likely that more blood has been spilled over *intra*-religious conflicts than over *inter*-religious ones.

15. More exactly (and not surprisingly), a hotly debated topic among the ʿ*ulama* and others within the Muslim world concerns the matter of which of the components of various traditions are to be considered Islamic.

16. From the point of view of Religious Studies there is no essence (or definitive meaning) to the term "religion". As such, all attempts to find and define the "essence" of a specific religious tradition are doomed from the start. All searches for an essence (or definitive, overarching definition) of "religion" (or "Christianity", "Islam" or "Hinduism") only end up missing the specific historical location of each terminological usage. There is no "view from nowhere" (Nagel 1986) – no Archimedean point outside of history – from which to determine a fixed and universal meaning for terms like "religion", "Islam", etc.

17. Cf. Below about the Thomas theorem.

18. This, of course, opens up a can of worms that I can peep into but not sort out here; in (Sander 2012) the matter is discussed in a bit more detail.

19. A complication, of course, is that different religious traditions consider different "dimensions" of a tradition to be of different importance for living a correct life according to the tradition. Christians, for example, generally place more emphasis on the cognitive (belief/faith) aspects, than do Muslims and Hindus, for whom the behavioral aspects (rites and rituals, regulations regarding food, dress, the sexes, etc.) are more important. It is observations of this sort that have inclined many to talk about Christianity as a primarily *orthodox* tradition and Islam and Hinduism as primarily *ortopraxic* traditions.

20. The intended as well as unintended functions of religion on the individual (micro), group (meso) and societal (macro) level, and the evaluation of these functions, is another of those issues that has been discussed in numerous books and articles by sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, political scientists, theologians, etc., and that I, therefore, can only touch upon here.

21. This, of course, does not mean that a religious tradition/religiosity cannot also fulfill a large number of other (positive as well as negative) functions for individuals, groups and societies.

22. As I said, I am aware that religions have many other functions on the macro (sociological) meso (social-psychological) and micro (psychological) levels. Psychologists and sociologists of various sorts have made the list of such functions very long. In this paper, however, I will only deal with the above-mentioned function, which is fulfilled not only by religions but by other "ideological systems" as well—something that is important to note.

23. From this, of course, it follows that I see religions in primarily practical terms. Their primary function is not to answer questions such as "what should I believe", but rather to answer questions such as "how should I live my life", and for many also "how shall we organize our human society".

24. This, I believe, is one of the things behind Voltaire's famous statement: "If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent

him". This is also in line with my own and many others' belief that *religiosity* is a fundamental aspect of human nature—or the human condition. Thus while *religiousexpression* may vary according to time, place and circumstance, to be human is to be *homo religious*: "however much the context has changed, the basic functions religion plays in human life are essentially the same" (Greeley 1973:16). In keeping with this understanding, Berger (1999) has noted that "the religious impulse has been a perennial feature of humanity… It would require something close to a mutation of the species to extinguish this impulse for good". Protagonists of rational choice theory as well as thinkers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, William James, Mircea Eliade, Paul Tillich, Eduard Spranger, James B. Pratt, Rudolf Otto, Erich Fromm, Rollo May and Viktor E. Frankl also hold Berger's opinion that human beings are "incurably religious".Most adherents of so-called *attribution theory* also hold this view.

25. For a slightly more detailed discussion with regard to the following (i.e., the structure of a worldview or pattern of interpretation), see Sander 2000.

26. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss how this might fit with what at first sight appears to be, for example, an idealistic monistic tradition such as Advaita Vedanta.

27. A fairly clear example of this structurecan be found in the *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta,* Buddha's first (deer park) sermon at Sarnath. Aristotle is on the same track in his *Nicomachean Ethics.*For similar ideas, also see: Stevenson and Haberman 2004: 1f; Byrne 1995: 75; Yandell 1999: 17.

28. The difficulty of any general discussion of rationality is aggravated by the fact that the term "rationality" tends to be used differently in different disciplines, including specialized discussions within philosophy, theology, economics, sociology, psychology, political science, etc.

29. As has been noted even by Stephen Hawking (1992), our collective sciences know only a very small fraction of all there is to be known about the world and the universe, and there are likely things that science can never know. And in principle, this holds true for

scientifically knowable knowledge as well as for possible properties of the universe that are beyond the reach of scientific methods—i.e., that scientific methods can neither prove (make probable) nor disprove (make improbable). This, of course, would include many of the claims made by religious traditions. According to Eck (2012: 304), a similar view is held in the Vedas, according to which "'three-quarters' of the divine reality is beyond human comprehension, and our grasp is limited to the fraction available to us here below, in this dimension of vision" (Purusha Sūkta (*Rig Veda* 10.90)).

30.   This is more elaborately discussed in Sander 1988, sect. 3.5.3.

31.   As should be clear from other parts of this paper, the fact that I here focus on *belief* (the conative or cognitive aspect of religion) should not be interpreted as a claim that this is *the only* or even *the most* important aspect of religion. It is, however, an important component since religion/religiosity, like all other forms of human behavior, presupposes implicitly or explicitly held beliefs about the universe (which should also be clear from other parts of this paper).

32.   This is a version of "presumed innocent until proven guilty".

33.   Other and more philosophical reasons are given in Sander 1988, esp. sect. 3.6.

34.   Above all, that we happen to have been born at a particular time and place and socialized into the worldview and life-world of that specific time and place. John Hick confirms, in this connection, "that in some ninety-nine per cent of cases, the religion which an individual professes and to which he or she adheres depends upon the accident of birth" (1989: p. 2).

35.   Meaning that we have arrived at our beliefs via *our own* experiences and by some rational, scientific method.

36.   A similar opinion is expressed by MacIntyre & Smith (1977: 462): "To say to oneself or to someone else 'Doubt all your beliefs here and now'... is an invitation not to philosophy but to mental breakdown, or rather to philosophy as a means of mental breakdown".

37.   Which is an *epistemological*, not an *ontological*, kind of relativism

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adorno, T.W. (Ed.) (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. New York: Harper.

Allport, G.W. (1960). *The individual and his religion: a psychological interpretation*. New York: Macmillan.

Amir, Y. (1976). The role of intergroup contact in change of prejudice and ethnic relations. In P. A. Katz (Ed.). *Towards the elimination of racism* (pp. 73-123). New York: Pergamon.

Asad, T. (1993).*Genealogies of Religion. Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press

Basinger, D. (2002). *Religious diversity: a philosophical assessment*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Batson, C.D., Schoenrade, P. & Ventis, W.L. (1993). *Religion and the individual: a social-psychological perspective*. (Rev. ed.) New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Bauman, Z. 1993 *Globalization. The Human Consequences*. New York: Colombia University Press.

Bauman, Z.(2000). *Liquid Modernity,* Cambridge, Polity.

Beck, U.(1992). *Risk Society : Towards a New Modernity,* London, Sage.

Beck, U. (2006) *Cosmopolitan vision*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Berger, P.(1980). *The Heretical Imperative. Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation,* Garden City, N.Y, Anchor Books.

Berger, P. (1969). *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion,* Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday.

Berger, P. (1999). "The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview". In: P. Berger (Ed.) *The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Washington, D.C.: Eerdmans.

Beyer, P. & Beaman, L.G. (Ed.) (2007). *Religion, globalization, and culture*. Leiden: Brill.

Berger, P., & Huntington, S. (Eds.) (2002). *Many globalizations: Cultural diversity in the contemporary world*. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (1967)*The Social Construction of Reality*. London: Penguin Books.

Boudon, R. (1980) "Subjective Rationality and the Explanation of Social Behavior". *Rationality and Society*, October 1989 1: 173-196.

Beyer, P. (1994)*Religion and Globalization*. London: Sage.

Beyer, P. (2006). *Religions in global society*. London: Routledge.

Berenschot, W. (2011). *Riot politics: Hindu-Muslim violence and the Indian state*. London: Hurst.

Byrne, P. (1995). *Prolegomena to religious pluralism: reference and realism in religion*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Carrette, J.R. & King, R. (2005). *Selling spirituality: the silent takeover of religion*. London: Routledge.

Clarke, P.B. & Beyer, P. (Eda.) (2009). *The world's religions: continuities and transformations*. London: Routledge.

Clifford, W.K., James, W. & Burger, A.J. (Eds.) (2008). *The ethics of belief: essays by William Kingdon Clifford, William James, A. J. Burger*. (Rev. ed.) [Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace].

Conee, E. & Feldman, R. (2004). *Evidentialism: essays in epitestemology*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Conze, E. (1969)*Buddhist Meditation,* New York

Cousineau, M. (1998) (Ed.) *Religion in a Changing World. Comparative Studies in Sociology*. Westport: Praeger.

Eck, D.L. (2012). *India: a sacred geography*. New York: Harmony Books.

Eisenstadt, S. (2000). "Multiple Modernities". *Daedalus*, 129/1: 1–30

Eisenstadt, S.N. (Ed.) (2002). *Multiple modernities*. New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers.

Eisenstadt, S.N. (2003). *Comparative civilizations and multiple modernities. Part 1*. Boston: Brill.

Fitzgerald, T. (1990). 'Hinduism and the "World Religion" Fallacy'.*Religion*, 20:

101–18.

Giddens, A.(1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity : Self and Society in the Late Modern Age,* Cambridge, Polity press.

Giddens, A.(2003). *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives,* New York, Routeledge.

Greeley, A. (1973). *The Persistence of Religion*. London: SCM Press.

Hawking, S.W. & Hawking, S.W. (Eds.) (1992). *Stephen Hawking's A brief history of time: a reader's companion*. New York: Bantam Books.

Hick, J. (1989). *An interpretation of religion: human responses to the transcendent*. New Haven: Yale.

Hume, D. (1991). *Dialogues concerning natural religion: in focus*. (New ed.) London: Routledge.

Hume, D. (1963). *Hume on religion*. Collins.

Kalberg, S. (1980). "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the analysis of rationalization processes in history". *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 85, No. 5, pp. 1145-1179

King, R. (1999).*Orientalism and Religion. Post-colonial Theory, India and 'the Mystic East'*, London and New York: Routledge.

King, R. (2005) "Orientalism and the study of religion". In: Hinnells, J.R. (Ed.) (2005). *The Routledge companion to the study of religion*. London: Routledge, pp. 275-290.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press

Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: the human development sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jaspars, J. & Hewstone, M. (1982). "Cross-cultural interaction, social attribution and inter-group relations". In S. Bochner (Ed.), *Cultures in contact. Studies in cross-cultural interaction* (pp. 127-156).Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Karner, C. & Aldridge, A. (2004). "Theorizing Religion in a Global World". *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 18, Nos. 1/2, Fall/Winter 2004, ss. 5 – 32.

Lambert, Y. (1999) "Religion in Modernity as a New Axial Age: Secularization of New Religious Forms?" Sociology of Religion, 60: 3, 303-333.

Larsson, G. & Sander, Å. (2008)*Islam and Muslims in Sweden. A contextual study.* Berlin & Geneva: Lit–Verlag.

Lifton, R. (1993).*The Protean Self – Human Resilience in an Age of Fragmentation.* New York: Basic Books.

Luckmann, T.(1967). *The Invisible Religion : The Problem of Religion in Modern Society,* New York, Macmillan.

Lyotard, J-F. (1984).*The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

MacIntyre, R. & Smith, D.W. (1977) "Epistemological crises, dramatic narrative, and the philosophy of science". *The Monist*, 60, 453-472.

McLennan, G. (1995).*Pluralism.* London: Open University Press.

Mau, S., Mewes, J. & Zimmerman, A. (2008). "Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational social practices". *Global Networks 8*:1–24

Nagel, T. (1986). *The view from nowhere.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Parekh, B. (2000).*Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Peterson, M. (Ed.) (1998). *Reason & religious belief: an introduction to the philosophy of religion.* (2. ed.) New York: Oxford University Press.

Pollack, D. & Olson, V. (Eds.) 2008 *The Role of Religion in Modern Societies.* New York, London: Routledge.

Ramadan, T. (1999). *To be a European Muslim: a study of Islamic sources in the European context.* Leicester: Islamic Foundation.

Rokeach, M. (1960). *The open and closed mind: investigations into the nature of belief systems and personality systems.* New York: Basic Books

Sander, Å. (2012). "What Can a Liberal State Reasonably Expect of Its Citizens? Some reflections on the relations between the state and religion (and between religions themselves) in a liberal democracy." (in press, Jadavpur University, Kolkata)

Sander Å.(2010). "Islam and the West: their view of each other and the possibilities for dialogue", *Avrasya Diyalog*, Istambul

Sander, Å.(2009). "Sociology of Religion: Main Topics and Socio-Political Relevancy." In: Sardella, F. & Sain, R. (Eds.) (2012)

Sociology of religion in India. Past, present and future. (in press, Jadavpur University, Kolkata,

Sander, Å. (2000). "Religion som förståelse i mötet mellan invandrare och olika typer av vårdpersonal". In C. M. Allwood & E. Franzen (Eds.) *Interkulturell psykologi – migration och kulturmöten i Sverige.* Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 282-319.

Sander, Å. (1988)*En Tro – En Livsvärld. En fenomenologisk undersökning av religiös erfarenhet, religiöst medvetande och deras roller i livsvärldskonstitutionen, vol. I och II.* Filosofiska Meddelanden, Röda Serien Nr. 27, Institutionen för filosofi, Göteborgs universitet.

Sander, Å. (1997).*Some Reflections on the Integration of Ethnic Minoriteis in a Modern Welfare State.* Kim-rapport Nr. 22, Centrum KIM, Göteborgs universitet

Sander, Å. & Cavallin, C. (2012). "Hinduism Meets the Global World: the "Easternization" of the West?". In: Brunn, S. 2012 *The Changing World Religion Map.* Springer: Munich (in press).

Santos S. (Ed.) (2003a).*Religious Fundamentalism in the Contemporary World: Critical Social and Political Issues.* Lanham: Lexington Books.

Santos S. (Ed.) (2003b).*Islamic, Hindu, and Christian Fundamentalism Compared: Public Policy in Global Perspective.* Lewiston: Lampeter

Schütz, A. (1973)*Collected Papers I. The Problem of Social Reality.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Schütz, A. (1976).*Collected Papers II. Studies in Social Theory.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Sessions, W.L. (1994). *The concept of faith: a philosophical investigation.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Smart, N. (1977). *The religious experience of mankind.* Glasgow: Collins.

Smart, N. (1995)*Choosing a Faith.* London: Boyars.

Stark, R & Finke, R. (2000).*Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stenmark, M. (1995). *Rationality in science, religion, and everyday life: a critical evaluation of four models of rationality.* Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press.

Stevenson, L.F. & Haberman, D.L. (2004). *Ten theories of human nature: [Confucianism, Hinduism, the Bible, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Marx, Freud, Sartre, Darwinian theories].* (4. uppl.) New York: Oxford University Press.

Swidler, A. (2001).*Talk of Love: How Culture Matters.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Swidler, L. & Mojzes, P. (2000).*The Study of Religion in an Age of Global Dialogue.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Thomas, D. I. (1928).*The Cildren in America: Behavioral Problems and Programs.* New York.

Varshney, A. (2002). *Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Whitley, B.E. & Kite, M.E. (2010). *The psychology of prejudice and discrimination.* Belmont, CA. Wadsworth.

Wiggins, J. (1996). *In Praise of Religious Diversity.* New York: Routledge.

Woodhead, L., Fletcher, P., Kawaniami, H. & Smith, D. (Eds.) (2002). *Religions in the Modern World. Traditions and Transformations.* London: Routledge.

Woodhead, L. & Heelas, P.(2000). *Religion in Modern Times : An Interpretive Anthology,* Malden, Mass., Blackwell.

Yandell, K.E. (1999). *Philosophy of religion: a contemporary introduction.* London: Routledge.

Zebiri, K. (1997). *Muslims and Christians face to face.* Oxford: Oneworld.

Ziehe, T.(1989). *Kulturanalyser : Ungdom, Utbildning, Modernitet : Essäer,* Stockholm, Symposion.

CULTURE AND LANGUAGE

JAI SINGH

Language is woven into the very fabric of all human cultures to such an extent that it is impossible to imagine culture without it. All myths about the origin of humanity suggest that human subjects were preloaded with language from the very beginning. The culture of a particular society and their life world are reflected in their language. In other words, they show how the languages in which we speak, sing, pray and otherwise conduct our daily lives carry information about our individual and collective identities, ideologies and histories. Language and culture are thus mutually influential.

Grammatical, pragmatic and meta-pragmatic categories project themselves into the world, and our understanding of the world projects itself into what we deem significant in our discourse. Language and ideology overlap, defining not only how we understand the way we speak, but the way we understand the significance of what we speak about. Language is learned and transmitted culturally and not genetically. It is taught, when parents deliberately encourage their children to talk and to respond to talk, correct their mistakes, and enlarge their vocabulary. Language is transmitted as part of culture and the culture is transmitted very largely through language itself. It is interesting to note that the greatest part of learned behavior or culture is transmitted by vocal instruction and not by imitation.

LANGUAGE has a setting. The people that speak it belong to a race (or a number of races), that is, to a group which is set off by physical characteristics from other groups. Again, language does not exist apart from culture, that is, from the socially inherited assemblage of practices and beliefs that determines the texture of

our lives… Culture may be defined as what a society does and thinks. Language is a particular how of thought.[1] Language is interwoven with culture; it affects how we think and behave, and is affected by how we think and behave. Actually languages grow up in the correlation with culture, they are part of culture. They are learnt and not transmitted genetically. Language is not merely one of the several aspects of culture. It is prima inter pares as it makes possible the development, the elaboration, the transmission of the culture.

Speech and a well ordered language are characteristic of every known community of human beings. No society has ever been found which is without language. Language is an essentially perfect means of expression and communication among people. "Of all aspects of culture it is fair guess that language was the first to receive a highly developed form and that its essential perfection is a prerequisite to the development of culture as a whole."[2] The symbolic element of language, especially speech, has vast qualitative expansion over animal communication systems. Speech is infinitely more productive and allows people to communicate about things that are remote in time and space. Speech is one achievement of this process that uniquely identifies the human subject as humans. This ability of man's speech to transcend and transform his self sets man off fundamentally from the other animals. It suggests that "by means of speech the human self articulates a highly differentiated consciousness. Man does not merely respond globally to a total situation. Rather, by speech he refers to distinct aspect of his situation and unifies different objects by naming under different concepts…Thus he speaks his world and speaking in this sense is a creative process, for, he transforms his self from the speakables to the unspeakable where he lives in a world created and re-created continually by his own lived experiences in speech. Thus through (the power of) speech, man

can create and multiply the possible spaces and temporal orders that make up his self to the world of a non-temporal and non-spatial sphere."[3] Even for that matter, artistic expressions are sign practices, which are dependent on and probably generative of the achievement of symbolic representations and reveal human subject as a living, communicative symbol. In the case of a symbolic sign, the process of interpretation comes to the foreground from cultural perspectives; that is to say that to be human is to be an interpreter whose achievement of symbolic significance stems from the vast capacities of man as man. Language is more than just a means of communication. It influences our culture and even our thought processes. Language and culture always have an interactive influence on each other; the two cannot exist without each other. Language is a great force of socialization, probably the greatest that exists. Significant social intercourse is not possible without language and the common language is a potent source of social solidarity among its speakers. Thus Edward Sapir emphasized greatly the unique culture-language relationship as is evident from the following quotations from his works:

1) "In the first place, language is felt to be a perfect symbolic system, in a perfectly homogeneous medium, for the handling of all references and meanings that a given culture is capable of, whether these be in the form of actual communications or in that of such ideal substitutes of communication as thinking. The content of every culture is expressible in its language and there are no linguistic materials whether as to content or form which are not felt to symbolize actual meanings, whatever may be the attitude of those who belong to other cultures. New cultural experiences frequently make it necessary to enlarge the resources of language, but such enlargement is never an arbitrary addition to the materials and forms already present; it is merely a further application of principles already in use…."[4]

2) "The use of language in cultural accumulation and historical transmission is obvious and important. This applies not only to sophisticated levels but to primitive ones as well. A great deal of cultural stock in trade of a primitive society is presented in a more or less well developed linguistic form. Proverbs, medicine formulae, standardized prayers, folk tales, standardized speeches, song texts, genealogies, are some of the more overt forms which language takes as a culture preserving instrument."[5]

3) "Of the linguistic changes due to the more obvious types of contact the one which seems to have played the most important part in the history of language is the 'borrowing of words across linguistic frontiers. This borrowing naturally goes hand in hand with cultural diffusion. An analysis of the provenience of the words of a given language is frequently an important index of the direction of cultural influence. Our English vocabulary, for instance, is very richly stratified in a cultural sense. The various layers of early Latin, medieval French, humanistic Latin and Greek and modern French borrowings constitute a fairly accurate gauge of the time, extent and nature of the various foreign cultural influences which have helped to mold English civilization. The notable lack of German loan words in English until a recent period, as contrasted with a large number of Italian words which were adopted at the time of Renaissance and later, is again a historical significant fact. By the diffusion of culturally important words, such as those referring to art, literature, the church, military affairs, sport and business, there have grown up important transnational vocabularies which do something to combat the isolating effect of the large number of languages which are still spoken in the modern world."[6]

4) "The importance of language as a whole for the definition, expression and transmission of culture is undoubted. The relevance of linguistic details, in both content and form, for the profounder understanding of culture is also clear. This does not follow, however, that there is a simple correspondence between the form of a language and the form of the culture of those who speak it…. It is only very rarely, as a matter of fact, that it can be pointed out how a cultural trait has had some influence on the fundamental structure of a language. To a certain extent this lack of correspondence may be due to the fact that linguistic changes do not proceed at the same rate as most cultural changes, which are on the whole far more rapid."[7]

5) "Language is a guide to 'social reality.' Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about the social problems and processes. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an accidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered to be representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.

The understanding of a simple poem, for instance, involves not merely an understanding of a single word in their average significance, but a full comprehension of the whole life of the community as it is mirrored in the words, or as it is suggested by the overtones. Even comparatively simple acts of perception are very much more at the mercy of the social patterns called words than we might suppose. If one draws some dozen lines, for instance, of different shapes, one perceives them a s divisible into such categories as 'straight', 'crooked', 'curved', 'zigzag', because of the classificatory suggestiveness of the linguistic terms themselves. We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation."[8]

Language is mostly used in a social setting. It is probably the most important instrument of socialization that exists in all human societies and cultures. It is largely by means of language that one generation passes on to the next its myths, laws, customs, beliefs and thoughts. It is largely by means of language that the child comes to apprehend the structure of the society into which he is born and its culture. As a social force language serves both to strengthen the links that bind the members of the same group and to differentiate the members of one group from those of another. We use it to communicate with others. We depend on others when learning language, and we constantly borrow one another's uses of expression. Language helps us perform various social functions, and many of its uses have become institutionalized. Hence Edward Sapir comments: "The 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group." It is a kind of symbolism which makes you aware of the presence of the divine. Whatever makes you aware of the presence of the divine becomes sign for this. Signs are scientific and symbols are religious. Symbolism is already involved in language; and

language is a set of symbols governed by set of rules. No natural language can be separated from cultural backdrop. Every culture has its own language. Even if it is not a complete language there is a dialect. Both language and culture cannot be separated; actually they are very intimately related. When we talk of a natural language then it is very deeply rooted with the culture. The artificial or technical or formal languages are not related with the culture but with some practical purpose or function only. Usually any language develops only in relation to a culture.

There are two elements always present in culture: moral and aesthetic, these are constitutive elements. Origin of culture is not natural but manmade. When one deviates from nature the result may be either of the two, deformity (non- natural to un-natural tendency) or refinement (refinement is culture). But what is refinement or deformity! can be decided only after the origin of culture, since the criteria of taste – moral or aesthetic standard will develop only with the development of culture. This is a post-hoc question.

Every culture is a linguistic community. Every culture has its linguistic community. The development of language, in the history of a particular cultural community, evolves the culture and it itself is guided by the culture. Language is the historical development of the community, it evolves the culture and the culture thus developed evolves the language too. Every community of a culture has its own language; and that language is so deeply related to its culture that both cannot be separated from each other. Thus both are growing by supporting each other. For example in European culture or Anglo-Saxon race we see the growth of science. Their language is quite enriched with terminology from technology. It is said about German language that there is deep level of thinking in it but superficial level of analysis. Similarly in English language there is great analysis but superficial thinking. In Indian languages

whether it is Sanskrit or Hindi, there is very deep spiritual or internal thinking due to which language has developed in a particular manner. Language and culture of a community are so interlinked with each other that they cannot be separated. Hence, more often than not, we face extreme difficulty when we translate certain passages from one language to other language, since in it lacks development of similar thought culturally. It is not that it is impossible, it is difficult. As for example, the Sanskrit word dharma cannot be translated exhaustively in English and similar is the case of Jewish word, Mitzwah.

Europe has a common culture and on the basis of its development grew a family of languages called by Whorf SAE (Standard Average European), which has its own thought pattern. Thought is the part of culture; communication and articulation is possible due to language. Language develops peculiarly due to a particular type of thought pattern. In different cultures there has been different pattern of thought hence different kind of language. Say in India there was a greater emphasis on Self, God, deeper problems of life but scientific, in western sense of the term, language could not develop. When we take vocabulary or something to other culture where it is not present originally then clearly it is very difficult. This shows that there is a concomitant relation between language and culture. This relation is on two levels. First level is that one has to contemplate on language. There are two factors in language, langue and parole. Langue is the mark or evocable or the sound of the language; and parole is the meaning related to it. This parole is very culture specific. Language and culture grow on each other and with each other. At one time one influences the other and at other time the other influences the first; this is applicable to all times. Second level of relation is that thought gives expansion to language, gives growth to it. Language will grow according to the thought pattern. As is the thought so

will be the language, and if the kind of thought is absent in a culture such vocabulary will also be absent in the language. Evidently, influence of language on culture is immense and so is the vice-versa. This leads to a kind of cultural relativism, meaning thereby that if you don't belong to a culture hence don't possess its values then you cannot understand it. You cannot understand some things completely because you are not born in that culture. This does not mean that man cannot understand it and it is something else. Actually it is a part of human experience. This is a human culture and that also is a human culture. Neither it is that one will totally understand that culture nor one will totally misunderstand it. There are elements of a culture which cannot be understood completely by persons from other culture. Function of language is actually cultural only. From eating- drinking to customs & rituals, from moral to scientific thoughts, all kinds of thoughts are heritage of culture. All thought processes take place in a language; in the common language of its culture. Therefore there is a very intimate relation between language and its culture. To understand a language is to understand a culture, language can be understood through understanding the culture. Hence we cannot separate literature, language and culture.

The view that 'language functions not simply as a device for reporting experience, but also more significantly as a way of defining experience for its speakers' came to be known as 'the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis'. The *pūrva pakṣa* or backdrop of Sapir/Whorf hypothesis is the common conception that "language reflects a pre-existing reality of which men are pre-linguistically aware. Languages are then devised to describe that reality. Since this reality is pretty much the same for all peoples, since environment is fairly similar, one expects that all languages will be basically similar in their modes of describing that reality. Equally it is commonly assumed that while, no doubt, what we say often

affects how we behave, the position is usually that what we say is determined by how we behave. Men first behave, and then describe how they behave."[9]

Some people like Donald believe in a "culture-first" theory, which poses the prior emergence of a mimetic leading to subsequent evolution of language. They feel that cognitive skills evolved in early hominids allowing rudimental knowledge sharing across individuals in a nonverbal manner. The needs for improved communication lead to the emergence of language as an efficient system for sharing knowledge. Language came to exist only because humans could learn, produce, and process it. It has been shaped by cultural transmission over many generations. Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Whorf said that language predetermines what we see in the world around us. In other words, language acts like a polarizing lens on a camera in filtering reality--we see the real world only in the categories of our language. Kant would say it is like the two forms of sensibility of time and space, which is pre given and through which we know the phenomena.

Sapir and Whorf strongly oppose this common conception. "For them, language is not mere passive recording instrument, which reflects a pre-existing reality of which we are aware. Rather it is the essential factor in forging what our conception of reality is, and how we perceive it. Not only our conceptions and perceptions, but also our attitude towards our fellow men, and so our behavior towards them, are largely dictated to us by the language we happen to posses. Nor is it the case that languages share any grate similarities; they differ radically, and as a result, the ways in which men conceive, perceive, evaluate, and behave will differ radically. Put in an extreme form, the hypothesis is that it makes no sense to speak of reality. What reality is for a person will be a function of the language he employs, and there will be as many 'realities' as there are radically distinct languages. Since there is no super-

language, from the stand point of which it is possible to choose between differing conceptions of reality, different forms of evaluation, and different ways of perceiving. We are committed to complete relativity, with no prospect of making objective tests of divergent systems of thought."[10]

Leonard Bloomfield,[11] a prominent linguist said that thinking was 'talking to oneself.' This means that thinking is an internal communication that takes place in the same language in which external communication takes place. Hence the denotative properties of the external language influences the internal thought pattern. Meaning there by 'if you can't say something you can't think about it.' Edward Sapir took a stronger position that if you cannot say something you cannot perceive it. His student Benjamin Lee Whorf took a lenient position that language exerts a controlling influence on thought. This is nearer to Bloomfield's position that thinking is an external communication/ conversation. Benjamin Lee Whorf notes that where a culture and a language have developed together. And there is significant relationship between the general aspects of the grammar and the characteristic of the culture taken as a whole. He notices that Eskimo language have a variety of words for different kinds of snow where we use only one; Aztec are even poorer for they use the same word stem for cold, ice and snow.[12] Sapir claims that the vocabulary of a language clearly reflects the physico-social environment of a people; and the entire vocabulary of a language would be "a complex inventory of all ideas, interests, and occupations that take up the attention of the community…."[13] According to Sapir "Language is not merely a more or less systematic inventory of the various items of experience which seem relevant to the individual, as is so often naively assumed, but is also a self-contained, creative symbolic organization, which not only refers to experience largely acquired without its help but actually defines experience for us by

reason of its formal completeness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectations into the field of experience. In this respect language is very much like a mathematical system which, also, records experience in the truest sense of the word, only in its crudest beginnings, but, as time goes on, becomes elaborated into self-contained conceptual system which previsages all possible experience in accordance with certain accepted formal limitations….. [Meanings are] not so much discovered in experience as imposed upon it, because of the tyrannical hold that linguistic form has upon our orientation in the world."[14] Whorf develops the same thesis when he says "….that the linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individuals' mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade. Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to greatly, between different grammars. We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds – and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds."[15] According to Whorf, language shapes our ideas rather than merely expressing them. These conceptualizations are derived primarily from analyses of certain exotic linguistic systems, notably those of the Hopi, Shawnee, and Nootka Indian Cultures, which are compared with the family of languages called by Whorf SAE (Standard Average European). Franklin Fearing[16] summarizes Whorf's analysis into four headings:

I. The linguistic relativity principle.

No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality, but is "constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free… . We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated."[17] The linguistic relativity principle means "that users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars towards different types of observations and different evaluations of external similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world."[18] Franklin Fearing comments "Cultural-relativistic thinking emphasizes culture as a determiner of the individual's values, motives, needs, and in general, his world view. Such theory stresses the diversity and role of cultures and minimizes the biological universals controlling factors in human behavior."[19]

II. Background and obligatory character of linguistic systems.

The complex systems of linguistic patterns which are assumed to determine thinking are conceived to be outside the critical consciousness and control the individual. The notion that when we talk we are completely free to express any idea we wish to express is an illusion. "This illusory appearance results from the fact that the obligatory phenomena within the apparently free flow of talk are so completely autocratic that speaker and listener are bound unconsciously as though in a grip of a law of nature. The phenomena of language are background phenomena, of which the talkers are unaware, or at most very dimly aware…"[20]

The phenomena of language are to its own speakers largely of a background character and so are outside the critical consciousness and control of the speaker who is expounding

natural logic. Hence, when anyone, as a natural logician, is talking about reason, logic, and the laws of correct thinking, he is apt to be simply marching in step with purely grammatical facts that have somewhat background character in his own language or family of language but are by no means universal in all languages and in no sense common substratum of reason.[21]

III. Processes which are prior to linguistic patterning.

Whorf recognizes a form of experience which occurs irrespective of language. This primordial experience may be common to all men: "The tremendous importance of language cannot, in my opinion, be taken to mean necessarily that nothing is back of it, of the nature of what has traditionally been called "mind." My own studies suggest to me that language, for all its kingly role, is in some sense a superficial embroidery upon deeper processes of consciousness which are necessary before any communication, signaling, or symbolism whatsoever can occur and which also can at a pinch effect communication (though not true agreement) without language's and without symbolism's aid. I mean "superficial" in the sense that all processes of chemistry, for example, can be said to be superficial upon the deeper layer of physical existence, which we can know variously as intra-atomic, electronic, or subelectronic.[22]

IV. Historical relations between linguistic patterns and culture.

Whorf assumes an interaction between cultural norms and linguistic patterns. There are "connections but not correlations or diagnostic correspondence between and linguistic patterns."[23]

Tackling the hen-egg query about which was first! Whorf says, "Which was first the language patterns or cultural norms? In the main they have grown up together, constantly influencing each other. But in this partnership the nature of language is the factor that limits plasticity and rigidifies channels of development in the more autocratic way."[24] Language "represents the mass mind,"

and while it is affected by innovations it is affected "little and slowly." When Sapir and Whorf talk of the connection between language and thought, they are interested not in the connection of a particular sentence with a particular thought, but in connection between whole areas of language, and whole areas of human intellectual phenomena. For example, the connection between how men think about the nature of time, and the grammar of the language they use to talk about time. So it is being claimed that people in different societies perceive, behave in, conceive of, and take attitude towards the world in radically different ways- and these differences are largely to be explained in terms of their possessing radically different languages. David Cooper comments, "They are saying that not only do different people classify what they perceive differently, but that they actually perceive differently as a result of having different languages. They sat that not only do some people lack very sophisticated concepts, like that of electron, but that some people lack such basic concepts as those of time, space, matter, and cause. They are saying that not only do certain attitudes vary with language, but that whole systems of norms and morals differ as a result of linguistic differences."[25] Spengler holds the view that numbers (mathematics), morals and language are culture relative phenomena. He says 'there are several number worlds as there are several Cultures. We find an Indian, an Arabian, a Classical, a Western type of mathematical thought and, corresponding with each, a type of number-each type fundamentally peculiar and unique, an expression of a specific world feeling, a symbol having a specific validity which is even capable of scientific definition, a principle of ordering the Becomes which reflects the central essence of one and only one soul, viz., the soul of that particular Culture. Consequently there are more mathematics than one…. . The style of any mathematics which comes into being depends wholly on the culture in which it

is rooted."[26] For morals he says "there are as many morals as there are cultures, no more and no fewer.… . Each culture possesses its own standards, the validity of which begins and ends with it. There being no general morale of (entire) humanity."[27] Similarly he says "One condition of… . Higher world-consciousness is the possession of language, meaning thereby not mere human utterance but a cultural – language, and such is non-existent for primitive man and existent but not accessible in the case of the child. They have an inkling but no real knowledge of history and nature, being too intimately incorporated with the ensemble of these. They have no culture."[28] And "Culture-languages are languages of historical men… . Culture languages are historical languages, which means primarily, that there is no historical event and no political institution that will not have been determined in part by the spirit of the language employed in it, and conversely, that will not have its influence upon the spiritual form of that language."[29] The notion of language as a "guide to social reality" is not entirely original with Sapir. The seed of this doctrine are to be found in his teacher Boas as is evident from the passage from his 'introduction to the Handbook of American Indian Languages': "It seems, however, that a theoretical study of Indian languages is not less important than a practical knowledge of them; that the purely linguistic inquiry is part and parcel of a thorough investigation of the psychology of the people of the world"[30] and "…language seems to be one of the most instructive fields of inquiry in an investigation of the formation of the fundamental ethnic ideas. The great advantage that linguistics offer in this respect is the fact that, on the whole the categories which are formed always remain unconscious, and that for this reason the processes which lead to their formation can be followed without the misleading and disturbing factors of secondary explanation, which are so common in ethnology, so much so that

they generally obscure the real history of the development of ideas entirely."[31]

Wittgenstein also shares this belief about the language-culture relation. In Philosophical Investigations he writes, "To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life." It is noteworthy that in Blue and Brown Books (134) also imagining a language is equated with imagining a culture. Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language emphasizes that language is a living activity which consists of language games. To know a language game means to know a certain kind of language use. Therefore, language games are not only devices for describing language, but also exist in the actual practices of language. In this sense, language games cannot be fixed; they always change. Accordingly, language games are embedded in the totality of communal activities. A form of life is a given unjustified and unjustifiable pattern of human activity in other words, part of human natural history.[32] It consists of shared natural and linguistic responses. Speaking certain language or speaking and understanding a language is engaging in certain modes of behavior that exhibit a variety of abilities or skills. It is to engage in what Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life.'[33] "If a Lion could talk, we could not understand him,"[34] reason being that he does not share the relevant form of life with us. Wittgenstein opines that "sharing a language is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."[35] He holds that human beings agree in the language they use, and this is not the agreement in opinions, but in the form of life. It is the characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consists in the steady forms of life, regular activity. Its function is determined, above all by the action which it accompanies. He takes the common behavior of mankind as the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language. Hence he says that even if a lion could talk, we won't

understand him; since he does not share the relevant form of life with us. Thus speaking is engaging in what Wittgenstein calls 'forms of life'. He declares boldly that "The limits of my language are the limits of my world."[36] This establishes the Sapir-Whorfian contention that language predetermines what we see in the world around us; and language and culture are very intimately related to each other.

Department of Philosophy
MMV, Banaras Hindu University
Varanasi-221005

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Harcoyrt & Brace:"Language", 1921, p.233
2. Sapir Edward, "Language" in 'Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences', Ed. Shils, Routledge, London, p.155, hereafter Sapir
3. Sebastian Velassery, Concept of Speech in the Upanishads, Panjab University Research Bulletin, (arts) Vol. XXIV, No.1, April 1993
4. Sapir op cit., P.156
5. Ibid., P.160
6. Ibid., P.164
7. Ibid., P.165
8. Sapir Edward: "Selected writings in Language, Culture and Personality", Ed. by David G. Mandelbaum, Berkely, University of California Press, 1949, p.162, hereafter Mandelbaum.
9. David Cooper: "Philosophy and the Nature of Language", Longman, London, 1973, p. 100, hereafter Cooper.
10. Ibid., p.100-101
11. Leonard Bloomfield: "Language", University of Chicago Press, 4th Edition,1992

12. Whorf, B.L: "Science and Linguistics", in 'Technical Review', 42 (1939-40):6. Carroll, p.216

13. Sapir, Edward: "Language and Environment", 'American Anthropologist', n.s., 14 (1912):228. Reprinted in "Selected Writings of Edward Sapir", ed. by David G. Mandelbaum, Berkely, University of California Press, 1949, pp.90-91.

14. Sapir Edward : "Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages," Science 74, 1931, p.578

15. Whorf, B.L: "Language, Thought and Reality", Ed. by John B. Carroll, Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T., 1956, pp. 212-213, hereafter Whorf.

16. Franklin Fearing: "An Examination of the Conceptions Of Benjamin Whorf in the Light of Perception and Cognition" in 'Language in Culture', pp.47, hereafter Franklin

17. Op. Cit., Whorf, p.214

18. Ibid., p.220

19. Op.cit., Franklin, p.49

20. Whorf, B.L.: "Collected Papers on Metalinguistics", Washington, D.C., Department of State, Foreign Services, 1952, p.11

21. Ibid., p.4

22. Ibid., p.21

23. Ibid., p. 45

24. Op. Cit., Whorf, p. 156

25. Op. Cit., Cooper, p. 102

26. Spengler, O.: "Decline of the West", p.59

27. Ibid., p. 345

28. Ibid., p.55

29. Ibid., p. 152.

30. Boas: "Introduction to the Handbook of American Indian Languages", p.63

31. Ibid., p. 70-71

32. Wittgenstein: "Philosophical Investigations", I §25.

33.   Ibid., I §19

34.   Ibid., II, p.223

35.   Ibid., I § 241

36.   Wittgenstein: "Tractatus", 5-6.

CONTRIBUTORS

D.B. Chaube,
Professor, Department of Philosophy & Religion,
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi- 221005.

Sachchidanad Mishra,
Professor, Department of Philosophy & Religion,
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005.
Email: sachchitmishra@gmail.com

Shriprakash Pandey,
Professor & Head, Department of Philosophy & Religion,
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005.
Email: sppandey_1760@rediffmail.com

R.C. Pradhan,
Professor of Philosophy, University of Hydrabad, Hydrabad (A.P.),
Email: pradhanrameshchandra@yahoo.com

Pradeep Gokhale,
Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Research Professor,
Central University of Tibetan Studies Sarnath, Varanasi-221 007 (UP).
Email: pradeepgokhale53@gmail.com

Mukul Raj Mehta,
Research Scientist "C",
Department of Philosophy & Religion, Banaras Hindu University,
Varanasi-221 005
Email: mukul_maha@rediffmail.com

Baleshwar Prasad Yadav,
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy,
Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidyapith, Varanasi (U.P.), India
E-mail: bprasad.mgkvu@gmail.com

Kali Charan Pandey,
Associate Professor,
Department of Philosophy, University of Lucknow, Lucknow-226007
Email: phkc@rediffmail.com

Āke Sander,
Professor, Department of Literature, History of ideas and Religion
(LIR), University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
Email: aake.sander@religion.gu.se

Jai Singh,
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, MMV, Banaras Hindu
University, Varanasi, UP.
Email: jaiphilosophy@ gmail.com

NOTE TO AUTHORS

The Editor and Editorial Board of *Ānvīkṣikī* welcome specialized papers/articles in Indian philosophy and articles that exhibit the relevance and importance of philosophy in general and Indian Philosophy in particular in the present scientific era and global world. The article may exhibit the distinctive characteristics of the various Indian philosophical traditions. They especially welcome those original contributions that expose the puzzling issues of the classical and contemporary Indian philosophy. They welcome also those articles which illuminate in a comparative manner the importance of Indian Philosophical concepts, epistemological issues, roots of religious ideas and as well as socio-economic philosophical problems.

The papers/articles submitted will be sent/mailed to the referees for their comment and the author will be communicated the decision only after the referees' report.

The journal is a bi-lingual one. All articles and papers either in English or in Hindi are printed. The authors are requested to use diacritical marks in a consistent way wherever they find a necessity. The system of transliteration of Sanskrit/Pali/Prakrit terms and names should be consistent within each article and should conform to generally accepted practice. Manuscripts should be prepared for electronic copyediting and typesetting. Authors are responsible for the accuracy of all quotations and for supplying complete references, including block quotations, endnotes, and reference lists.

Authors are requested to use the following formatting techniques: the title using 14 pt type;
double-space using 12 pt type;
use double quotes to mark concepts, terms, titles of articles, and direct quotations;
use single quotes to mark quotations within quotations and scare quotes; direct quotation of more than 40 words should be set off in separate, indented paragraphs;
italicize book and journal titles and foreign words;
align left: avoid the use of justification commands. Prepare the article in Unicode font while submitting an article in Hindi.

Two non-returnable copies of all contributions should be sent to the Editor, *Ānvīkṣikī,* Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005, UP, INDIA.

Book reviews and books for review should also be sent to the Editor, Ānvīkṣikī, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005, UP, INDIA

Alternatively, the articles/book reviews should be mailed to aanveekshikee@ gmail.com as an email attachment in PDF format as well as in the Microsoft Document format. While sending an article as an email attachment the author is required to attach the fonts too.

The authors are requested to submit a declaration in this format while submitting an article.

The Declaration of the author for publication of articles in the Ānvīkṣikī journal—

1. I, the author of the research paper entitled " …" declare that it:
    a) does not contain any libelous or unlawful statements;
    b) does not infringe on any copyright, privacy rights or any other proprietary rights;
    c) has not been previously published elsewhere in its entirety. In the event, the Work contains material that has been previously published, such excerpted material has been attributed to the proper author(s) and identifies where it has been previously published; and
    d) is my sole, original work, or in the case the Work is prepared jointly by more than one author, I warrant that I have been authorized by all co-authors to submit the work on their behalf.
2. I agree to hold harmless, indemnify and defend the journal publishers, its employees, contractors and agents from any and all losses, damages, expenses, claims, suits and demands of whatever nature (including legal fees and expenses on a solicitor client basis) resulting from any breach of the above warranties.
3. I authorize the Editors of the journals to edit and modify the manuscript. I also give my consent to the Editor of "Ānvīkṣikī" to own the copyright of my research paper.

Author's Name and signature—

Date and Place—